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Abstract 
The nature of values has been an ongoing topic of discussion in philosophy, particularly in ethics. 
However, as the issue of how values should play a role in science has become more prominent, the 
discussion has not always paid due emphasis on clarifying the nature of values as perhaps it should 
have been. With the rise of arguments against the value-free ideal there has been an emergence of 
multiple accounts which aim to explain how values can be used in science while maintaining scientific 
integrity. I term these complex of approaches “value management.” Value management as a normative 
idea stems from the notion that somehow values represent some kind of threat to the integrity of 
science, even if how exactly they present a threat is not clear. What values are, and how they are 
problematic isn’t always explicit and there is no obvious definition of the term that is shared by 
philosophers of science. Competing visions of what values should play a role in science, and how they 
should play a role, may lack justification or be talking past one another if they do not share the same 
concept of value.  
To address this, I argue that there needs to be a more precise articulation of what values are, 
and that once we develop a nuanced account of value, many of the concerns that value management 
accounts respond to change or disappear. Looking to some historical and modern discussions of 
values and valuation, I show that there are accounts of value that are compatible with scientific 
thinking as judgments of practice which emphasize problem-solving and the relationship between 
events rather than reducing to mere desire. I argue that once we focus on values as verifiable judgments 
of practice, they are actually a source of scientific integrity and that our attention should focus on how 
values are experimentally formed through the process of inquiry. My analysis reveals that science is a 
complex and highly developed form of value judgment and that consideration of what makes value 
judgments successful is the key to ensuring that science can maintain integrity despite the use of 
various scientific, ethical, and social factors playing a role in the outcome of a scientific judgment.  
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Chapter 1: Conceptions of Value and Normative Approaches to Values in Science 
 
The problem of the place that values should play in science has been a contentious one for some 
time. Throughout much of the 20th century, the standard view in philosophy of science was the 
value-free ideal: the view that social and political values should have no influence over the 
reasoning of scientists, and that scientists should not concern themselves with such values 
(Douglas 2009, 1). In the last few decades, there has been an emergence of philosophical works 
that argue against this ideal. If we accept that values need to or should play a role in the process of 
scientific inquiry, then what role should they play? It is this normative epistemic concern that has 
encouraged various accounts of ways in which values should play a role in scientific inquiry and 
how to choose what values should play a role, all the while maintaining some claim towards 
scientific objectivity. My focus will not be on those arguments against the value-free ideal 
specifically, but what is suggested as a replacement ideal regarding how values should play a role 
in scientific reasoning. There are now numerous accounts that detail normative criteria regarding 
the place for values in science, but what concerns me is how each account conceives of what a 
value is. There is historical precedent in the debates of philosophy of science that suggests that 
concerns about the use of values in science has as much to do with what a value is taken to be as 
it does about the importance of maintaining scientific objectivity. In fact, what objectivity is taken 
to consist of may involve implicit assumptions about what it means to value.  
In addressing the matter of what role values should play in science, I will argue that more 
precision in discussion of value and valuation is necessary in the science and values literature. It 
is necessary because there are competing visions of how values should play a role in science. To 
see why, consider a situation described by Helen Longino whereby competing theories can share 
common experiences and common meanings, and common modes of measurement, but a subject 
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can be multiply characterized and measured owing to differing background beliefs which can lead 
to incompatible and yet empirically incomparable findings (Longino: 2013, 2014). Now, imagine 
two competing normative accounts of values in science. The proponent of the first account argues 
that values should be limited in some form (however you may wish to imagine this) in conducting 
scientific inquiry, while the proponent of the second account argues that values should not be as 
limited in their use.  
Proponents of each account may observe and agree on certain phenomena recorded within 
a given scientific inquiry: the scientist(s) had certain motivations, made certain judgments, 
expressed certain desires, feelings, or interests, and so on. The proponent of the first account notes 
the mere invocation of a feeling and concludes that a certain value was used and thus determines 
that the inquiry, by using such values, was poorly conducted. The proponent of the second account 
observes that certain interactions took place among the feelings, interests, and desires resulting in 
a value being formed and concludes that the inquiry was conducted properly.  
Why would one side conclude that the inquiry was done properly while the other concludes 
that it wasn’t? After all, both sides observed and recorded the same phenomena. The difference 
arises because despite each agreeing on their observations, both attended to different aspects of the 
inquiry. The proponent of the first account examines the mere invocation of a feeling and 
concludes that a value is being used. The proponent of the second account focusses on the 
interactions of feelings, interests, reasons, and desires and concludes that a value is being used; 
however, the mere invocation of a feeling would be insufficient to be considered a value according 
to them. While arguing about the roles that values do, can, and should play in inquiry, neither 
seems to understand that they don’t agree on what a value is. The proponent of the first account 
doesn’t believe that reason plays any role in valuing, it only provides the means of attaining what 
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is valued; for them the value just is the feeling. The proponent of the second account believes that 
value is a product of the way feelings, interests, desires, and reasons interact. The two may not 
even agree what the value being used is, or how it is being used. They are talking past one another 
until they adopt the other’s conception of value.1 For example, in Chapter 4 (4.6) I discuss a 
disagreement between Heather Douglas and Janet Kourany regarding how values should be used 
where each presumes something different by the concept of value and this presumption affects 
whether they consider value usage in certain cases to be problematic.  
In the following pages, I will argue that a more precise conception of value will help clarify 
discussions of the roles for values in science. Proper evaluation of any normative account of 
managing values in science requires a clear conception of what a value is. It is possible to articulate 
such a conception of value that will clarify the discussion by presenting a nuanced understanding 
of how values come about and remains consistent with scientific thinking such that they are in 
principle verifiable. With such a model of valuation in place, we can evaluate existing normative 
accounts to demonstrate why it is important to be precise about what account of value is being 
made and how doing so can clarify discussion of normative accounts of values in science. Finally, 
using this conception of valuation I will suggest new methods for generating and testing normative 
proposals for resolving problematic issues involving scientific objectivity and values. 
1.1. Background: Value Management 
In recent decades, philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the role that 
values play in science. In addition to feminist critics of science and sociologists of science who 
argue that scientists employ many kinds of values in their research, philosophers have begun 
reconsidering the largely standard view in the field: the value-free ideal. Heather Douglas (2009), 
                                                          
1 I am not suggesting that actual philosophers subscribe to the position just discussed. 
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Helen Longino (1990; 2002), Philip Kitcher (2001; 2011), and Janet Kourany (2010) have 
challenged the ideal of value free science, arguing that values do play a role in science, and offered 
elaborations of how they should play a role.  
In abandoning the value free ideal, philosophers have shifted towards articulating their own 
normative accounts of science to describe what good science looks like when values are being 
used by scientists in conducting their inquiries. While the word “ideal” has sometimes been 
attached to such accounts, I prefer to avoid the term due to its ambiguity. It can connote an end-
in-itself, or an idea of perfection which may not be attainable. In the literature, it can sometimes 
also merely mean a heuristic that specifies certain minimal criteria. Thus, I will use the term 
normative account where possible, unless an account is specifically identified with the word. 
In presenting such normative accounts, each philosopher tends to gravitate towards 
questions of, and prescriptions for, how to “deal” with values that may play a role in science. This 
complex of approaches is what I will call “value management.”2 Value management is a response 
to two basic questions: the first asks, given that values play a role in science, what kinds of values 
should we adopt? The second question asks, given that values need to play a role, how can we 
maintain some sense of scientific objectivity or integrity?  
It is important to note that questions about value management arise because, even amongst 
those who argue that values are not only necessary but desired in scientific practice, the issue of 
values and valuation nonetheless seems to present problems for science. These problems can be 
formulated in the two questions mentioned. Furthermore, they are ongoing problems for scientific 
                                                          
2 Kourany has called Longino’s work the “social value management ideal” (Kourany 2010, 58; Longino 2002, 50), 
but my use of value management is slightly different. The concept of value management aims to capture what the 
project of all value ideals or normative accounts attempt to do, and so isn’t specifically about Longino’s approach 
to dealing with values. It more broadly captures an issue that Kourany focusses on, that is epistemic and social 
success concerns with reference to the role, use, and selection of values in the process of scientific inquiry. 
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practice. Science and its relationship to society and what it values is dynamic and changes over 
time, preventing any kind of once-and-for-all-time solution. The value-free ideal avoids the 
problem by arguing against the inclusion of values, at least in the justification of scientific claims, 
in the first place,3 but since this option is not available to those who believe values need to be 
included, and since the problem is ongoing, the problems cannot be cured but can be mitigated by 
appropriately managing it; the same way one may manage chronic medical symptoms. The result 
is that value management accounts create rules or norms that direct us to resolve the problematic 
aspect of using values in science: they aim to determine what values to adopt and how they should 
be used.   
In the remainder of this section, I survey four influential approaches to value management.   
1.1.2 Helen Longino 
 Helen Longino’s approach to value management focusses on intersubjective criticism 
(Longino 1990, 71). She argues that there is a gap between a given state of affairs (such as the 
level of mercury in a glass tube) and the hypothesis for which it is taken as evidence of. This gap 
is filled by background assumptions which allow us to take a given state of affairs as evidence for 
a hypothesis since they stipulate some regularity or relation. For example, red spots may be taken 
as evidence that I have the measles because of my belief that red spots are a symptom of the 
measles (1990, 41). Different background assumptions allow us to attend to different aspects of 
the same state of affairs to use as evidence for conflicting hypotheses (1990, 43). Because of this, 
where we have choices between background assumptions, and where there is no independent 
justification for the adoption of one over another, any decision is a product of a value, and there is 
a risk that theory choice will be driven by subjective preferences (1990, 61).   
                                                          
3 This is a simplistic understanding of the value-free ideal in that it suggests that there are no values employed at 
all. Values may be used in deciding what research projects to engage in, and epistemic values can be used as well. 
For my purposes here, the simplification will suffice.  
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Longino argues that values can be managed to the degree to which they are subject to, and 
survive from, a process of transformative criticism from an epistemic community. In other words, 
values are acceptable to the degree that they are capable of surviving the critical processes she 
prescribes. In terms of value choice, Longino prefers certain kinds of values that are compatible 
with feminist science (1990, 1996) but she does not specify particular kinds of values a priori that 
we could rule out as unacceptable unless they are incapable of surviving criticism. It is only 
through the process of surviving such criticism that a value can be transformed from subjective 
into objective (Longino 2002, 129).  
Longino’s emphasis on criticism implies a community of inquirers to do the criticizing. 
She prescribes certain norms to govern such processes of transformative criticism including: open 
and recognized venues, uptake of criticism, public standards for discussion and criticism, and 
tempered equality (Longino 1990, 2002). While such standards would be those adopted by an ideal 
scientific community, we can still recognize that objectivity is a matter of degree and that science 
can remain objective to the degree that the community satisfies such norms (Longino 2002, 134).  
Her recommended process aims to reduce arbitrariness and individual preferences and 
idiosyncrasies. Objectivity in science is thus maintained to the degree to which any background 
assumptions adopted based on a value is subject to control (Longino 1990, 74). Thus, the process 
of transformative criticism not only preserves the integrity of science, but determines which values 
to employ, thus answering the two questions that approaches to value management attempt to 
answer.  
1.1.3 Heather Douglas 
Heather Douglas presents a normative account for science that aims to accept a role for social and 
ethical values while protecting the integrity of science (Douglas 2009, 1). Focussing on the 
question of general moral responsibility and the authority of science, Douglas argues that science 
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(and scientists) should be concerned about and adopt values that ensure that they consider the 
consequences of potential error in their work and the risks to the public; that they should adopt 
values that allow for ethical research; and, more generally when it comes to issues of science and 
society (on matters like influence over public policy, public funding, etc.), that they should adopt 
values that allow for democratic accountability. On Douglas’s account this need for values is not 
merely an unfortunate affair for in many cases we want scientists to be responsible in providing 
advice and engaging in ethically sound research. Thus, not only is the value free-ideal untenable, 
it is not desirable (2009, 85).   
 In rejecting the value-free ideal, Douglas pivots to the concern about what role values 
should play in science. She notes that, “the inclusion of social and ethical values in scientific 
reasoning seems to threaten scientific objectivity” (2009, 115). Thus, she recognizes the 
problematic nature of values that value management accounts aim to address. In response to 
concerns about the integrity of science given the influence of values, Douglas articulates a new 
normative account concerning values in science that focusses on the roles that values can play at 
different stages of inquiry (2009, 87). Values can play a direct role where they provide reasons 
that motivate our choices, and they can play an indirect role by determining the benchmark for 
how much evidence is sufficient to accept a hypothesis. Scientific integrity can be preserved so 
long as values only play a direct role at certain stages of inquiry, while values can play an indirect 
role at any stage (2009, 88).  
Douglas supplements her account with a list of seven different forms of objectivity, 
occurring across the contexts of world interactions in inquiry, individual thought processes, and 
social processes. She argues that these forms of objectivity are conceptually distinct and not 
reducible to each other (2009, 132). By drawing attention to the different ways that objectivity can 
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be manifested, Douglas demonstrates that different forms of objectivity have their strengths and 
weaknesses, determining objectivity in specific contexts requires that we pay close attention to 
whether particular claims have certain desired forms of objectivity, and that objectivity has 
different functions within a given inquiry. Objectivity is thus possible even without the value-free 
ideal. Thus, Douglas emphasizes the need for objectivity in science, while her concern about the 
consequences of error draw attention to how we should determine what values to adopt.  
1.1.4 Janet Kourany 
Janet Kourany argues for an approach to value management which she refers to as the ideal of 
socially responsible science, arguing that given science’s influence in, and dependence on, society, 
science should be an ally for equality and should include egalitarian values (Kourany 2010, 13-4). 
Historically, in exposing prejudices, science has served as an ally in the struggle for equality for 
women. However, it has also done much to perpetuate the problems of women such as attempting 
to prove their intellectual, social, and moral inferiority (2010, 4-12). Similarly, science can aid in 
the well-being of those of different races, ethnicities, sexual orientations, abilities, and other social 
justice matters, but it has also done harm to those groups. Thus, she argues that science should be 
an ally for equality since society is deeply affected by science and since society pays for science 
through taxes and consumer spending. 
In contrast to traditional philosophy of science which primarily concerns itself with 
epistemic issues, she argues that a socially responsible science should raise questions that make 
the egalitarian ideals of human flourishing central. This affects not only evaluation of scientific 
programs in terms of what questions to pursue and how should scientific communities be 
organized, but also evaluations of research itself (2010, 15). Because of the kinds of questions that 
socially responsible science asks – like “should research of interest and benefit to women be 
prioritized?” or “Should ways of evaluating scientific research be adopted that favor egalitarian 
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views?” – it is obviously concerned about whether social values belong in science and whether 
science should be value free. The need for values in science is owing to the untenability of the 
value-free ideal. While she notes that the ideal has been considered promising for its potential to 
root out sexist and androcentric values, there is concern that it is not a viable idea for actual science 
(2010, 55). Also, feminist science seems more adequate and objective, yet was also shaped directly 
by feminist values. The idea that the value-free ideal would hold that such science is subjective is 
problematic, and thus, Kourany urges for a more adequate account of understanding scientific 
objectivity that is better equipped than the value-free ideal to deal with problems of sexism and 
androcentrism in science. Thus, an alternative conception of objectivity must account for how to 
achieve objective science while also providing a way to achieve social reform (2010, 57).  
Socially responsible science requires rooting out sexist and androcentric values and 
replacing them with egalitarian ones that respond to the justice-related needs of society; scientific 
success must be defined in terms of social success that emphasizes human flourishing (2010, 68). 
Using the example of Carolyn West’s research as a program controlled by sound social values but 
“equally controlled through and through by sound epistemic values” (2010, 70), she argues that 
this ideal can maintain objectivity. Kourany suggests that a scientist can maintain objectivity (an 
epistemic goal) by ensuring that social objectives are prioritized “as far as empirically possible,” 
or in other words, the explanations, hypotheses, and methods used should be those that promote 
(or at least do not inhibit) egalitarianism unless and until they can be demonstrated to be false or 
unworkable for the research project as the empirical findings no longer make entertaining them 
reasonable. Egalitarian aims are not guaranteed to be successful (2010, 72). Research is to be 
judged by both social and epistemic standards, and importantly, a scientist cannot fulfil their social 
objectives if they do not fulfil their epistemic objectives (2010, 71). 
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1.1.5 Philip Kitcher 
Philip Kitcher has argued for the inclusion of values within science, believing that there is need 
for value judgments within scientific practice. Even if science doesn’t aim at being immediately 
applicable in terms of our well-being, certain projects may be chosen for their ability to play a role 
in future investigations or because it aids in the development of tools for further experimentation. 
All these assessments require judgments of value (Kitcher 2011, 31). While this is relevant to 
choosing projects, value judgments are part of the practice of inquiry itself because scientists need 
to make decisions about proceeding from one step of inquiry to another (2011, 34). 
Kitcher also focusses on the relationship between science and society. Science does not 
aim to discover any kind of truth, but rather significant truths (Kitcher 2001, 65). Kitcher argues 
against the idea that science can always be thought of as being pursued for its own sake. We don’t 
investigate all phenomena, only certain phenomena that is epistemically significant (Kitcher 2001, 
66; Kitcher 2011, 31). What we find significant determines not only what projects to investigate, 
but also how we categorize the phenomena that is studied which thus provides us with different 
representations of reality (Kitcher 2001, 47). If what is epistemically significant is context-
independent, then science could be isolated from social and moral values. However, Kitcher rejects 
that such a conception of epistemic significance can be found, thus he takes, “moral and social 
values to be intrinsic to the practices of the sciences” (2001, 65).  
Science is affected by and affects society around it, meaning that science must address 
matters of the collective good. Kitcher uses the notion of a well-ordered science to consider the 
kinds of values that science should adopt. Since science studies what is significant, and since 
science affects society, society should have some input into what counts as significant. The ideal 
of a well-ordered science is supposed to capture public input to determine what are the aims of 
society (2010, 122-5). In recent years, however, Kitcher has amended his views by including an 
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account of valuation and “the ethical project” (Kitcher 2011b). In Science in a Democratic Society, 
he provides an account of valuation as a process of mutual engagement requiring ideal deliberation 
when it comes to value disagreements (Kitcher 2011, 50). The values that scientists should adopt 
are those that would be agreed upon by deliberators under such circumstances. Additionally, he 
sees the potential for value verification and ethical progress to protect the integrity of science. He 
explains, “Broad schemes of values can play a legitimate role in scientific practice, but they are 
required to be sustainable in an ideal situation” (2011, 59). 
1.1.6 Summary 
To summarize, four separate accounts of value management have just been examined 
regarding how they try to answer two questions: How do we determine what values to use? And, 
how do we ensure objectivity is maintained? For Longino, the answer to both questions is reflected 
in the idea of transformative social criticism and the limitation of idiosyncratic value use. For 
Douglas, the values to be adopted are the ones that permit ethical research and democratic 
accountability, and to maintain objectivity values should only play an indirect role in determining 
theory choice at certain stages of inquiry. For Kourany, the values that ought to be adopted are 
those that would be part of a socially responsible science. Objectivity is to be ensured by requiring 
both social and epistemic success in theory choice. For Kitcher, the values to be adopted are those 
that would address the public good, and objectivity would be ensured to the degree that values are 
formed by what would take place under ideal conditions of moral deliberation. 
1.2. Conceptions of Values and Value Management  
The accounts just provided are broad overviews. Eventually each will be addressed in greater 
detail, but for now these overviews provide examples of what I mean by value management. These 
four different accounts of value management have all yielded different answers in terms of what 
values to adopt and how to maintain objectivity or integrity in science once values are included. 
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Each is concerned about what to do or not to do about values, and each has slightly different 
emphases and goals: for example, Longino wants diversity in epistemic communities to keep 
idiosyncrasies in check, Douglas wants to avoid having values override evidence as a reason to 
accept a conclusion, Kourany wants to not only ensure that certain preferred values are included 
but also that specific values be excluded, while Kitcher wants to promote human flourishing and 
maintain altruistic tendencies in keeping with the ethical project.  
Each account emphasizes different approaches and different aims. However, I believe that 
the account that each provides, and its relative emphases are in part informed by how each 
conceives of what a value is. Examining what each takes a value to be when it recommends how 
to manage values can not only provide insight into whatever problem their account seeks to redress, 
but it also suggests the importance of determining how we ought to think about values if any 
account of value management in science is to be justified.   
In other words, how one conceives of a value may motivate the kinds of concerns that one 
may have as they discuss the role values ought to play in science. Some philosophers have noted 
this issue. Kitcher has taken note of the concern that “value judgments are subject to no standards 
at all, that valuing is a matter of taste” and this can affect answers to how we think about their 
place in science (Kitcher 2011, 39). Matthew J. Brown has criticized the position of the lexical 
priority of evidence over values, arguing that it “reduces the idea of value judgment to merely 
preferences rather than judgment properly so-called” (Brown 2013, 836). The idea that different 
conceptions of what a value is can affect what form an argument takes raises several questions. Is 
a value more than a mere preference? Do various proposed normative accounts of value 
management in science presuppose a conception of what a value is? Does changing that conception 
affect how we evaluate that normative account? Can we settle upon a conception of value as 
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something more than a mere preference; one that allows us to verify them with evidence, suggest 
some are better than others, one that provides a means to determine what values to adopt in an 
objective way? Would such a conception allow us not only to determine what values to adopt but 
ensure that objectivity in science can be ensured? To demonstrate that competing conceptions of 
what a value is can in part determine positions about what roles values ought to play in science, 
and how they should play such roles, I will next turn to conceptions of value that have affected 
historical discussions about values in science.  
1.3. Historical Approaches to Values and Values in Science  
Much of the analysis of early accounts of value and their role in the values in science debate I will 
discuss comes from Robert N. Proctor. Historically, the concern about values and knowledge was 
less problematic because according to the ancient Greek conception, values were a part of the 
world itself. According to the Aristotelian conception of the universe, all things moved towards 
natural ends and so everything moved towards what it ought to be (Proctor 1991, 39). With the 
development of modern-day science and the rejection of the teleological worldview came the idea 
of a mechanical universe that operates according to geometrical, Euclidean principles. The effect 
of this was a reconceived notion of what a value is as it no longer had a place in a mechanical 
universe (Dewey 1929, 95-6). So long as what was ultimately real were physical descriptions of 
size, shape and motion, values could not be ultimately real and were thus relegated to the category 
of secondary qualities. So long as the notion of moral values as fixed ideals (as the ancient 
conception had held) was retained, values would necessarily be distinct from natural science 
(Dewey 1922, 224).  
 A further effect of the scientific revolution was a revolution in views about values (Proctor 
1991, 40). Hobbes, for instance, argued that values do not lie in the structure of the world, but are 
produced by humans (Hobbes 1962, 48). The different desires, passions, and feelings were 
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dependent upon humans; the judgment that a thing was good was nothing more than an expression 
of feeling (Proctor 1991, 44). Hume was also key to this change in the conception of value. He 
argued that moral claims are not susceptible of truth values because truth requires agreement with 
fact, while morality is not capable of this, thus morality cannot be an object of scientific study. 
When we examine certain cases, examining the facts will do no good. When it comes to morality, 
“You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of 
disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ‘tis the object 
of feeling, not of reason” (Hume 2000, 301). This shift in conception of value, or rather the 
adoption of a new “ethical ontology” had the effect of excluding values from science (Proctor 
1991, 53). Science would have no business studying morality outside of sociology, anthropology, 
and psychology, and value claims had no business in determining facts or truths. The exclusion of 
values from scientific investigation was also a compromise with religious and political officials, 
creating a clear separation between facts and values (Proctor 1991, 38; Nelson 1990, 305).  
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities in the 17th and 18th centuries was 
used to defend the idea of the exclusion of values from science since values as expressions of 
desires or passions were subjective (Proctor 1991, 62). By contrast, instead of conceiving of values 
as subjective and mental, there were those who took the nature of values to be something that had 
to remain fixed and absolute: there is a certain nobility to values that would be sullied by scientific 
study of them. Science needed to remain value free so that values could remain science free (1991, 
8). This mode of thinking continued into the 19th century and early 20th century when the formation 
of social sciences sparked a debate about whether values ought to be part of scientific thinking. 
One such debate occurred regarding whether science should work for the betterment of the nation 
or whether it should be politically neutral. 
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 Those, such as Werner Sombart, who argued in favor of neutrality in science in this debate 
did so on the basis that values are subjective. Social science could only be objective in so far as it 
excluded judgments of value (1991, 91). According to this view values were a source of bias, and 
a hindrance to objective knowledge (1991, 88). There were those who argued in favor of the use 
of values, for instance by interpreting “productivity” to include moral as well as empirical 
judgments to determine to what degree the well-being of people is served by economic activities. 
Their defence rested on the idea that values were objective forms of knowledge. Oscar Engländer 
argued that the search for universal, objective, and ultimate values was a legitimate task for 
economic science (1991, 90). Those who opposed the value-free ideal believed that values were 
objective, and that science could be used to improve valuation (1991, 97).  
In the 20th century, the logical positivists mostly espoused a non-cognitivist account of 
ethics, holding that values were not verifiable. Yet unlike those who earlier had argued for value-
neutrality on the basis of non-cognitivism, in the 1940s logical empiricists in the Unity of Science 
movement were motivated by issues involving science and society and did not advocate for value 
neutrality in science. In 1934, Rudolf Carnap argued that moral claims are disguised imperatives. 
While “killing is evil” has the grammatical form of an assertive or representative proposition, it is 
in fact an imperative rule. It is this confusion which has led philosophers to believe that such 
statements are either true or false (Carnap 1935, 24). A claim like “killing is evil” is merely an 
expression of a wish. From such a statement, we cannot deduce any proposition about future 
experiences and thus it is not verifiable and has no theoretical content (Carnap 1934, 5). 
Later, Carnap admitted that certain statements about values are factual statements; these 
included the psychological, historical, and sociological study of values, as well as statements about 
means-ends relationships and use (Carnap 1963, 999). However, Carnap argues that in any value 
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statement, eventually one could find a pure “optative” or wish component that had no cognitive 
meaning (Mormann 2005, 140). A sentence like “let us take road a rather than road b” must be a 
pure optative because such an utterance doesn’t imply any reasons for its adoption (for example, 
that one road is shorter than the other) (Carnap 1963, 1002). Carnap’s non-cognitivism was based 
on a strict distinction between the practical and the theoretical which can be divided into two 
different kinds of questions. Internal questions are theoretical matters for science and can be tested 
empirically, while external questions are practical. Carnap makes it clear that the decision to use a 
framework for inquiry is an external question and as a practical question it is “although itself not 
of a cognitive nature, will nevertheless usually be influenced by theoretical knowledge” (Carnap 
[1956]2011, 251). 
Otto Neurath was also a non-cognitivist. He believed that values arise from human wants. 
In an analysis of ethics, he notes that “if all metaphysical elements are removed from ethics […] 
then what remains is only either statements about certain ways of behavior of men, or their 
commands to other men” (Neurath 1931[1983], 81). He distinguished between unconditional and 
conditional value statements. The unconditional statements express “subjective opinions” which 
can be accepted as data, while conditional statements are empirical testable assertions regarding 
the appropriateness of a given means toward a given end (Cartwright et al 2008, 113). However, 
he dismissed any reference to ‘ought’ statements as found in ethics. For Neurath, “what sets 
unconditional values and fixes the final ends of human action is will—conation, not cognition” 
(2008, 132). Any use of fixed ends lies outside of science and are instead matters of the “social 
will” of those concerned. 
These are only two outlines of value shared by some of the logical empiricists, but their 
non-cognitivist approach to value did not prevent either Carnap or Neurath from accepting the use 
 
 
17 
 
of values in science. For instance, Neurath believed that when theory choice was underdetermined 
by logic and evidence, then social and political reasons should play a role in theory choice (Howard 
2003, 43). Carnap could allow for the use of values when it came to determination of answers to 
external questions about what frameworks to adopt, and that these matters could in some cases be 
determined by convention (Carnap 1936; 1937).4 Further, logical empiricists within the Unity of 
Science movement argued that their job should be to provide institutional support for unified 
sciences, to build a rapport with the public, to use the new logic to clarify scientific thinking, and 
to clarify the humanitarian goals they shared over regressive, or conservative philosophies which 
sought to set limits on scientific thought (Richardson 2007, 303). 
While the logical empiricists insisted that there cannot be value judgments, the American 
pragmatists insisted that science was impossible without verifiable value judgments (Silk 2018, 
109). The pragmatists fought a long battle with non-cognitivism; believing not only that values 
were objective, but that values had a place in science and science had a place in resolving value 
disputes (Proctor 1991, 177).  John Dewey (1903; 1915; 1938; 1939) spent years articulating a 
theory of valuation and argued that values were inherently part of any form of inquiry as inquiry 
is a form of practice, and that all judgment is a judgment of value (MW8: 23). C.I. Lewis argued 
for a similar position (Lewis 1941), insisting that knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially 
connected (Lewis 1946, 1). The pragmatists took their conception of values to mean that values 
had a necessary and inherent part of all scientific inquiry. Further, this conception of value not 
only meant that values are needed for science, but that science had a responsibility to improve 
social conflicts by improving our capacity to value by replacing dogmatic impulses and instilling 
a scientific attitude. As Dewey notes: 
                                                          
4 Note that Carnap contrasts convention with objectivity.  
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If [science] is incapable of developing moral techniques which will also determine these 
relations, the split in modern culture goes so deep that not only democracy but all civilized 
values are doomed. […] A culture which permits science to destroy traditional values but 
which distrusts its power to create new ones is a culture which is destroying itself (LW 13, 
171-2).5 
 
Thus, the pragmatists see science as having ethical responsibilities that are in some ways similar 
to what the logical empiricists advocated for, but in other ways are quite different.  
 During the Cold War, many within the logical empiricist camp began to advocate for value 
neutrality. George Reisch (2007) has argued that pre-1950 scientific philosophy was concerned 
with society and values, but later transformed itself into a philosophy of science that was only 
concerned with logical and epistemic concerns. There was also a recognition of the need to “soften 
the rhetoric of Wissenschaftliche Philosophie and become Philosophers of Science” (Giere 1999, 
222). This was due to the Cold War politics of anti-communism and McCarthyism. The political 
pressures of the 1950s led to the transformation of logical empiricism from a politically engaged 
movement to one that shed its cultural and social engagements (Reisch 2007, 6). It is noteworthy 
that this change in logical empiricism was a way to adapt to the new political climate: for the 
movement to “grow and thrive in the age of the Red menace, [it] would have to appear […] free 
of ideological contamination” (2007, 355). 
 By the 1950s there was a growing sense that logical empiricism espoused non-cognitivism 
and that normative claims were not to be included within philosophy of science. In 1951 Hans 
Reichenbach articulated an account of values as something volitional and subjective and based on 
self-justifying axioms which are not testable (2007, 356). Only ethical implications and not basic 
                                                          
5 John Dewey, The Collected Works, 1882–1953 spans thirty-seven volumes which are grouped into the following 
sets: The Early Works, The Middle Works, and The Later Works. References to the Collected Works in this 
Dissertation will indicate the year; whether it is noted from his Early Works (EW), Middle Works (MW), or Later 
Works (LW); and the volume number within that grouping of his Works, followed by the relevant page number(s) 
in the volume. 
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axioms were testable and thus capable of logical proof. Herbert Feigl adopted Reichenbach’s 
axiomatic account of values to argue for the isolation of values from philosophy of science. In 
other words, it wasn’t just that values were subjective, but that they now were believed to have no 
logical justification (2007, 362). Eventually, Hans Reichenbach’s distinction between the context 
of discovery and the context of justification provided for the claim that the epistemic value of 
scientific theories lies with their relationship between logical relations and evidence, and that 
politics and values are not relevant to science (2007, 355).  
The differing conceptions of values between the logical empiricists and the pragmatists 
would affect how each theory could respond to Cold War pressures. Notably, while some logical 
empiricists argued for the inclusion of political aims within science, their non-cognitivist views 
meant that their aims were not justified by their conception of science. As Reisch explains, “The 
scientific world conception did not need logical justification because it was already, as an empirical 
fact, alive and poised to dominate modernity” (2007, 378). According to Feigl, the embrace of 
values that aim at social improvement were indirectly adopted since science could not justify them 
(2007, 360). Because the values espoused by the Unity of Science movement was not justified by 
science, it may have been easier to give those up to transition to an apolitical stance that seemed 
necessary during the Cold War. Carnap, for instance, adopted the approach of keeping his political 
preferences and scientific philosophy apart given that they were two different kinds of enterprises 
(Mormann 2007, 131; Reisch 2007, 382). 
Ronald Giere has attempted to explain the decline of social engagement amongst logical 
empiricists, arguing that the intellectual thinking of the logical empiricists in Europe was not 
continuous with the later thinking in North America (Giere 1991, 218). Giere notes that in Europe 
they were just as radical as the pragmatists, “But these facts were left buried in the past. Once in 
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America, the Logical Empiricist philosophers of science pretty much stuck to their Ps and Qs” 
(1991, 233). 
For the pragmatists however, elimination of values was more problematic. Because 
valuation is inherently part of their conception of inquiry, they could not give up discussion of 
values as easily. For Morris and Lewis there was “the fear that a too restrictive meaning criterion 
might transform some areas of philosophy they took as essential into meaningless topics. These 
areas include ethics” (Limbeck-Lilienau 2012, 91).  Dropping social concerns for pragmatism was 
more problematic as social context drives inquiry and inquiry aims at melioration, and thus social 
values and concerns play an inherently stronger role; they could not be dropped. 
What we can conclude from the history of 20th century philosophy of science is that 
competing conceptions of values would lead to different conclusions about how science should be 
conducted. For the pragmatists, an empirical cognitivist conception of values meant that it was 
science’s business to improve valuation in social and political relations. While earlier logical 
empiricists shared the idea that science should benefit society, as just discussed, their justification 
for this claim was different. Further, while they did leave room for values to play a role in scientific 
inquiry itself, what function they were to play differed. For Neurath, values were used only where 
evidence was insufficient to provide an answer. He thus adopted what Brown calls the lexical 
priority of evidence over values (Brown 2013, 830). For Carnap, values were only used for external 
questions where evidence couldn’t determine an answer. This stands in contrast to the pragmatists, 
for whom such divisions between evidence and values were untenable; their conception of values 
influenced a completely different understanding of experience, evidence, and science (Silk 2018, 
90). Eventually, during the Cold War many logical empiricists not only abandoned the social and 
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political goals of the Unity of Science movement, but also used the axiomatic conception of values 
to argue for the exclusion of values from science altogether to advocate for the value-free ideal.  
Thus, by the second half of the 20th century we see a dispute between some logical 
positivists who would eventually support the value-free ideal on the basis of a non-cognitivist 
conception of value during the Cold War, and the pragmatists who rejected the value-free ideal on 
the basis of their cognitivist position. Clearly then, differing conceptions of value can and have 
affected differing normative accounts concerning values in science. While not every logical 
empiricist supported the value free ideal, clearly non-cognitivist conceptions of values were used 
to argue in favor of either the limitation or exclusion of values. In addition, the pragmatists’ 
conception of values meant that values were not only important but necessary for successful 
science. Thus, when we examine the historical debates arising after the fall of teleology, we clearly 
see that different conceptions of values can influence different accounts of value management. 
Even in more recent years, philosophers have drawn attention to the possibility that values may 
not be subjective to argue that values need not be a threat to objectivity (Kuhn 1977, 335; Intemann 
2001, S513; Brown 2013, 836).  
1.4. “Scientific Values” and Science 
The previous section has established that it is at least plausible that differing conceptions of values 
played a role in how philosophers of science have historically argued for or against the inclusion 
of values in science. This raises the question as to what kind of conception of value might be 
appropriate if values are going to be used in science. Unlike debates in the 19th century, when those 
who believed in objective values often argued on the basis of a reductionist account espoused by 
Bentham, or a Kantian conception of universal reason, the pragmatists and other 20th century 
philosophers attempted to draft more nuanced and scientific approaches to value and valuation 
consistent with developments in experimental thinking.  
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Scientific philosophers6 like Richard Rudner urged for the development of a “science of 
ethics.” He argued that values needed to play a role in science, and since “scientific method 
intrinsically requires the making of decisions” (Rudner 1953, 6), to pretend as if we don’t make 
evaluations will not lead to objectivity. His concerns warranted a “radical reworking of the ideal 
of scientific objectivity” and the view “that a science of ethics is a necessary requirement if 
science’s progress towards objectivity is to be continuous” (1953, 6). Meanwhile, other 
philosophers such as Abraham Edel (1961) and the Columbia naturalists including John Herman 
Randall Jr, Herbert W. Schneider, Irwin Edman, Horace L Friess, and James Gutmann (Jewett, 
2011) explored a scientific and naturalistic approach to ethics and values. The account to be 
developed in this dissertation will be consistent with such a naturalistic science of ethics because 
such a “science of ethics” will be continuous with scientific methods.  
According to Owen Flanagan, naturalistic ethics specifically rejects the use of the 
supernatural or relying on rationales for moral claims based on a priori dictates of a faculty of pure 
reason (Flanagan 1996, 120). Indeed, the methodological commitments of naturalistic ethics 
include the fact that any claim cannot be shielded from empirical testing, and that there can be no 
sharp distinction between moral investigations and those in other disciplines; in other words, 
ethical science must be continuous with other sciences (Flanagan, Sarkissian, and Wong 2016, 20). 
In making this connection between moral thinking and scientific thinking, naturalists argue that 
morality needs to be fallible, eschewing foundational, absolute, or context-independent truths or a 
priori algorithms in making judgments (Johnson 2014, 21).7  
                                                          
6 Scientific philosophy is a term scholars have used to describe an early 20th century approach to issues of science 
and philosophy which included a number of schools including (but not necessarily exclusively) the logical positivists 
and the pragmatists (Reisch 2005; Richardson 2003).  
7 Indeed, much of these commitments are in keeping with the various possible ways that Ray Lepley tells us that 
values can be experimental as discussed in Chapter 2.  
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Those who are skeptical of the use of values in science may have their skepticism rooted 
in relying on concepts thought to be alien to scientific methodologies; either because they believe 
that the components are so subjective so to as not permit of verification or testing (ex. Values as 
mere wishes, preferences, biases), or so universal and absolute that experimentation is considered 
irrelevant to their validity (ex. Values as ideologies, dogmas). It is because the naturalist commits 
to provide an account of values continuous with scientific methods, and Rudner’s urging that in 
accounting for values in science we should form a science of values, that a naturalistic account of 
values is a good hypothesis by which to start providing precision to the term as it is used in science.  
 Flanagan argues that naturalistic ethics contains two components: a descriptive-
genealogical component which specifies the capacities and propensities of Homo sapiens to 
explain how we come to feel, think, and act about moral matters, and a normative component 
which explains why some norms, virtues, and values are better than others (Flanagan 1996, 119). 
For example, Paul Churchland argues that moral truths are as objective as other instances of truth, 
and that all knowledge acquisition is a process of learning how: how to recognize a wide variety 
of complex situations and how to respond to them appropriately, and that this contrasts with the 
idea of correspondence between internal ideas and external facts (Churchland 1993, 298). Our 
ability to make immediate discriminations in our observations is a product of refining our 
perceptions, cognitions, and responses from exposure to various situations. He argues, for 
example, that the development of a social consciousness in the learning process of a child is not 
dependent upon internalizing abstract principles, but through learning how to navigate the structure 
of a complex social environment, and that this is a genuine case of learning about objective reality 
(1993, 300). He argues that refinement of the best ways to organize and administer our collective 
and individual affairs are driven by factors arising from our continuing social experience of 
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conducting life under existing moral frameworks; these processes of learning through experimental 
refinement is not dissimilar from science (1993, 302).  
Similarly, Flanagan argues that ethics as a science is a part of human ecology and is 
concerned with articulating what contributes to the well-being of humans’ natural and social 
environments, and on this basis, we can discern the difference between good and bad ideas 
(Flanagan, Sarkissian, and Wong 2016, 30). Mark Johnson argues that values and standards of 
good practices come from within those practices and are modified through a practice’s 
development (Johnson 2014, 32). According to him, moral evaluation is a form of imaginative 
problem solving (2014, 4). Still, both Flanagan and Churchland admit that there will be traditional 
objections, namely that while descriptive-genealogical ethics can be naturalized, normative ethics 
cannot be; that one cannot use so-called descriptive facts to derive normative facts.8 However, 
naturalists like Johnson argue that this distinction relies on the myth that moral judgments are 
essentially distinct from other judgments such that descriptive judgments must either be 
completely distinct from or even irrelevant to moral thinking (2014, 40). Also, to presume there is 
a sharp difference between what is descriptive and what is normative requires adhering to the fact-
value dichotomy. In the coming Chapters I will examine how naturalized scientific moral 
evaluation can be worked out and address the fact-value dichotomy, and this will form the basis 
of the conception of value I intend to use when considering the use of values in science. 
1.5. Overview of Thesis 
While Proctor’s work demonstrates how competing conceptions of values played a role in the 
development of the value-free ideal, I will not be challenging the value-free ideal in this 
dissertation. Some of the philosophers I have mentioned (Douglas 2009; Longino 1990; Kitcher 
                                                          
8 Mark Johnson notes that non-naturalist theories tend to presume that scientific knowledge has no relevance to 
normative evaluations (Johnson 2014, 20).  
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2002) have already provided arguments against either the tenability or the desirability of the value-
free ideal. To that end, I begin from the starting point that values are embedded in science at various 
stages of inquiry. Those looking for a defence of the idea that values play a significant role in 
science here will be disappointed. Rather, my interest is in how those who reject the value-free 
ideal have responded to how values should be a part of scientific inquiry. The idea that values need 
to play a role in science in certain ways is still seen as problematic for reasons that are not dissimilar 
from some of the historical grounds we have seen for the rejecting of values in science. Namely, 
to some theorists, values can represent a potential threat to scientific integrity. I will examine 
whether that threat exists, and in what ways it can pose a problem for science.  
 As mentioned, value management is a response to a perceived problem: specifically, a 
perception that values are problematic when it comes to their use in science. However, in many of 
the accounts offered by defenders of values in science, the discussion of values themselves tends 
to be limited, unclear, or lacking in sufficiently careful analysis in most cases. Unlike historical 
figures like Sombart or Engländer who directly acknowledged their competing conceptions of 
value, contemporary philosophers of science often do not pay sufficient direct attention to what is 
meant by value. When values are discussed, certain words tend to crop up in association with the 
potential issues of their use in science. For example, values are often associated with “wish,” 
“desire,” “judgment,” “subjective,” “bias,” “useful,” “like,” “enjoy,” “optative,” “will,” etc.  
But in what way might a value be a wish? In what way is a wish different from a desire 
according to those who argue for the use of values in science? Perhaps they are the same? Are all 
value claims subjective? Is a value different from a value judgment? Whether something is useful 
can be true regardless of whether we like it, so is a value something we like or something that is 
useful? Is it both? Neither? Without clarity about what is meant by value when we consider 
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potential approaches to value management, we begin to run into problems. Values are clearly 
considered problematic, but just what is problematic about them remains ill-defined. This can lead 
to difficulties for reasons that have been mentioned; it makes it difficult to compare different 
accounts of value management. It can also be difficult because if an approach to value management 
relies on a conception of value which holds, for example, that values are essentially the expression 
of a wish or an imperative, and this conception of value does not hold up well under philosophical 
scrutiny, then it makes the justification of any prescriptions about values difficult. Thus, we are 
faced with problems from different directions. There is the problem of how to resolve tensions 
between differing accounts of value management, the problem of how justified any account may 
be given the conception of values it adopts, and the problematic nature of values themselves.  
Resolution to these problems, it seems, must begin with a philosophical analysis of 
valuation. Sorting out the differences between desires, wishes, feelings, and so on will put us on 
firmer ground upon which we can begin to address exactly what is the nature of values and what 
is problematic about their use in science, and this is the kind of precision I aim to provide. As John 
Dewey notes in his analysis of inquiry, a problem well put is half-solved (Dewey 1938, 108). In 
other words, being more precise about values and what they involve will allow us to determine 
exactly what is problematic about their use in science; it will provide a means of comparison 
between competing conceptions of values adopted or implied by various approaches to value 
management to determine if their respective concerns are warranted; and will allow for us to see 
how various approaches respond to similar concerns and where they differ.  
In Chapter 2, I will address the issue of valuation directly. My aim is to provide an analysis 
of valuation that will present different possible meanings with regards to concepts typically 
attached to what is meant by value and present a conception of value that can resolve some of the 
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problems in philosophy of science just discussed. Such a conception will be compatible with and 
can be integrated into scientific practice by virtue of it being a conception of value judgment that 
is cognitive, capable of verification in the face of evidence, and is opposed to an idea of values 
that are fixed or external. I will therefore draw from a period in the 20th century when philosophers 
of science began to call for and attempt to provide such scientific accounts of valuation.  
 I will begin my analysis by considering the accounts of valuation developed by the 
pragmatists in the mid-20th century, including the work of John Dewey, Clarence Irving Lewis, 
and Ray Lepley. In providing such an account, I will begin by examining their unique approach to 
thinking about experience and its relationship to value. Essential to understanding both Dewey’s 
and Lewis’s account of empirical values is understanding their approach to experience and its 
relation to knowledge. I will draw attention to their broad distinction between two kinds of 
experiences -- those that occur immediately and without reflection, and those that involve 
reflection. Rather than focussing on individualized sensations, the pragmatists operate within an 
account that recognizes moral experiences, aesthetic experiences, cheerful experiences, scary 
experiences, and so on.  
In addition to these pragmatists, I will be examining the work of other philosophers who 
have developed naturalistic accounts of valuation that are compatible with scientific deliberation 
and which can be of use in resolving problems of value management. I have already discussed 
some modern philosophers on the issue of naturalistic ethics, but I will also discuss Kitcher’s 
account of valuation based on what he calls “the ethical project” (Kitcher 2011b). The aim of the 
chapter will be two-fold: one is to provide an analysis of the various components believed to be 
involved in values such as desires, emotions, and wishes; the second will be to argue for an account 
of value that incorporates insights from the accounts of value just mentioned that I believe will 
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expose the problematic aspects of value management in science. By providing such an analysis, I 
will be able to examine the claims and concerns that contemporary philosophers have had in their 
accounts of value management later on.  
In Chapter 3, I will shore up the account of a framework of values explicated in Chapter 2 
by addressing the issue of what it means to confirm or verify a value judgment. While in Chapter 
2 I will offer an account of empirical value, in chapter 3 I will expand on that account by examining 
the issue of verification. To do this, I will discuss Dewey’s concept of warranted assertability as it 
pertains to both verification and to patterns of inquiry in general. I argue that the concept of 
warranted assertability is compatible with and can strengthen even non-Deweyan accounts as it is 
similar to elements of Kitcher’s work as well as to the work of philosophers like Longino and her 
account of conformation (Longino 2002, 120). By clarifying what warranted assertability is and 
how it plays a role in inquiry, I can clarify what it means to verify a value judgment.  
By adopting Dewey’s account of the pattern of inquiry, I aim to show not only what it 
means to verify a value judgment, but also how deeply embedded value judgments, as judgments 
of practice, are to any form of inquiry. For Dewey, a proposition is neither true nor false but merely 
useful in so far as our actions within inquiry can move forward towards a final judgment and 
resolution of the problem. I will argue that verification of a claim, including a value claim, does 
not lie with the direct testing of a sentence, but with a value judgment’s ability to successfully 
allow for the transition of an inquiry from one that is less problematic to one that is resolved or 
closer to resolution. Value propositions are not independent of a situation or judgment such that 
they permit verification in the way philosophers typically tend to use propositions or think about 
value judgments as propositions. With these clarifications, I will present a three-fold division of 
value and articulate what is distinctive about values relative to facts.  
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In Chapter 4, I will use the analysis of value articulated in the prior two chapters to discuss 
the conceptions of values entailed by the value management accounts of Longino, Douglas, 
Kitcher, and Kourany. I will examine each of their accounts in turn and will reveal what conception 
of value each adopts for use in their account and will compare this to the account of values I adopt 
in Chapter 2. I will argue that to the degree that any value management account relies upon a 
conception of value in order to determine what is problematic about value, we can evaluate that 
account by evaluating the conception of values used.  
For instance, if an account of value management entails or presupposes a simple account 
of value, say “all values are just X” (emotions, preferences, measurements of utility, biases etc.) 9 
or even a thin account such that values can be explained as things we care about, I can compare 
that to the account I articulate in order to suggest that we have reasons to believe that values are 
more sophisticated than this. My aim is not necessarily to demonstrate that these alternate 
conceptions are mistaken, but that given that there is a plausible account that may reject simple 
conceptions, further justification of the conception is necessary. The analysis provided in Chapter 
2 can aid in clarifying aspects of value that are left unclear in current value management 
approaches, and if those approaches were to use the account of value judgments which I propose, 
I argue that some of the concerns and perceived problems that motivate such approaches are not 
warranted and do not have to be taken as being problematic.  
To do this will require unpacking the various accounts of value management to determine 
what conception of values are suggested by them, analysing the intuitions underpinning such 
conceptions of value, and noting how an alternative account of value can affect what we may think 
                                                          
9 I am not suggesting that the accounts I have discussed in detail do at this point. This is merely an example.  
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of a given approach to value management. I will examine all four accounts of value management 
in this way. 
In Chapter 5 I will elaborate how the conception of values I explicate in Chapter 2 and 3 
affects the issue of values in science. I will argue that once we adopt the conception of values I 
articulate, then values and valuation must play a role in every judgment made throughout the 
process of scientific inquiry. To make this argument, I will examine accounts of actual scientific 
practices. I will then focus on the question of how we can allow values to play a role in science 
while maintaining the integrity of science.  
Philosophers who have addressed the values in science debate are often concerned about 
the relationship between values and evidence. These concerns revolve around what to do when 
values and evidence conflict, and whether values should play a role where evidence is insufficient. 
With an adoption of the naturalistic account explicated in Chapters 2 and 3, I believe that such 
discussions are more complicated than they are typically considered to be. Values and evidence 
need to be understood in terms of the functions they play in inquiry rather than being understood 
as two concepts that stand in opposition to each other. This complicates the standard discussion 
about values and evidence.  
My account will also allow me to articulate what constitutes improper forms of inquiry in 
the abstract sense. While value judgments need to be based on, and revisable in the face of, 
evidence, preferences that are based on dogma or habit and are maintained come what may, and 
which represent a fixed end for inquiry as opposed to an end-in-view are what can lead inquiry 
astray. These are not good value judgments. Ultimately then, what is necessary for science is not 
any sets of epistemic or non-epistemic values at all, but value judgments specifically. Once we 
understand that a value judgment is controlled by the experimental processes of inquiry and that 
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proper inquiry into what practices we ought to engage in in science means that a value claim cannot 
be absolute, subjective, or not capable of revision, many of the concerns about the use of values in 
science are no longer valid.  
Ultimately this mode of thinking suggests that once we understand values as being 
controlled by inquiry, they no longer need an external management process. Values are already 
subject to control and modification through the process in which value judgments are formed. 
Properly understood, they are not ready-made antecedents for which processes of value 
management need to address their problematic elements. What is argued for, therefore, is that we 
ought to transcend the notion of value management, and focus on the notion of experimental value 
formation, or in other words, the processes by which value judgments are made rather than how to 
manage them after the fact.  
I will conclude by noting that accounts of what values are can and do affect how we think 
about the role that values do and ought to play in science. Various value management accounts 
discussed in the debate tend to presume, or at least are ambiguous about, what is meant by a value. 
Even if the account of value I adopt is ultimately not convincing, there can be important take away 
lessons to be learned. Disputes between positions that argue that values should play a larger role 
or a smaller role in science can be discussed more clearly if we make our views explicit whether 
values are just preferences or are objective. Until those considerations are made explicit and are 
discussed, we can be reasonably concerned that various participants in debates about science and 
values may be talking past each other. 
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Chapter 2: Empirical Accounts of Values and Valuation 
The adequacy of any approach to value management will in-part depend on the extent to which its 
conception of what a value is can be considered adequate. If a conception of value is insufficiently 
adequate, any account that argues the values should play a limited role in scientific inquiry in order 
to maintain objectivity on the basis of that conception (for example because of their subjective, 
metaphysical, idiosyncratic, or expressive nature) will be problematic.10 Despite the importance of 
having a precise conception of what constitutes a value, in-depth discussions of this sort are mostly 
missing from the values in science literature. My aim in this chapter is to present several accounts 
of value and value judgments emerging from scientifically-minded philosophy in the 20th century 
which sought to provide what Rudner might characterize as a “science of ethics” and to affirm 
such an account for further use in analyzing value management. The survey of different accounts 
will both demonstrate that it is possible to articulate sophisticated and nuanced approaches to value 
judgments compatible with scientific experimental thinking, and to draw from these accounts a 
conception of values that will serve as useful for the values and science debate today.  
Examining sophisticated analyses of the nature of valuation presents an opportunity to 
examine alternatives to any thin accounts of value which may be presumed in the literature and to 
gauge which type of account is more likely to be able to resolve tensions between values and 
science and will be more accurate to scientific practice. Additionally, drawing on naturalistic 
accounts will allow for the integration of an approach to value judgments that is compatible with 
scientific practice, avoiding what Kitcher calls “spooks” (Kitcher 2011, 40). In other words, the 
aim is to talk about values in such a way that avoids absolute, fixed, or purely metaphysical 
conceptions of values that would be alien to scientific inquiry; values should be treated as fallible, 
                                                          
10 A detailed account of how values are described in modern literature will be found in Chapter 4.  
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experimental, and verified in experience. I submit that if such an account of values were accepted, 
it would go a long way in alleviating concerns about the risks that values in science present, an 
argument that I will make at greater length in Chapter 5. Before discussing these accounts in detail, 
I want to begin by discussing the nature of values and experience as it will be relevant to 
understanding where some of these accounts are coming from.  
My commitment is to keep values within the realm of the empirical. An empirical account 
of value must avoid dialectical manipulation of pre-conceived notions of values as non-empirical11 
and begin with value as it is experienced, and valuation in terms of its function within experience. 
For instance, according to Dewey, valuation is characteristic of experiences of “all activity into 
which alternative possibilities enter. For wherever they enter a difference between better and worse 
arises” (Dewey 1922, 278). I will begin by considering a general account of experience, one that 
understands value as arising within adaptations by an organism within an environment, as an active 
process rather than a passive reception of sensory data. The accounts of Dewey and Lewis 
articulate value as it relates to experience and to these adaptations, and parse the various 
phenomena associated with values. I will also discuss the account by Ray Lepley who provides a 
survey of values in relation to factual claims to determine whether they possess any inherent 
properties that would distinguish them in experience, and Philip Kitcher’s account which relates 
values to shared social experiences as a long term evolutionary project. I will conclude by 
affirming an account of value that I will utilize in the following chapters.  
One will notice that each account stresses the importance of looking at concrete conditions 
of valuation and the relation that valuation has to such conditions. As Lepley notes:  
Valuation is commonly conceived as a terminal response, as a choice or preference which 
ends deliberation and determines a course of action. When so conceived, attention is 
                                                          
11 Hilary Putnam addresses such conceptions at length; such conceptions usually begin with an understanding of 
value which inherently makes it incompatible with empirical knowledge (Putnam 2004) 
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focused so exclusively upon the immediate act of choice that we lose sight not only of the 
processes which may have provided data which makes the choice itself more than 
subjective but also the processes of testing which may follow as effects of the actions which 
flow from the choice. (Lepley 1944, 182)  
I submit that were a specific empirical account of values accepted in philosophy of science, it 
would go a long way in alleviating concerns about the risks that values present if used in science, 
an argument I will make at greater length in Chapter 5.  
2.1. Values and Experience 
In the next two sections I will be discussing John Dewey’s and C.I. Lewis’ accounts of value, but 
before this it is beneficial to discuss their conception of experience first. Contrary to conceptions 
of experience found in traditional empiricism and its focus on sense data and spectator accounts 
of knowledge, the pragmatic theories of Dewey and Lewis are broader in scope. Some relevant 
elements of Dewey’s conception of experience are presented in the Reflex Arc Concept in 
Psychology (EW5). There, Dewey argues that we should not think about sensation, ideas, thoughts, 
or actions as fixed distinct entities, but rather as functional distinctions within a sensory-motor 
circuit. These circuits are part of a coordination that is undertaken between an organism and its 
environment.  
 Rather than assuming that sensations are merely stimuli to action, we must think of activity 
as primary. The movement of body, head and eye muscles determine the quality of what is 
experienced. Sensation comes because we engage in the act of seeing and in turn the quality 
experienced conditions motor responses. Our immediate experiences are a result of our motor 
activities which determine the “this” as the subject of judgment and changing our actions will 
change the experience (MW3: 16).12 Using the example of a child seeing a candle light and 
                                                          
12 This connection between experience and practice has obvious implications for the function that valuation can 
play in modifying our behavior. Thus, experience becomes a matter of judging the worth of an immediate 
experience given a specific end.  
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reaching for it, Dewey articulates how sensation and action play a role together. What is sensed is 
so because of the act of looking. Reaching is controlled by vision and in turn the act of reaching 
further controls how we fix our gaze. Thus, seeing and reaching are not separate, but part of a 
coordination of seeing-for-reaching (EW5: 98). Once the flame burns the hand, this quality 
becomes part of the circuit as well. The original optical-ocular experience is enlarged and 
transformed in its value; we undergo a change. It is not just a seeing but a, “seeing-a-light-that-
means-pain-when-contact-occurs” (EW5: 98).  
What Dewey suggests is that experience is not just isolated sensations, but rather 
consummatory in that various qualities are controlled and transformed as part of a coordinated 
circuit of activity and sensation which gives meaning to what is sensed. Experience is a result of 
an interaction with a creature and its environment. Because of this interaction, there is reaction and 
transformation of what is experienced. This transformation is an undergoing of a reconstructed 
relationship between an organism and its environment which determines future activities (LW10: 
48-50). This is true of transformation of the original experience of the candle light. Further, 
because what is sensed is tied to a coordinated activity, the activity will drive what the quality of 
an experience will ultimately be. Hearing a loud, unexpected noise will have a different “psychical 
value” depending on whether one is reading a book, performing a chemical experiment, or hunting. 
The quality of the experience does not precede the motor phase but is determined by it.  
 These remarks are crucial because it means that experience for Dewey is not passive but 
active, and that rather than sensations being isolated they are ultimately linked together and 
transformed through activity. This means that experience will be broader and will be of different 
kinds depending on the activity, including the possibility of distinct value experiences. That 
experience has this active element leads Dewey to join William James in arguing that experience 
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is “double barreled,” including not only what is experienced but how we experience: the processes 
of experiencing (Dewey 1925, 8). Because experience is active, or rather interactive, involving 
organisms and their environment, and since we are not distinct from nature, experience is “of as 
well as in nature […] things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is 
experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object—the human organism—
they are how things are experienced as well” (1925, 4a). Thus, for the pragmatists, experience is 
not purely mental or psychological. It is not experience that we experience, but nature itself. 
Experience also is neither necessarily private nor subjective as we are social beings who engage 
in shared activities and shared communications with each other (Hildebrand 2008, 36). 
Thus, experience in its “unanalyzed totality” includes act, material, subject, and object with 
each distinguished from each other through reflection to serve a functional purpose. This initial 
unreflective form of experience is what Dewey calls primary experience. In contrast to this is 
secondary experience, or those experiences which are a product of reflection as certain qualities 
are singled out in inquiry for the purposes of regulation. Primary experiences are immediately had 
prior to reflection and secondary experiences are reflective and aim to explain and understand 
primary experience (Dewey 1925, 4-5). Primary experience includes not only what is sensed but 
also what is enjoyed or suffered; they are experiences had while secondary experiences are 
experiences known (1925, 21).  
Lewis shares with Dewey many similar positions. He argues that we first experience things 
in an immediate “thin sense” that is free of interpretation and which has no cognitive content or 
epistemic status. There is also a “thick sense” that contains all experience as interpreted and it is 
used to justify and explain our beliefs (Lewis 1946, 53). Like Dewey he argues that the distinction 
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between objectivity and subjectivity are later classifications of experience rather than either one 
being a quality inherent to experience itself (1946, 408).  
This distinction between an unreflective and a reflective form of experience is important 
because both Dewey and Lewis argue that not all experience has to do with knowledge or is 
inherently a form of knowledge. Seeing a stick bent in water does not mean one knows that the 
stick is in fact bent. An unreflective experience is an appearance of something, leaving it up to us 
to interpret what it means. We choose to interpret the stick as bent because it serves as a better 
interpretation for inquiry not because it represents the “real” object (LW3: 70). As Lewis notes, 
“If I look across the top of my glasses and 'see two inkbottles', what I see is not misleading in itself 
[…] It is the interpretation put upon given appearance which is verifiable or falsifiable” (Lewis, 
409). As David Hildebrand notes experiences had may or may not become known experiences 
(Hildebrand 2003, 117). Differences in immediate forms of experience are not to be labelled as 
phenomenal or mental, or personal but rather are a product of a physical existential relation, not 
an epistemic relation (LW3: 58).  
This broadened scope of experience also means that there are distinctly different kinds of 
experiences. There are known experiences, but there are also aesthetic experiences, moral 
experiences, economic experiences, and so on (MW3:161). That I experience something as being 
valuable is not just my subjective feeling on the matter. As Dewey notes, “If experience actually 
presents esthetic and moral traits, then these traits may also be supposed to reach down into nature, 
and testify to something that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed 
to it in physical science” (Dewey 1925, 4). This idea that value is something that is a part of 
experience is shared by Lewis who argues that we can experience value immediately just as we 
experience any other apparent thing; value-disvalue is a mode of experience (Lewis 1946, 407). 
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Dewey indicates that moral experiences have the characteristics of having a sense of conflicting 
and incompatible aims, a need for activity, and thus a sense of the worth or desirability of certain 
results (MW5: 194).  
Providing this outline of experience draws attention to two important issues. One is that 
value can be a part of immediate experience. Because of this, we have no a priori reason to claim 
that values are inherently unempirical. In contrast, an alternate conception of experience found in 
traditional empiricism may argue that since experience is a matter of atomized sense data, and 
since we cannot “see” value then it is not empirical; that is not the framework in which the 
pragmatists operate. If value is part of experience, then it is to that extent empirical, and thus to 
that extent able to be investigated by scientific methods. Secondly, the distinction between 
unreflective and reflective experience tells us that what we immediately experience is not a form 
of knowledge. Dewey argues that this applies to the matter of values as well. He believes that we 
can experience value and thus good or bad independent of judgment: “a point similar to one I have 
made frequently about the subject-matter of perception as such—that explicit presence in 
experience is not equivalent to knowledge” (Dewey 1922a, 327). In other words, just as the 
experience of a bent stick is not knowledge that the stick is bent, experience of value does not 
mean that the thing experienced is in fact valuable or worth attaining. Only a value experience as 
interpreted and judged upon is capable of truth or falsity (Lewis, 408-9).  
2.2. John Dewey’s Account of Value 
Dewey took considerable efforts to develop an account of values and valuation that is naturalistic 
and necessarily integrated into the practice of science. For him, a value judgment is just a case of 
a practical judgment about what to do—a view he contrasts with the idea that value judgments are 
supposed to conform to “some ghostly thing called value-objects” (MW8: 30). As mentioned, 
valuation in Dewey’s account involves conflicting impulses as the basis of moral experience. 
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Before I discuss this further, we should consider what use Dewey can be in considering the 
different factors and phenomena involved when we think about value. This includes different 
possible meanings of the term “value,” the relationship between phenomena such as liking and 
wishing to valuing, differences between liking something and a judgment of value, on what basis 
such judgments should be made as a means of engaging in intelligent action, and the difference 
between means and ends as they relate to instrumental value and inherent value. Thus, I will begin 
with his analysis of the various concepts connected to value and the phenomena they describe. 
2.2.2 Different meanings of “value” 
There are four different kinds of values to initially consider. The term “value” could 
indicate something being of intrinsic or of instrumental value. In terms of judgment, value “may 
be found without judgment, without implying cognition […] we may also, however, subject values 
to knowledge and judgment” (Dewey 1922a, 326). For example, we may treat an object as a useful 
means and in that regard esteem it without a judgment. In other words, there is the possibility of 
instrumental values and immediate values, both where there is judgment or cognition and where 
there isn’t.  
Dewey emphasizes the distinction between finding something to have value and judging 
that it is valuable (valuation). It is the confusion between an experience of good and a judgment 
of value which has created difficulties in discussions of value (MW8: 23). He explains:  
I am convinced that contemporary discussion of values and valuation suffers from 
confusion of the two radically different attitudes—that of direct, active, non-cognitive 
experience of goods and bads and that of valuation, the latter being simply a mode of 
judgment like any other form of judgment, differing in that its subject matter happens to 
be a good or a bad instead of a horse or planet or curve. (MW8: 26) 
In his discussion of the distinction between an experience of value and a judgment of one, Dewey 
recalls the point about the relationship between experience and knowledge; something 
immediately experienced does not constitute knowledge of it. Thus, an experience of value is not 
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the same as a judgment; it is not cognitive. He argues that there is a big difference between 
evaluation as a critical process and an ordinary experience of good or evil, noting, “finding a thing 
good apart from reflective judgment means simply treating the thing in a certain way, hanging on 
to it, dwelling upon it, welcoming it and acting to perpetuate its existence […] It is a way of 
behaving towards it, a mode of organic reaction” (MW8: 26). This mode of valuing is what Dewey 
calls prizing. According to Dewey “value” can designate both prizing something in the sense of 
having a high regard or appraising something as having or assigning a value (Dewey 1939, 5). 
2.2.3 Prizing and its associated phenomena 
Valuing or esteeming something denotes an affective attitude rather than an intellectual 
one (Dewey 1922a, 326). This distinction is important because when it comes to values in science 
it will be useful to be able to distinguish between something we value without judgment 
(esteeming, valuing) and something that we consider to be valuable because of judgment 
(appraisal/valuation). However, if valuing is considered to be the primary or only form of value 
possible, it may warrant skepticism about values playing a large role in science since they would 
not be open to empirical criticism, whereas when appraisal is included this may not be the case. 
Dewey argues that rather than being opposing, valuing and valuation can be complementary with 
prizing constituting a particular kind of valuing which is bound with appraisal13 and so I will 
recount the process of prizing first and the phenomena it describes.  
 Prizing is an active form of liking or disliking something. Here the emphasis is on action 
and behavior with regard to liking, or what is referred to as “affective-motor.” Liking as a form of 
behavior could mean being devoted to, caring for, cherishing, and so on. This distinct behavioral 
take on liking can be contrasted with “enjoying” something apart from any activity. Instead, liking 
                                                          
13 See section 2.2.3 for his account of this.  
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is a form of enjoyment where one is concerned to invoke effort or energy to bring about or maintain 
the existence of something. Thus, liking is not taken to be a mere feeling or affective quality 
(Dewey 1939, 14). When liking is taken as affective-motor it has reference to specific existential 
situations, allowing for specific observations of a lacking which is perceived along with 
observations of what motor activity is taken to procure that lacking. A mother who claims to prize 
her child but neglects it is deceiving herself (1939, 15).  
 Since prizing is affective-motor and thus describes active phenomena, it is crucial to 
recognize what the activity is a response to. In situations which require effort, there is a situation 
with certain foreseeable consequences, some of which are considered to be problematic or would 
be objected to: a breakdown in the equilibrium of energies which determine the interactions of an 
organism and its environment. Prizing occurs only when it is necessary to bring something about 
lacking, or to conserve the conditions which would otherwise be unstable, necessary to maintain 
something (1939, 15). Because there is something wanted and there is energy taken to bring it 
about, valuation involves desiring. Is this any different from a wish? Are values merely a matter 
of wishing, and if not, what distinguishes them from a desire? According to Dewey prizing and 
wishing describe different phenomena since where there is prizing there will be effort. We may 
wish for a golden throne, but if there is no effort taken to obtain it or to consider what may be 
required in the way of efforts needed, it remains just a wish. Are we led then to defining values in 
terms of desires?  
Yes, but with a certain caveat; like Lepley’s point about terminal responses tells us, 
desiring is not something complete in-itself. For Dewey desire is never isolated in this way. If it 
were isolated, we would have no basis to distinguish desires from each other. If desire is just a 
desire, at that point it becomes merely personal. Instead, Dewey takes desiring in its active sense 
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to be relational to the situation in which it arises.  Objects of desire exist because of the contexts 
and the activities undertaken where there is something lacking. The function of such a desire is to 
resolve that tension. Rather than being merely personal, desire “is an active relation of the 
organism and the environment” (1939, 16). In fact, Dewey considers prizing more in terms of a 
spatial-temporal event, as a relationship between an organism and its environment, than anything 
else. He notes, “There is nothing particularly ‘personal’ about the prizings […] which are subject 
matter of those inquiries that result in evaluations” (LW16: 316). Dewey argues that the reason we 
take desire to be inherently subjective or personal is because of a false psychology that does not 
focus on what function desire has for practice. A desire or preference for a certain form of action 
is just a character of action and not something merely mental or private. As such, desire is a product 
of tensions that exist between an organism and its environment where there are conflicting possible 
courses of action. It gains an intellectual or mental character where it becomes part of a logical 
process of judgment (MW8: 34). 
Dewey notes, “Practically all of the fallacies in the theories that connect valuation with 
desire result from taking ‘desire’ at large” (Dewey 1939, 17). A desire is not, for example, a mere 
impulse but rather is caused by impulses; they are modified impulses occurring in situations where 
something prevents immediate execution of action and involves foresight of consequences. 
Because Dewey takes values to be connected to desires, which are not personal but relational, a 
value cannot be merely personal, despite personal tendencies causing our desires. He notes, “The 
view that ‘a value is any object of interest’ must also be taken with great caution. On its face it 
places all interests on the same level. But, when interests are examined in their concrete makeup 
in relation to their place in some situation, it is plain that everything depends upon the objects 
involved in them” (1939, 18). Thus, it is simply not the case that all interests or desires stand on 
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the same footing with regards to their function in a given situation. So, while values involve 
interests or desires, it does not follow that any personally held interest or desire is equally adequate. 
These distinctions will serve as useful to the analysis of values in science in later chapters.  
Thus, it becomes crucial to consider how we talk about desire in different contexts and the 
function it serves in different situations, whether we are talking merely about its function in an 
organic process or in a logical process. The adequacy of a desire depends on its adaption to the 
needs and demands imposed by the situation. For instance, if I were dying of thirst in the desert, 
my desire for salty potato chips might be inadequate. Because the function of a desire is to bring 
about what is lacking, verifiable propositions about the value of such desires are possible. Thus, 
so far Dewey’s account has parsed the phenomena connected with valuing including desiring and 
liking, while excluding wishing. It has also established that valuing is relational and not merely 
personal, and thus their adequacy will depend on examination of those relations. Dewey’s point 
here mirrors the point Lepley has made: we cannot think of values as being isolated terminal 
responses or impulses; they arise from and respond to contexts and situations. If we don’t notice 
this, we are more likely to think of values as being inherently subjective. 
2.2.4 Appraisal, Ends and Means 
The central aspect of valuation involves appraisal. It is possible to verify whether someone 
does prize something. But this is only one kind of judgment we can make about values. A second 
form of judgment involves determining value where there is uncertainty about whether something 
really is valuable (Dewey 1922a, 326). We may at times be uncertain about whether something 
really is valuable despite our experience that it is and so we must take a critical eye towards it. 
Dewey notes, to judge is to look beyond the thing experienced as self-sufficient and enclosed and 
to consider its relationship to other things and its potential effects and consequences (MW8: 28). 
In other words, whereas prizing is a term that describes a kind of behavioral attitude, appraisal 
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involves examining a prized thing in terms of the consequences to which it can lead where there 
is doubt about which consequence should be realized. In appraisal, we compare what will be the 
different consequences of different forms of prizings. We must consider whether propositions 
about prizings are capable of being appraised so as to determine their worth or whether “some acts 
of prizing are better than others” (Dewey 1939, 20). Thus, where there is appraisal there is 
valuation, whose central character involves a “change of mode of behavior from direct acceptance 
and welcoming to doubting and looking into” (MW8: 30). 
Dewey argues that valuations are no different in logical form from other judgments, 
contrary to other accounts of valuation which labels valuations as emotional and thus distinct from 
other forms of judgment like scientific judgments. The difference lies in the subject matter of the 
judgment, where valuation considers prizings which happen to be affective. The prizing is the 
subject matter of appraisal because it is in doubt about whether it is valuable. Despite the fact that 
the subject-matter of valuations are affective prizings, this does not mean that the judgment itself 
is distinctly emotional in contrast to other kinds of judgments (LW 16: 314-6). Appraisal as a form 
of judgment is thus not different from other kinds of judgment; Dewey expects them to be about 
existential matters, and to be carried out in such a way that avoids blind biases or prejudices. 
If there is no logical difference between value judgments and other judgments, what is the 
basis of appraising value? A common feature found in considerations about judging behavior is 
the means-ends relationship. If I want to bring about a certain consequence, a certain course of 
action is needed, and thus certain means judged to be of value. These hypothetical imperatives can 
form generalized normative rules which are capable of scientific verification. If I plan to build a 
bridge, there are certain principles of engineering that I should abide by and these determine how 
I ought to behave. So, certain norms or rules of appraisal are not a matter of personal preference 
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but can be as experimentally justified as impersonal subject matter (Dewey 1939, 22). Thus, one 
form of appraisal can be a matter of judgment to determine whether certain means are fit to produce 
certain ends and is determined through experimental inquiry. The only alternatives are proceeding 
through blind trial and error, or there is no end entertained at all and only blind action.  
One concern here is that so long as appraisal is only a matter of determining whether 
something is good as a means to an end, then we have no way to judge which ends are worth 
attaining. In other words, a hypothetical imperative only works so long as we know what end we 
ought to be trying to achieve. This is where Dewey offers his distinct approach to valuation. Rather 
than thinking about ends as fixed things independent of inquiry, an end entertained or aimed at is 
part of, and functions within, inquiry. It is not a general idea or concept, but rather a specific 
consequence that we try to bring about. An end is actually only an outcome, while what we 
entertain within an inquiry is an end-in-view. For example, a doctor who heals a patient does not 
have health as an absolute end-in-itself, but rather a specific goal of “restoring a patient to health” 
which would involve rectifying the problem or symptoms they present with. Dewey notes, “We 
cannot seek to attain health, wealth, learning, justice, or kindness in general. Action is always 
specific, concrete, individualized, unique” (Dewey 1920, 167). An end-in-view is not only a 
concrete aim, but as an idea; its function is to stimulate deliberation and action. They, “are not, as 
current theories often imply, things lying beyond activity at which the latter is directed” (Dewey 
1922, 223). For this reason, Dewey will have something unique to say about how the ends are 
adopted according to how we value certain means. 
An end-in-view as an idea or aim are what Dewey calls “terminals in deliberation.” They 
function as potential resolutions to the ongoing tension that causes us to deliberate about what to 
do. An aim within inquiry is supposed to ultimately stimulate activity, at which point an action 
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continues onto another aim. They are turning points in activity. For example, a sailor may have 
the aim of reaching a harbor but reaching it will not lead to a cessation of activity, but a redirection 
of it as new ends-in-view are considered. Thus, ends are also beginnings of new action (1922, 
226). An end-in-view also gives activities a meaning as it aims to bring something about. As 
Dewey notes, “an end-in-view is a means in present action; present action is not a means to a 
remote end” (1922, 226). Also, while Dewey argues that ends-in-view are turning points in activity 
and lead to redirecting pivots in action, another relevant yet not explicitly mentioned fact, is that 
they represent pivots in deliberation as well as we consider each aim, the means required to obtain 
it, and what those actions or outcomes mean to us.  
But if an end is not a fixed end, and things are evaluated in terms of whether they function 
well as means to an end, on what basis do we have to appraise whether certain ends-in-view are 
better than others? A means can clearly be appraised, and an end-in-view can be prized, but what 
else can be said? I have already mentioned that a certain prizing can be evaluated to the degree 
that it responds to the needs of the situation it arises in, but Dewey makes an additional point. 
Desires or interests are not considered independently of how we consider the means required to 
obtain them. Considering the means can modify the ends-in-view or aims we have, something 
Dewey thinks bears out when we consider actual deliberative activity (Dewey 1939, 25). He notes 
when we consider an end, if we find that it would take too much time, too much energy, or if 
attained would bring about too many other problems, we would appraise that as a bad (or rather 
worse) end for the given situation (1939, 23).  
The fact that means and ends cannot be sharply distinguished from each other and 
evaluated separately is because of what is included in the meaning of an end-in-view. Recall that 
what distinguishes a desire or interest from a mere wish is that there is an active interest to bring a 
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certain aim about. What makes the end “in view” is that it is considered in terms of what that aim 
would concretely look like. As Dewey notes, when it comes to an end-in-view as a potential course 
of action, “we can judge its nature, assign its meaning, only by following it in to the situations 
wither it leads, noting the objects against which it runs and seeing how they rebuff or unexpectedly 
encourage it” (Dewey 1922, 192).  An aim forms when there is a reaction against existing 
conditions and we cannot act in a satisfactory way given those conditions. We could imagine a 
scenario of conditions where we would be satisfied, but if we do not consider the activities needed 
for making such changes, we only engage in fantasy. An end-in-view is formed, “only when it is 
worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, that is in terms of ‘means’” 
(1922, 234). Such an aim is only warranted to the degree that we do survey existing conditions and 
their capacity to act as means. Notice again how Lepley’s point about values being relational and 
not terminal responses is again salient. 
Focusing so much on the specific contexts in which desires are formed and the 
consequences they produce is important for Dewey, because anything less than focusing on actual 
situations in which appraisals take place is likely to lead to notions of fixed ends or that values are 
subjective as already discussed. He believes that misconceptions in our thinking about value are 
because we fail to take account of “an empirical analysis of concrete desires and interests as they 
actually exist” (Dewey 1939, 29). Dewey’s analysis insists that in concrete cases, a desire only 
occurs where there is a problem because when things are going smoothly, there is no need to desire 
nor form an end-in-view. However, the presence of a problem is merely a necessary condition for 
valuation, but not a sufficient one. An impulsive or habitual response is always possible once a 
problem is encountered. When there are conflicting impulses however, such that there is a question 
of which response is worthier, these impulses will need to be transformed into desires with an end-
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in-view. The intellectual “ideational” component found in an end-in-view as the aim of a desire is 
that transformation. These points suggest that since valuation involves desire and since desires 
form only where there is a problem, valuation only takes place where there is a problem and there 
must be an intellectual factor in its resolution (1939, 34).  
2.2.5 Reasonable and Unreasonable Desires: Valuation as Intelligent Behavior 
A response to a perceived problem can follow two paths. It can either be a matter of impulse 
or habit, or it can proceed by forming an end-in-view about how best to resolve the problem faced. 
As a concrete aim, it will account for the means necessary. As Dewey notes, “It is simply 
impossible to have an end-in-view or to anticipate the consequences of any proposed line of action 
save upon the basis of some, however slight, consideration of the means by which it can be brought 
into existence” (1939, 35). Thus, the activity is mediated by the anticipation of consequences of 
the end-in-view and this will modify the desire.  
Crucially, Dewey takes valuation to be connected to desires and interests in the active sense 
previously discussed. An active desire or interest is “ineffectual” unless it takes account of 
environing conditions. The end-in-view “is warranted in the precise degree in which it is formed 
in terms of these operating conditions” (1939, 29). In fact, ends-in-view formed in this way are 
often considered wise and a sign of maturity, while ends adopted without considering their 
requirements or effects are usually considered immature and shortsighted. To judge value, in other 
words, is to judge that something fulfils certain conditions, and in considering these conditions 
what is initially immediately valued is revised.   
On this basis we can again distinguish between various desires and interests, rather than 
lumping them together or considering them of equal worth (1939, 26). Dewey notes that the 
difference between reasonable and unreasonable desires is that a reasonable desire will be formed 
on the basis of existing liabilities and resources, while an unreasonable desire is one that arises 
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casually and is not altered by further consideration of existing conditions (1939, 29). Maturity 
consists in not giving into casual or immediately felt desires but in “remaking [them] in their first 
manifestation” by considering the consequences of our desires if acted upon. In fact, an 
unconsidered or immediately felt desire is not a desire at all, but rather what Dewey calls an 
impulse, which is a product of organic tendencies. For there to be a desire, there must be a 
modification of the immediate impulse. Or, in other words, the difference between a desire and an 
impulse is that in the desire there is an end-in-view (1939, 30).  
The necessary relationship between ends-in-view and consideration of means is important 
for Dewey because this is how we can claim to have verifiable value judgments. Through 
experimental trials and errors, noting both where we fail to bring about the ends desired and where 
we succeed, where certain conditions make certain ends possible, we make possible through 
intellectual means the creation of desires which are better suited given the conditions available for 
realizing them. This intellectual component of appraisal thus produces new or modified prizings. 
As Dewey notes, “wherever there is an end-in-view of any sort whatever, there is affective-
ideational-motor activity; or, in terms of the dual meaning of valuation, there is a union of prizing 
and appraising” (1939, 31). According to Dewey, values created as a product of judgment are just 
as immediately felt or experienced, but they have an added dimension. The end has integrated with 
its means and altered its meaning; the immediate value has a different quality (Dewey 1922a, 328). 
If we admit to verifiable propositions about evaluations of means, and if “these propositions enter 
into the formation of the interests and desires which are valuations of ends, the latter are thereby 
constituted the subject matter of authentic empirical affirmations and denials” (Dewey 1939, 30).  
This intellectual or ideational component is what it means to form an end-in-view. It is 
possible to enjoy something without an end-in-view and thus to take account of means required. 
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There may be active intent to bring something about, but it doesn’t rise above mere impulse or 
blind habitual response without some form of judgment; some formation and modification of an 
end-in-view. Thus, we can establish now an overview of the different forms of valuing. Where 
there is only immediate experience of value, there is enjoyment but no judgment, no formation of 
an end-in-view. There is valuing but no valuation. In these circumstances the only judgment 
possible is a judgment about value, such as “Mary values X.” In cases where what should be valued 
is uncertain, where there is critical reflection, there is prizing where an end-in-view is formed and 
thus a union of prizing and appraisal. This is possible because valuation has taken place. The key 
point that Dewey emphasizes is that valuation is possible, that new values come to be where there 
is uncertainty, and it doesn’t reduce to cases of valuing; judging does not merely record prizings 
but changes them. Valuation is about the intelligent formation of a new determinate value.  
2.2.6 Instrumental and Immediate Values and the Ends/Means Continuum 
Since, for Dewey ends are evaluated relative to the needs of a situation and in view of the 
means required for their attainment, his position does not hold that there are ends-in-themselves, 
or ends that retain their worth regardless of any means or consequences involved. The end-in-view 
is only relative to a situation. Recall that an end as an aim is a means to a direct pivot in activity 
or that an end-in-view is means to present action (Dewey 1922, 226). Activity does not cease when 
an aim is attained, it is merely redirected to something else. Thus, an end as an outcome is also a 
beginning. This means that the distinction between ends and means is temporal and relational, that 
every end is also a means to further ends and since every means to an end has to be brought about 
to be a means, it is also an object of desire and an end-in-view (Dewey 1939, 43). Thus, any 
distinction between an end and a means is always a functional distinction for the purposes of 
inquiry and a present activity, not a static property. 
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The lack of a fixed distinction between ends and means also means that there is no fixed 
distinction between instrumental values and inherent, or perhaps more accurately, immediate 
values. For Dewey inherent value is redefined as a quality of the value experienced. If something 
is experienced as a value, it has that quality inherently or immediately. But, the distinction is 
between immediate and instrumental is intellectual, but not a logical or existential distinction 
(Dewey 1922a, 327).  Anything valued immediately is capable of being judged in its capacity as 
means to future ends. By the same token, instrumental goods can be valued as immediately good. 
If a means is not a mere means but indispensable, it is capable of being an end-in-view, of being 
valued for its own sake as an integral part of the total end. Dewey notes, “Every condition that has 
to be brought into existence in order to serve as a means, is in that connection, and object of desire” 
(Dewey 1939, 42). Thus, instrumental goods are capable of also being inherently or immediately 
good. This matter is relevant to what Dewey has to say about the nature of intrinsic goods. If 
something is found to be immediately good, it has that quality intrinsically in experience. In other 
words, if we prize it, it has immediate worth. We cannot interpret that as indicating that that means 
that its value is out of relation to anything else, or that it is an end-in-itself independent of means 
or contexts. On Dewey’s account since value is connected to desires and interest, and since those 
are relational, there is no such thing as a value independent of its relation to anything else (Dewey 
1939, 28). Therefore, if we desire something to serve as a means it has an immediate value.  
It is because values arise as desires and interests in response to the tension between an 
organism and its environment that values will always be relational and never fixed or isolated 
goods in themselves. Thus, Dewey rejects fixed ends. On his view, the failure of philosophers to 
notice this is because they do not pay attention to concrete desires as they actually exist. So long 
as values are relational and functionally determined, we can be more empirical about determining 
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what to value. Dewey notes, “If the notion of some objects as ends-in-themselves were abandoned, 
not merely in words but in all practical implications, human beings would for the first time in 
history be in a position to frame ends-in-view and form desires on the basis of empirically 
grounded propositions” (Dewey 1939, 43). This will be relevant to discussion about the use of 
values in science because the notion that values held dogmatically or absolutely is to be rejected; 
instead their status and worth will have to be experimentally demonstrated.  
The claim that means can also be ends, and ends can also be means and that both exist 
along a continuum raises the concern that there is no logical point at which to cut off evaluation 
when making a judgment. Dewey’s response is to point back to the issue where evaluation began 
which is with the problem currently faced. He notes that control of the transformation of an impulse 
into a desire and formation of an end-in-view is found when we consider the needs of the actual 
situation as observed. He notes, “The ‘value’ of different ends that suggest themselves is estimated 
or measured by the capacity they exhibit to guide in making good, satisfying, in its literal sense, 
existing lacks. Here is the factor which cuts short the process of foreseeing and weighing ends-in-
view in their function as means” (1939, 46). In any deliberation on a given question, the question 
itself provides the end, where “end” here means the terminating limit of judgment. The situation 
we face is what forces the question and thus terminating limit. For example, we may deliberate 
about the worth of buying a suit and if so what kind of suit, but the end of judgment exists where 
we make the decision about what to do because the situation demands that we make a decision one 
way or another (MW8: 44). In other words, inquiry begins with a problematic situation, and our 
judgment is justified by considering potential means and consequences which will resolve the 
problem and resolve the tensions within the situation without creating further problems for us.14  
                                                          
14 This model of judgment will be expanded on in the following chapter. 
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To summarize, Dewey’s account of value allows us to distinguish between the concept of 
wishes or impulses at large and desires and interests which are formed in response to concrete 
problematic situations and include concrete aims or ends-in-view. Valuation relates to desires and 
interests which take place within contexts and situations and not as isolated phenomena. Because 
desires exist in relationship to a situation which either will or will not be resolved by acting on that 
desire, and since that situation has objective factors and requirements needed for resolution, we do 
not have to treat all desires as equally adequate or assume that how we ought to respond to the 
objective needs of a situation is a merely subjective matter. Values must be considered not just as 
terminal responses, but in terms of their functional relationship to a situation. The felt problem 
facing us is not merely psychological, but a factor of the situation itself, and convincing ourselves 
otherwise will not resolve the organic-environmental tensions facing us (Dewey 1938, 106). Thus, 
we do not have to accept the claim that values are either inherent or fixed (and thus unscientific), 
nor do we have to accept that value is merely a matter of impulse, wish, or desire or interest at 
large. We possess the means to discern between adequate desires and interest and inadequate ones 
and we can measure whether the formation of an end-in-view is an adequate solution.  
2.2.7 Summary 
The issues Dewey raises are important when we discuss the role that values play in science 
and the concern that surrounds their use such as their relationship to desires, fantasies, wishes, 
likings, and preferences. Dewey’s account is thus relevant to parsing phenomena typically 
connected to the concept of value such as whether we are willing to take action to bring about what 
we want, or whether we consider the needs of the situation and the effects of action. Some of this 
terminology differs from their established use in philosophy of science, but it presents the 
opportunity to consider the merit of making clear distinctions between these phenomena and 
adding greater precision to our terminology. Dewey’s account also provides a basic model for 
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thinking about the logic of value judgments in terms of the relationship between means and ends 
and our ability to critically analyze and experiment with proposed plans of action which we have 
desire to pursue. Dewey’s articulation of the basis of critical analysis of prizings will be relevant 
towards the end of the chapter, while his account of the logic of such judgments will be discussed 
in the following chapter.  
2.3. C.I. Lewis’ Account of Value 
Clarence Lewis joins Dewey in offering a naturalized account of valuation, although he is far more 
emphatic about the necessity of such an account to make sense of knowledge. Dewey’s account 
will serve to provide a broad understanding of values, but it also focusses on individual experience 
and thus does not explain variance in value experience from person to person, or how we disagree 
about value in any great detail. Thus, in explaining Lewis’ account here I will focus on his analysis 
of similarities of value judgments and knowledge judgments and their necessary connections, and 
the different ways values can be experienced, verified, and predicated in greater detail. According 
to Lewis, “Evaluations are a form of empirical knowledge, not fundamentally different in what 
determines their truth or falsity, from other kinds of empirical knowledge” (Lewis 1946, 365). To 
make sense of this claim, it will be necessary to examine his account of knowledge first.  
2.3.2 Knowledge, Value, and Action 
Lewis believes that knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected; 
knowledge guides action, while action is determined upon the basis of evaluation (1946, 3). 
Knowledge involves the process of taking what is experienced as given, or in “thin experience,” 
as signifying something else which is capable of being realized in future experience through action. 
Knowledge thus serves as a guide for action; its function is that of an instrument enabling transition 
from one immediate experience to another, “from the actual present to a future which is desired 
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and which the present is believed to signify” (1946, 4). The control which knowledge provides to 
our action is for the sake of realizing what we value and avoiding what is undesirable.  
 Because of this close connection between knowledge, action, and evaluation, Lewis argues 
that the purpose of knowledge is to allow us to alter the future content of reality; it permits 
deliberate action. If we were incapable of assigning value to future possible outcomes, then 
deliberate action would be pointless.15 It is in these connections that knowledge for Lewis, as for 
Dewey, is not merely a mental exorcise, but a process of adaptations between an organism and its 
environment. Lewis notes, “No attitude, feeling, or other conscious state of the organism could be 
assigned a significance of empirical cognition except such as are responses to some character or 
item of the environment” (1946, 12). These points thus not only echo the points already made by 
Lepley and Dewey in that values are not isolated but responsive to a situation, but also establish 
the point that valuation is necessary for knowledge. The latter point will be further developed in 
the following chapter.  
2.3.3 Experience and Meaning 
 As noted in section 1, Lewis believes in a form of experience free of interpretation which 
is immediately given. However, this immediate experience is necessary for knowledge, but is not 
a form of knowledge-in-itself. For an experience to be cognitive, we must use what is given as an 
interpretation to get an indication of some future experience beyond what is currently presented. 
This constitutes the meaning of what is experienced. Meaning is restricted to what is verifiable; a 
meaning is verified if, upon the adoption of a mode of action, the newly presented experience is in 
accordance with what is anticipated.  
                                                          
15 Note that Lewis is broadly talking about deliberate action as action where one is aware of what is going on and 
aware of it being alterable in contrast to knee-jerk reactions or mere physical responses. Thus, not all action 
requires explicit conscious appraisal and decision (it can be habitual), but rather the behavior could have been 
initiated by appraisal and decision and would have been if the question of consequences and desirability were 
raised (1946, 8). See pages 5-9 of his book for further information on his account of action.   
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For Lewis, for something to count as empirical knowledge, it must be verifiable (1944, 26). 
The predictive function of perceptual knowledge where a meaning is found in interpreting a given 
experience is as follows: with what is given, if I act in such a way, the subsequent experience will 
have a particular eventuality (1946, 16). When such circumstances occur, and where action is 
taken, and the result is as anticipated, “the pragmatic signification of the perceptual apprehension 
is verified, and the object, or character of the object, which it mediates is found to exist or to be 
real” (1946, 16). However, when what is given is separated from any interpretation of it, such an 
apprehension is not verifiable (1946, 26). As noted, only where there is interpretation of a given 
experience, can there be verification. Without interpretation of experience (without meaning), 
what is experienced can only be enjoyed or suffered (1946, 14). Because there can be no 
knowledge where there is no possibility of error, and since apprehension of immediate experience 
is not susceptible to error, it cannot be a form of knowledge.  
According to the account of meaning Lewis adopts, the total meaning of any belief is the 
experienced consequences which would follow were certain operations performed and which 
would stand as evidence for or against the belief. For example, when I examine a white paper 
before me, I predict that if I move my gaze to the left, the image of the paper will move to the right 
relative to my visual field. If I were to fold the paper in half, the paper would crease. If these 
consequences were to occur as anticipated, it would corroborate my belief that there is a real piece 
of paper before me. However, for Lewis for any claim about an objective fact (“there is a real piece 
of paper before me”) there are an infinite number of potentially testable claims.16 He notes, “It 
seems clear that in so simple a case as the white paper supposedly before me, the number of 
[implied consequences] is inexhaustible […] there will never be a time when the fact—or non-
                                                          
16 It may be worth noting that this position is identical to Carnap’s in his outline of confirmation (Carnap 1936, 
426).   
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fact—of this piece of paper now lying on my desk will not make some trivial difference” (1946, 
176). Even the most trivial real event will always make some conceivable trivial difference which 
could stand as evidence for or against a belief.  
This matters because it means that beliefs about objective facts will never be completely 
confirmed. At best, any verification presents probable corroboration of a belief. It may be 
confirmed to a degree of practical certainty, but never absolute certainty. Because of this, Lewis 
points to an important difference in two kinds of empirical judgment. One kind will involve 
phenomenalistic judgments about immediate experience as presented, a knowledge of sense 
perception. This category includes claims like “If I move my eyes to the right, the image that 
appears to be a piece of paper will move to the left.” The second kind will be about an objective 
fact, about the objective piece of paper, such as “A piece of white paper is before me.” With this 
division, Lewis argues that there are three classifications of empirical statements: formulations of 
present immediate experience, terminating judgments, and non-terminating judgments.  
2.3.4 Three Classifications of Empirical Statements 
Rarely do we explicitly formulate statements of present immediate experience (or thin 
experience), which would be entirely phenomenal if expressed in linguistic form. Any verbal 
formulation would denote appearances rather than assert any objective fact. For example, such a 
formulation might be “I see what appears to be granite steps” rather than “I see granite steps.” 
Nevertheless, despite the potential difficulty in formulation and general unnecessity of explicit 
formulation, they are necessary for empirical judgment. Lewis notes, “there is such a thing as 
experience, the content of which we do not invent and cannot have as we will but merely find” 
(Lewis 1946, 182). According to him, “Without such apprehensions of direct and indubitable 
content of experience, there could be no basis for any empirical judgment, and no verification of 
one” (1946, 182). This given content is part of perception but is not cognitive-in-itself. It involves 
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only direct experience, not including anything that we see, hear, or learn from experience that we 
could conceivably be mistaken about. Apprehensions of the immediately given are not judgments, 
nor are to be classified as knowledge, because there is no possibility of error. Such statements 
about the given can only be true or false insofar as we can lie in our reports of them (1946, 183) 
The second classification is terminating judgments. Terminating judgments are predictions 
about future possible experience. Beginning with what is immediately given, they prescribe a test 
by way of acting, regarding what would a further experience be like. They take the form “Given a 
certain sensory cue (S), if a given action is taken (A), then an expected consequence in experience 
(E) will result.” Because E is an eventuality of immediate experience, and not something 
describing an objective fact, these kinds of judgments can be known with certainty (1946, 184). 
For example, “If I look at what appears to be a ketchup bottle, I will see what appears to be red” 
can be known with certainty because all it describes is what appears in experience, and not an 
objective fact. Terminating judgments only assert what would be found in experience as presented; 
they make no assertions about reality (1946, 204). According to Lewis, it may still be possible that 
I am dreaming and that there is no such bottle, but that I am directly experiencing a quality I call 
red17 is beyond doubt. Unlike formulations about the given, these judgments are predictive in their 
nature and thus capable of verification. Thus, for Lewis, they are a form of knowledge.  
Finally, there are non-terminating judgments. These are judgments about objective reality. 
Objective judgments about things can be translated into a series of terminating judgments for the 
purposes of testing, but for reasons noted earlier, there would be an indefinite number of such 
judgments necessary for full verification. Recall, that the meaning of a claim, such as about a white 
                                                          
17 Notice that it is the quality as expected, not necessarily that I can call it red that is important. Lewis is skeptical 
about the degree to which such phenomenal qualities can be given a linguistic formulation without some 
interpretation being involved.  
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piece of paper, includes all the conceivable effects or implications it could produce in experience; 
in other words, any objective fact is translatable into a series of predictive statements. For example, 
if the paper were real, we could say that if it were folded it would crease, if it were left alone it 
wouldn’t randomly disappear, and so on. To test these effects, we would translate them into 
terminating judgments about what would be found in experience. To put it another way, the sense 
meaning of any objective claim must be put in terms of the terminating judgments implied by it. 
However, as Lewis notes, “no limited set of particular predictions of empirical eventualities can 
completely exhaust the significance of an objective statement” (1946, 184). The claim that a piece 
of paper is white, rather than just appearing white, always has implications for further possible 
experience beyond what at a given time have been found to be true. Lewis explains, “Theoretically 
complete and absolute verification of any objective judgment would be a never-ending task: any 
actual verification of them is no more than partial” (1946, 185).  
Each verified terminating judgment adds to the degree of verification of the objective fact, 
which thus makes the judgment more probable. However, this will only be a matter of degree. We 
may be practically certain that there is a piece of paper before us, but in so far as further empirical 
tests can be done, then there is always a degree of theoretical uncertainty (1946, 187).  
 Lewis’ account of the nature of empirical judgment is developed and then applied to values 
to demonstrate that values are also empirically verifiable. As previously noted, Lewis believes that 
value judgments are a form of knowledge no different from any other. He claims that this fact has 
been obscured by a failure to distinguish between mere apprehensions of good in experience from 
predictions of possible realizations of value and appraisals of objective-value quality in existing 
things. Resolving this requires paying attention to the nature of value and how we can distinguish 
between subjectivity and objectivity in value-ascriptions.  
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2.3.5 Three Classifications of Value Statements 
 According to Lewis scholar Charles Baylis, Lewis’ value theory parallels his account of 
empirical knowledge (Baylis 1964; 565). Lewis articulates three types of value claims, each 
corresponding to the three classifications of empirical statements. First, there are value claims 
about what is found in immediate experience. For example, to say “this is good” is just to report 
the directly experienced character of what is presented, however this is merely to say that there is 
apparent value to what is experienced. Formulations of these kinds of experience intend nothing 
more than this apparent quality (Lewis 1946, 374). While not intending to describe objective 
properties themselves, such direct value-apprehensions are necessary for the determination of 
value. Like any expression of immediate experience, these formulations of value are not a form of 
judgment and thus not a form of knowledge.  
Lewis explains that value as phenomenally experienced is a general mode of presentation 
that is subject to degree in the sense that we could say that other modalities would be better or 
worse, but without being able to make decisive comparisons or calculations. The attempt to assign 
any kind of numerical measure to an experienced good or bad would be arbitrary.  
The pleasure of good company and a concert combined would not be equal to the sum of 
the pleasure of the company and the concert apart from each other; it would be the total pleasure 
found in the total state of affairs; the constituent experiences only combine into the whole such as 
to qualify the total value-character (1946, 491-4). The value found in an experience of an event is 
not a sum of the components that went into it, but rather form a temporal Gestalt (1946, 487). 
Thus, there can be no strict measurement and no calculus of what is immediately good. Instead, 
the immediate good is characterized as, “that mode or aspect of the given to which desire and 
aversion are addressed: and it is that by apprehension of which the inclination to action is normally 
elicited” (1946, 403). This characterization is similar to Dewey’s description of prizing.  
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It is also worth noting that he does not equate value or disvalue with pleasure or pain. He 
argues that terms like “liked,” “wanted,” “good,” and “bad,” are good indices of what is 
immediately experienced as value, but that “pleasure” and “pain” are poor indices because they 
are too narrow, and generally their connotation suggests a qualification of the subject experiencing 
and their “organic sensations” rather than the content of the presentation (1946, 404). Thus, Lewis’ 
view is not a form of narrow hedonism.  
 The second type of value claims are evaluations which are terminating judgments. These 
predict, given certain circumstances, what an immediate experience of value would be if a certain 
action were taken. For example, “If I taste what is before me, I shall enjoy it.” These are judgments 
which are capable of verification, and capable of error, and thus they are a form of knowledge. 
Also, like any other terminating judgment, they can be decisively verified.  
 The third type of value claims are evaluations as non-terminating judgments. These are an, 
“ascription of the objective property to an existent or possible existent” (1946, 375). What 
objective property is judged in this case are, “ascriptions to some actuality, or to some conceived 
actuality, or to some kind of entity, of a potentiality for contributing to a value-quality to 
experience” (1946, 397). Like any kind of non-terminating judgment, they are never decisively 
verified, and always retain the possibility of further significance for future experience and are 
capable of further confirmation. As Baylis notes, “a person can at most make probable judgments 
about values which are independent of his wish” (Baylis, 562). Thus, like any claim about an 
objective fact, they can never be determined to be completely true or false, only to a degree we 
might consider practically certain. Also, like any non-terminating judgment there is nothing in the 
meaning of them which isn’t translatable into terminating judgments. There is no limit to the 
number of such translations, each of which can add to the degree of confirmation. Lewis notes, 
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“Any particular confirmation of such a judgment comes by way of finding true some terminating 
judgment which is a consequence of it” (Lewis 1946, 376). Thus, any confirmation of any objective 
value must be realizable in a value experience of the first type of value claim mentioned. 
2.3.6 Valued Versus Valuable 
 The distinction between these three kinds of value claims, particularly the first and third 
kinds of value claims, is crucial because like Dewey, Lewis argues that much of the confusion 
about values has to do with immediate experiences of value and judgments of value. He argues 
that there has been a “failure to distinguish mere apprehensions of good or ill in experience from 
predictions of the possible realizations of these qualities in particular empirical contexts, and from 
appraisals of the objective value-quality resident in existent things” (1946, 365). By making this 
distinction, we can separate what is desired and what is desirable. An immediate experience of 
good is unmistakable, but we can be mistaken about objective properties. It is possible, “to desire 
what is not in its real nature desirable; to have an interest which is mistaken; to believe that a thing 
will conduce to satisfaction when in fact it will lead to pain” (1946, 398). This idea only becomes 
clear if we distinguish between what is valuable as being directly prized, and what is valuable 
because it is judged as being capable of realizing such a quality in experience (1946, 398).18 
 Lewis’ conception of value is naturalistic since it holds that we do not need anything more 
than natural insight to make evaluations; all that is needed is what can be learned from the 
experience of life in the natural world rather than relying on transcendental norms (1946, 399). He 
also makes it clear that it is not subjective or relativist either. He notes that he “does not intend to 
                                                          
18 Lewis notes that he borrows the terms “prized” and “appraised” from Dewey, but uses them differently (1946, 
398). Dewey uses prizings to refer to a kind of behavior and to an extent so does Lewis, be he seems to emphasize 
prizings in terms of their connection to an immediate given quality in experience. For Dewey, appraisal is not 
completely distinct from prizings, but for Lewis appraisal seems to be a completely separate form of judgment 
dealing with objective properties rather than immediate experience. Outside of this section, when I use the terms I 
will be referring to Dewey’s meanings.  
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put evaluations which the fool makes in his folly on par with those of the sage in his wisdom” 
(1944, 399). Truth or falsity of value judgments is independent of what we may wish: the value 
predicates are not determined by immediate liking, or desire, or interest, “but determined 
independently of what one may think or feel about them” (1946, 399). Rather, truth or falsity is 
determined by reference to natural consequences of acting in accordance with that is judged. 
2.3.7 Subjectivity and Objectivity in Values 
Lewis stresses the importance of rejecting subjectivism when it comes to values. He 
believes that value judgments are a form of cognition directed towards facts which determine their 
correctness just like any other form of knowledge. On his account value as immediately 
experienced is apparent and it is this factor which allows for the distinction between subjectivity 
and objectivity. If one bites into an apple, one cannot be mistaken about the good or bad taste of 
the present bite, but we could be mistaken if on this basis alone we judge the apple to be good or 
bad. Immediate experience is not classified as subjective or as a mere appearance only such that 
we would consider it non-veridical (1946, 408). Every empirical apprehension is first an 
apprehension of an appearance. What is considered to be subjective and objective is a product of 
a later classification of apprehended content with reference to the relation of the content to further 
possible experience rather than being inherent. If an immediate experience, gives rise to a belief 
which later experience corroborates, it is considered objective in the sense of being veridical. If 
not, then it is subjective and illusory (1946, 408). This relationship between the apparent and the 
objective is no different from any other form of knowledge. 
This matter demonstrates that immediate liking or disliking does not necessarily allow us 
to conclude the objective value properties of existent things. Like the apple example, upon hearing 
a piece of music or seeing a painting, we cannot be mistaken about our present enjoyment or 
distaste, but any conclusion we attempt to reach in terms of the music’s or painting’s future effects 
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can be subject to error. For example, the painting may be hung in poor lighting which obscures the 
image; thus, we may like it momentarily, but ultimately be mistaken about its objective value 
(1946, 411). But this is not to claim that immediate values are inherently subjective, for immediate 
values have the capacity to be veridical and objective values can only be verified through them. 
According to Lewis, the idea that immediate values are inherently subjective, rather than being a 
later classification, is a mistake that leads to the criticism of naturalistic conceptions of value 
because of the presumption that we cannot infer objective value from subjective experience (1946, 
414).  
For example, we may find out through investigation that the reason why an immediate 
value-experience has the quality it does could be owing to matters of personal history, make-up, 
or attitude on this particular occasion. We must admit “as objective any datum which has the 
character of a normal and common human apprehension in the presence of the object in question, 
and to regard as subjective only those which deviate from this by reason of something which is a 
personal or temporary characteristic of the individual subject” (1946, 420).  These personal factors 
are present in all experiences and can affect other qualities as well such as shape, colour, and size 
(1946, 416). The reason an experience could be considered subjective is because we may be misled 
about the value-possibilities of similar future situations, or we may infer that others would find the 
same value under like conditions. Despite personal factors having such effects on experiences, we 
still don’t need to consider the subjective experience non-veridical.  
Subjectivity as a factor of experience does not have to lead to adverse effects on our ability 
to make objective judgments. Lewis argues that idiosyncrasies of apprehension may exist without 
affecting our ability to discriminate and analyze related elements of experience in the same way 
as others. For example, a color-blind person may experience a quality which is commonly 
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described as green despite not experiencing it as others do. Despite this, they may learn to say 
“green” when others do. In this case the personal character of the visual data marks it as subjective, 
but it does not prevent them from correctly interpreting the experience as clues to objective fact 
(1946, 420). No apprehension, whether it is subjective or objective, is inherently misleading; only 
an interpretation of what is apprehended can be misleading.  
In fact, Lewis goes so far as to claim that subjectivity of data not only characterizes much 
of our experience, but that it can also be a continuing characteristic of an individual’s experience. 
Yet, so long as it is recognized and compensated for, the subjectivity of their apprehension is no 
more likely to lead to a misjudgment than objective apprehension (1946, 421-2). If value 
apprehensions were not veridical, if there were no correlation between what we experience as value 
to objective value-properties, then it would be impossible to learn and ameliorate our experiences. 
Lewis points out, if there is such a correlation, “then the law of it will determine what kinds of 
objects, under what circumstances, possess potentiality for conducing to our enjoyment or our 
pain—their objective value qualities” (1946, 424).  
Because of the argument Lewis presents on the nature of subjectivity, his outline permits a 
great degree of variability in what can be immediately experienced as value, while still retaining 
the possibility for objective value. He notes how factors like context, habits, and anticipations can 
all affect the value quality experienced (1946, 426-8). There is also more variability, not just 
moment to moment within an individual, but from person to person. In response to the claim that 
there seems to be a greater variance on value-qualities experienced to other qualities, Lewis argues 
that often the matter has to do with how we detect differences. For many qualities experienced, it 
is usually more important to express agreement on color than on whether we like it, and failure to 
experience as others do may even go unnoticed. For example, the color-blind person who says 
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“green” when everyone else does makes it difficult to detect idiosyncrasy (1946, 419). Also, we 
should not overemphasize agreement over physical qualities and disagreement over value qualities 
to infer an inherent difference. As Cheryl Misak points out, this view distinguishes value 
judgments from sensory judgments in degree, not by kind (Misak 2013, 189). Lewis notes, “those 
who would think to discover an absolute difference between value-apprehensions as flatly relative 
to the individual and other empirical findings as unqualifiedly universal and common, must 
obviously be very thoughtless or excessively naïve” (Lewis 1946, 419).19 
When it comes to the verification of objective value properties, Lewis’ argument that there 
can be objective value despite variation in personal experience suggests we do not need to conclude 
that objective value-judgments are exclusively determined by the possibility of direct value-
experience. For instance, we may believe that a neighbor is a good musician because of their 
renditions of flawless passages despite the music itself not being personally satisfying (1946, 377). 
This would also be true of our finding that a chisel is good because it is sharp, which is learned by 
cutting oneself. Lewis notes, “Just as one may find evidence that a thing is round or is hard in other 
ways than by seeing it round or feeling it hard, so too the objective value of a thing may be 
confirmed ‘indirectly’ in other ways than by what would be called ‘experiencing the value of it’” 
(1946, 376). Thus, the formulation of objective tests may allow for confirmation, without 
depending on personally experiencing a value-quality. 
2.3.8 Value Predication 
Lewis provides an important analysis regarding objective values and value experience 
prediction between potential and actual value predicates. Recall that something has objective value 
if it contains a permanent possibility of leading to a value-experience that is attributed to the object 
                                                          
19 In the following section, we shall see that Ray Lepley presents a similar argument concerning how variance in 
fact questions just as in value questions should make us skeptical about inferring inherent differences.  
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apart from conditions which are merely personal or peculiar. These qualities exist in the object 
even if this capacity for value-experience is never tested, just like a nugget of gold may have a 
particular value even if never unearthed. On the other hand, values are often considered to be 
relative to actual circumstances, just like we may also claim that the gold is worthless if it is never 
unearthed. Lewis makes sense of this by distinguishing between value predication as potential 
versus actual. In potential situations, we rely on subjunctive clauses which specify the value-
experiences that would occur if certain conditions were satisfied. This is no different than claiming 
that salt is soluble because if it were placed in water it would dissolve, even if we never actually 
test this. Lewis notes that values predicated in this mode are objective values (1944, 519). In actual 
predications of value, however, we are concerned with what can be predicated given actual rather 
than possible conditions.20 Thus, to say that something is or isn’t valuable is what can be said given 
present circumstances. In the case of the unlocated gold, given actual conditions, it is of no value 
to anyone. Lewis terms values in this mode of predication as values-in-fact (Lewis 1946, 520).21  
This distinction is important because it allows us to make sense of how seemingly 
contradictory claims likes “that gold is valuable” and “that gold is worthless” can both be true. 
Lewis describes various kinds of values-in-fact. The first are values relative to persons, or values-
in-fact relative to personal circumstances. For example, a concert ticket may not be used by a 
person if they have another engagement. In this case the ticket has objective value, but not to that 
person (1946, 522). By that same reasoning we can explain why something may be of value to one 
                                                          
20 Lewis doesn’t use these terms, but it may be helpful to borrow some of the language used by Carnap. According 
to Carnap a claim may be confirmable if we know of the conditions that would confirm the claim even if those 
conditions do not actually exist (i.e. If we could locate the gold, if the gold produced a value-experience, it would 
have value). On the other hand, a claim is testable if we know of the procedure by which we could confirm it 
(Carnap, 1936). If we were to state that a testable claim must reference actual conditions, then a value claim could 
be confirmable but not testable.  
21 For Lewis, actual predications do not change the object or its qualities. The relativity of values predicated in this 
way are relative to circumstances, not relative to the object or to people.  
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person and not another. Lewis argues that this can allow us to distinguish between what is relative 
and what is subjective. While personal circumstances may prevent a value from being realizable 
to a person, so long as these circumstances are accidental to rather than characteristic of the subject 
experiencing it, the value is not subjective. Subjectivity in value apprehension is due to a limitation 
of the realization of a value due to conditions “characterizing the nature and capacity of the subject 
in question” and thus the finding of value by this subject is not indicative of the possibility of 
value-finding on the part of others, and is unreliable and likely to mislead the subject in the future 
(1946, 529).  
On the other hand, a value may be considered comparatively speaking as being better than 
average, better than other things, or better than nothing. According to Lewis, a value is objectively 
good if it is more good than bad overall, but it is possible that something can be genuinely valuable 
even if it is bad overall but is not completely worthless. For example, a broken tool can still be 
better than no tool if there are no alternatives. Thus, something can be genuinely valuable to a 
person, despite it being objectively bad (1946, 526). Lewis emphasizes that objective values are 
based on impersonal findings, but this does not entail that most people would enjoy something of 
value. He notes, “majority votes prove nothing—except concerning what is relative to majorities” 
(1946, 526). Thus, what is impersonally valuable is not the same as what is generally valuable. 
This outline of values-in-fact allows for a clear distinction between what is relatively valuable 
compared to what is subjective. Thus, we can say that something can be objectively valuable, but 
not valuable to a person; something can be not objectively valuable but valuable to a person; 
something can be objectively valuable, but not to most people; and something can be valuable to 
a person, but only subjectively so.  
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This framework by Lewis provides tools needed to make sense of the various forms of 
value predication. He notes, “Objects are assessed in many ways and from many different points 
of view, with results which would oftentimes appear incompatible with one another if this diversity 
of the specific meanings of ‘value’ as applied to them should not be recognized” (1946, 539).  
Because of this:  
there is no such thing as the value of an object or objects, which is either relative or 
absolute, subjective or objective. Instead there are all these various modes in which the 
value of objects commonly is—and for good reasons—must be assessed; each having its 
own specific meaning and corresponding criteria of correctness. (1946, 530)  
With this in mind we can understand relativity without denying objectivity. For according to Lewis 
all value depends on an object’s relation to actual or possible experience. While the possibilities 
of experience are partially dependent on the subject, the qualities of experience an object may 
induce depends on the object itself. The character by which it will or would under appropriate 
conditions produce satisfaction is on that basis not relative (1946, 532). The closest thing to a final 
kind of valuation would require considering a thing as eventually contributory to satisfaction in 
some whole life or lives (1946, 540).  
 This thinking should go a long way in reply to arguments that disagreements about value 
or worth must be simply a matter of subjective taste. Something may have objective value, yet this 
may not always be realizable in every context. This manner of thinking is not unheard of in 
philosophy of science either. Nancy Cartwright has argued that a number of physical laws such as 
Snell’s law are examples of ceteris paribus laws, or laws that are only true under ideal conditions, 
but under actual conditions are false owing to “disturbing factors.” In other words, there are a 
number of generalizations that can be considered objectively true but may not be realizable. 
Despite the limitations, Cartwright argues that scientists have legitimate reasons for relying on 
them (Cartwright 1983, 48). Additionally, Longino argues that successful use of such 
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generalizations should count as knowledge (Longino 2002, 110). A scientific study of value, thus, 
can be similar to physical science in that it can involve the systematic study of the conditions upon 
which generalized relationships do hold, and in a way that doesn’t require us to understand value 
as being any more subjective than Snell’s law.  
This framework also permits an account of improper reasoning when it comes to such 
predications. For example, a tax hike could be both fiscally prudent and economically dangerous. 
Both premises may be true but are insufficient to determine the issue overall. Arguing to a 
conclusion regarding overall desirability or comparative value from a premise implying some 
value only is what Lewis calls the fallacy of epithet (Lewis 1946, 536). For example, tax cuts can 
be deemed something valuable, but that alone does not imply its desirability compared to other 
policy options. Another fallacy, the fallacy of attribute, occurs when both a conclusion and a 
premise are comparative in nature. For example, “a good pistol” could indicate a good weapon. In 
an absolute sense, where it means that it is better than no weapon, then this makes sense, but 
comparatively a better than average pistol can still be a poorer than average weapon. Alternatively, 
a better than average pistol can still be a poorer than average thing overall (1946, 537).  
2.3.9 Summary 
 In summary, Lewis’ account of value has some similarities to Dewey, and much of his 
independent analysis corroborates Dewey. But the relevant things to take away from his account 
is not necessarily where he differs from Dewey, but what he chooses to emphasize. What we gain 
from Lewis that we don’t find as much in Dewey is a detailed analysis of the relationship between 
the content of immediate experience and the nature of subjectivity and objectivity in value 
judgment. We also gain a careful understanding of the various ways in which value can be 
predicated and what we should take such predications to mean under various circumstances and 
contexts and what this can tell us about subjectivity in values. Once again this serves to 
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demonstrate the need to think of values in relational and concrete terms instead of isolated terminal 
responses in the form of mere preferences, or desires. This serves in helping to address 
misconceptions that tend to arise in discussions of value and dispel reasons for thinking that they 
must be subjective, such as why there may or may not be competing experiences of value. Lewis’ 
account of possible fallacies associated with value judgment round out the development of an 
account of the logic of value judgments. These ideas will be relevant to understanding the ways in 
which scientists may end up incorporating values in different, possibly conflicting ways without 
falling into idiosyncrasies or subjectivism. 
2.4. Ray Lepley’s Account of Value 
Ray Lepley was a student of Dewey, who devoted much of his work to the matter of values and 
valuation. His account of value is also useful to consider. Unlike Dewey or Lewis, who focus on 
the deliberative processes by which value judgments are made, Lepley offers a broader account of 
the status of values, including the different forms they take, their relative empirical ability to be 
verified, and their relationship to factual judgments. Consider some basic questions that he 
addresses like, does the term “value” in the context where we mean “to value” mean the same 
thing in all contexts? Does “verifiability” mean the same thing in all contexts? If values are to be 
experimental, does “experimental” mean the same thing in all contexts, or does it denote different 
possible things in a given inquiry? Consider a relatively simple conception of value: Ralph Barton 
Perry argued that a value was any object of any interest (Perry 1926).22 But as we have already 
noted from Lepley’s quote at the chapter’s beginning, we cannot think of an interest as a terminal 
response and so we need to ask ourselves: what does an interest designate in a given context? 
                                                          
22 Perry, like Dewey who similarly connects values to interests and desires, defines an interest as active, that it is 
affective-motor. His account is similarly complex (Perry 1926, 115). 
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2.4.2 Meanings of “Value,” “Experimental,” and “Verification” 
 Lepley argues that on the broadest or most inclusive conception of value, it would include 
all goods and evils. This would include economic, scientific, aesthetic, moral, religious, and 
recreational goods and evils, including the value of truth (Lepley 1944, 3). He refers to this 
meaning of value (rather unhelpfully) as value(1), however I will refer to it as the inclusive 
conception of values. Then there is the meaning of values as that which are contrasted with factual 
matters in terms of judgment, what he refers to as value(2) and what I will refer to as the fact-value 
conception of values. Finally, there is the meaning of value that is reserved for moral and ethical 
matters, what Lepley refers to as value(3), or what I will refer to as the ethical conception of value. 
These distinctions in the meaning of the term “value” are relevant in the sense that we not only 
should be aware what we are talking about when we talk of values in specific contexts, but also 
that the degree to which a value is verifiable may differ given which conception of value we are 
talking about. For example, some may grant that those values falling under the inclusive 
conception are more easily verifiable than those falling under the ethical conception of value.  
 If our aim is to provide an account of values in science that is compatible with a scientific 
outlook, it is also helpful to consider the various ways in which values can be experimental. 
According to Lepley, we can consider “experimental” as being that which contrasts with what is 
absolute, fixed, or universal. It can also indicate a process of operational testing not wholly 
determined by a priori elements, or fixed laws of understanding (1944, 4). Both conceptions of 
“experimental” can be contrasted with what is metaphysical. A third conception employed 
involves the careful search for data, control of variables, and use of objective methods of 
measurement and observation. Finally, “experimental” might include all the three previous 
conceptions. While scientific knowledge is experimental in this sense, these distinctions are 
relevant in so far as we can ask to what degree values are experimental, ranging from the first 
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conception to the fourth, and to what degree might they need to be experimental if they are to be 
adequately and responsibly employed in scientific inquiry.  
 Lepley believed that there was a growing sense in the early 20th century that various and 
even conflicting philosophical treatments on values were at least becoming more experimental to 
varying degrees, and that this signaled the potential for a reconstruction in value theory to be 
continuous with science. Historical issues regarding that philosophical trend,23 and the question as 
to how fruitful this course of inquiry can be, aside, an important question is whether the lack of 
advancement in an experimental approach for fact-value or ethical conceptions of value indicates 
an inherent difference between inquiry into values and scientific inquiry (1944, 11). Lepley argues 
that we need not accept that conclusion given other possible explanations for the lack of 
experimental advancement such as historical factors like the desire to avoid taking a scientific 
approach to moral, ethical, and religious matters in return for greater freedom for science in other 
areas. This conclusion is confirmed by Proctor (Proctor 1991, 33). Lepley notes this has enforced 
harder distinctions between the mental and the physical, the practical and the theoretical, and the 
material and the spiritual when it comes to moral matters than in other areas (Lepley 1944, 11).24 
Thus, it is best to reserve judgment about inherent differences until a more sophisticated analysis 
can be made.  
 Lepley points out that the basis of an experimental approach to knowledge involves the 
testing or verification of hypotheses. An experimental viewpoint for values would mean, “that 
values—moral values as well as scientific facts—are suggestions relatively verified and therefore 
                                                          
23 Accounts of values that were coming from scientific philosophy of the time seems to dissipate after the mid 20th 
century. It’s possible that this is due to the growing hesitancy to talk about values in philosophy of science during 
the Cold War.  
24 This raises not only historical factors as being relevant, but logical factors as well. When it comes to inquiry into 
values, a received notion that they are purely mental to the exclusion of the physical is obviously going to affect 
how successful we think experimental approaches to value will be.  
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in some sense and degree verifiable” (1944, 17). Thus, a value can only be known in so far as it is 
verified. This raises the question to what degree are values verifiable? And, are they verifiable in 
the same manner as “factual” matters? If so, it would seem possible that values are as objective as 
any scientific fact and not a matter of mere personal preference (1944, 13). Lepley is interested in 
whether there is a general pattern of verification common to scientific, artistic, and moral value 
claims and whether that pattern holds of descriptive “factual” claims as well. He chooses to adopt 
a “liberal” meaning of verification, denoting “any testing or confirmation, of whatever kind and 
degree” (1944, 19). In essence, Lepley adopts a model of verification that is in contrast with a 
notion which requires “final and demonstrable proof” of a claim (1944, 19).25  
 Lepley admits that the question of what is meant by verification can go a long way in 
determining what it means for a value to be verified compared to a fact. For some, the question of 
verification is the active testing of a hypothesis to determine whether it is accurate or inaccurate 
according to the “hard facts” as the final step in reflective thinking. Lepley’s preferred broader 
notion of verification when it comes to science includes considering the entire process of scientific 
inquiry as a practice. This involves an interrelated process of operations of reflective thinking and 
observation, the testing of ideas at various stages, and acknowledges the idea that scientific testing 
is not confined to exercises of observation and experimentation, but also exercises of critical 
thinking, mathematical testing, and social discussion (1944, 21). He notes, “verification permeates 
all the processes of critical and creative inquiry; these processes are integrally interrelated.” Thus, 
for Lepley verification consists in any process of testing through thought or action, “whether 
                                                          
25 Unlike the potential idea of demonstrable proof when it comes to facts. Pointing out the contrast here, however, 
is to clarify his position relative to other possibilities not to stand in contrast with a particular position advanced by 
others.  
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individual or social, to whatever extent these processes may yield ‘evidence,’ ‘confirmation,’ 
‘reasonable presumption,’ ‘established knowledge,’ or ‘proof.’” (1944, 21).  
Further, Lepley indicates that the term “verification” can be limited in that it suggests an 
exclusive interest in truth or correctness, while in moral or artistic matters, formulations may be 
better said to be “adequate.” He chooses to include this notion of adequacy into the concept of 
verification, noting that it could mean testing with respect to truth, “or with regard to relative 
adequacy, fruitfulness, or ability to lead on to other significant experiences” (1944, 22). It should 
be noted that verification functioning as a success term for relative adequacy rather than merely 
capturing a binary between truth and falsity even when it comes to scientific matters is not out of 
step with other philosophers of science. While pragmatists accounts of truth are often built on 
adequacy rather than capturing static states, Rudolf Carnap emphasizes the importance of 
“confirmation” to capture relative degrees of verification, while Helen Longino uses the concept 
of “conformation.” 
2.4.3 Verification of Factual and Valuative Claims: A Common Pattern of Judgment 
Lepley argues that verification among the various kinds of claims that could be commonly 
identified as values which fall under the inclusive conception of values (like truth in science, 
beauty in art, or goodness in ethics), and verification of claims which could be commonly 
identified as factual follow a methodology with the same general structure. This common structure 
is a matter of a “problem-solving adjustment” (1944, 23). Following the general pattern of problem 
solving described by Dewey, Lepley argues that inquiry begins with a felt difficulty, defining the 
problem, proposing solutions, evaluation of the solution, and experimental testing leading to a 
settled state. To test whether this general structure holds true of both factual and valuative 
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judgments, including those found in science, art, and ethics, he studies simple problems from each 
category, including instances that could be considered “purely factual” and “purely valuative.”26 
Lepley provides a series of examples of each formulation of a judgment in each category. 
Scientific examples include: “This will make the Bunsen burner light” (factual), and “The burner 
will burn well” (valuative).  Artistic examples include: “this paint is red” (factual), and “this tube 
is good paint” (valuative). Moral27 examples include: “the desk is 1 meter long” (factual), and 
“This is the best place for my desk” (valuative). In each case, he argues that judgments of each 
kind follow the same general pattern of inquiry and verification in terms of starting with an 
unsettled problematic state and moving to a settled one. Lepley notes that the value claims in these 
instances, for instance reference to a burner burning well, indicate a reference to a purpose (“burn 
well for what?”) which doesn’t seem to be present in the factual judgments. What is noteworthy is 
that the purpose itself arises in and is tested by previous operations and interactions and helps 
inform our expectations about how a burner “should” burn such that we are in a position to judge 
if one is burning well (1944, 26). Thus, we are in a position to make simple value judgments 
following a hypothetical imperative pattern of reasoning.  
Secondly, the reference to a purpose or interest is not unique to value judgments. What 
stimulates and holds certain perceptions and investigations into factual claims are matters of 
interest; there is no perception without interest (1944, 97). According to Lepley for any attention 
paid to an event, there is both an interest in the event in terms of its nature, but also an interest of 
the event in terms of its capacity to serve as means. He argues that this should cast doubt as to 
whether there are purely factual or purely valuative problems, arguing for the even stronger point 
                                                          
26 Lepley casts doubt whether there can really be such things. Rather distinguishing between the two kinds of 
judgment is more functional depending on the interest when making the judgment; whether it be a matter of 
knowing the nature of an event as opposed to considering the event as a means.  
27 Lepley describes moral judgments as relating to personal or social welfare. 
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that any valuative question can be translated into a factual question and vice versa. For example, 
“will this burner burn well?” can also be read as “will this burner burn with a specific flame?” 
Thus, he argues that any event can be experienced both as a fact and as a value (1944, 32).  
The survey indicates that on these now relatively simple judgments that could be 
considered “purely factual” and “purely valuative” that there is a common pattern of judgment. 
However there still remains open questions about more complex judgments, and whether values 
are just as verifiable as facts. Verification of factual and value judgments do however take place 
through a process of operations which eliminate a felt difficulty which can be expressed as a 
formulation. Lepley notes, “facts and values are here actually formulations and that these are in 
some degree established or confirmed through complex interactive operations of and among 
logical, psychological, physiological, and physical events […] formulations are treated as 
suggestions” (1944, 33). A fact or a value is thus experienced as verified suggestions regarding 
either a claim regarding an existence or a worth of something.  
According to Lepley the interactive operations of inquiry are able to test factual and 
valuative formulations because they are tests of events that have definite properties which are 
disclosed by interactions. These indicate certain consistencies of structure and behavior which can 
be taken as uniformities of existences, or of worth. Certain events, objects, or behaviors are 
experienced in the same or similar way day to day. This uniformity allows for formulations to be 
made and tested through continuing inquiries.28 He notes, “Such verification as is possible is…to 
be attributed to the somewhat uniform or individual ‘isness’ of events as experienced in and of 
interactions” (1944, 43). Verifiability depends on certain physical and logical conditions.  
                                                          
28 Notice the Peircean insight here in that continuity of inquiry can lead to more definite conclusions over time.  
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2.4.4 Factors that Affect Degrees of Verifiability 
Lepley’s analysis of the empirical possibilities of verification considers the nature of events 
as they affect performability of operations of inquiry (testability). This empirical analysis proposes 
a scale of degrees of possible verification from those formulations which would be easily verified 
to those which may be unverifiable, considering factual and valuative claims in the fields of 
science, art, and morals. His interest in the analysis is to determine what factors determine the 
degree of verification, whether the same factors which determine the degree of verification for 
facts also determine the same for values, and to see how the two sets of claims fall on a scale of 
frequency distribution with respect to the degree of verifiability. On the left of the scale are those 
claims which are definitely verifiable. These are claims where it is possible to easily test and find 
definite conclusions. On the right are those claims which are probably unverifiable. These are 
claims where it may (but not necessarily) be impossible to perform operations whose conclusions 
are open to public inspection and which would be free of biased inquiry, however there may be 
limited or restricted types of verification. Two-thirds from the left are those claims which are long-
term verifiable (LTV); they would require a lifetime or longer to verify. Between those easy to 
verify claims and those which would take a long time are claims testable in the short term which 
would permit testing of alternative hypotheses (ASH). In such occasions, we can relatively quickly 
test out multiple alternative suggestions. I have compiled the examples of Lepley’s survey into the 
following graphic. 
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With the series of factual and valuative claims provided which would be scientific, artistic, 
or moralistic in nature, we note that those claims which are definitely verifiable are the most 
Figure 1: A continuum of different levels of verifiability from the definitely verifiable, the alternate short-term 
hypothetical (ASH), the long term verifiable (LTV), to the probably unverifiable. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Examples of each of the levels of verifiability including factual and valuative claims. 
  Definitely 
Verifiable 
ASH LTV Probably 
Unverifiable 
Science Fact “This burner will 
burn.” 
“Present 
experiments on 
infantile paralysis 
will be successful.” 
“Research if 
carried over a few 
generations will 
determine the 
relationship 
between inherited 
traits and adult 
success.” 
“Consciousness is 
merely neuro-
muscular 
functioning.” 
Value “This burner will 
burn well.” 
“This experiment 
will be a crucial 
and significant 
one.” 
“It is worth it to 
spend a lifetime 
investigating the 
inheritance of 
susceptibility to 
cancer in rats.” 
“The events to 
which 
formulations in 
physics refer are 
better conceived 
as subjective than 
objective.” 
Art Fact  “This is red paint.” “This paint will 
appear darker 
than that one.” 
“Virtual reality will 
continue to grow 
as an important 
form of media.” 
“Beauty is 
delightful 
perception.” 
Value “This is not a good 
paint for this 
purpose.” 
“This color is too 
bright for a unified 
effect.” 
“The Beatles will 
prove to be the 
most influential 
band in the history 
of 21st century 
music.” 
“Not all forms of 
art are equally 
adequate modes 
of expression.” 
Morals Fact “My desk is 1 meter 
long.” 
“Tax A will 
produce more 
revenue than tax 
B.” 
“The importance 
of the United 
Nations will 
decline in the 21st 
century.” 
“There is no 
cosmic purpose 
to life.” 
Value “This desk will fit in 
my office. This is 
the best location for 
it.” 
“The social effects 
of tax B will be 
better than tax A.” 
“I will live a more 
successful life as a 
teacher than as a 
philosopher.” 
“The right is the 
will of the 
stronger in force 
and foresight.” 
 
 
Definitely Verifiable  ASH            LTV            Probably Unverifiable 
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simplistic, where the valuative claims tend to include reference to a purpose. Those claims which 
are considered probably unverifiable may change over time as the specific concepts employed in 
each claim may become more possible to test at a later time where this may not seem possible 
today. Longer term claims may be easily testable, but their temporal references are to matters that 
would require a long time to verify. The content of the claim may not exist yet, or we may lack the 
appropriate reference necessary to come to a conclusion. For alternative short-term hypotheticals 
complete duplication of trials may be impossible and thus conclusions would be less definite. 
Lepley’s analysis reveals that both factual and valuative claims vary in degrees of 
verifiability as opposed to factual claims only falling at one end and value claims falling on the 
other; it does not indicate that value claims are equally verifiable as factual claims, but rather that 
both vary. He acknowledges that on a frequency distribution, that given a larger number claims, if 
the factual ones will cluster towards the left while value claims cluster to the right, it would indicate 
that values are generally less verifiable than factual claims (1944, 50).29 However, any conclusion 
on this matter requires consideration of what factors determine the degree of verifiability. Lepley 
argues that the factors which determine the degree of verifiability have to do with the nature of the 
event to which the claim applies and is tested, those making the inquiry, and the interactions that 
take place between them. He divides these factors into three categories: the nature of the subject 
matter, purpose, and frame of reference (1944, 51).  
2.4.5 Factors Affecting Complexity of Value Verification: Subject Matter 
An event can be characterized along a series of dimensions like simple to complex, 
accessible to inaccessible, quantifiable to unquantifiable, controllable and uncontrollable, and so 
on. Events which are inaccessible, unquantifiable, and uncontrollable in various combinations 
                                                          
29 See Figures 3 and 4. 
 
 
81 
 
make it difficult to perform the operations necessary to get “the facts of the case” (1944, 52). 
Lepley suggests that where we can control for proper logical considerations like correctly 
identifying the problem and carefully considering potential solutions, it is the traits of the subject 
matter constituting the event which can affect the degree of verifiability. Since an event can be 
experienced both as a fact and as a value, this factor can affect the degree of verifiability for both 
factual and valuative claims.  
Given that events can vary in complexity and that this can affect the degree of verifiability, 
the next thing to consider is what is the subject matter of events which typically concern values 
compared to facts. For example, value formulations are more likely to have wishes as their subject 
matter than facts. Values are also more likely to deal with personal or social matters. If it were true 
that these subject matters are more complex, and thus formulations about them are harder to verify, 
then values would be less verifiable than facts. However, since there are complex physical subject 
matters and simple social subject matters; events of all kinds vary in complexity and thus are not 
inherently more complex or simple than others. Further, new forms of inquiry into social or 
psychological matters have increased the degree of verification possible than what was once 
considered possible (1944, 56). Thus, differences in subject matter should not lead to knee jerk 
conclusions that values, particularly ethical ones, are less verifiable.  
2.4.6 Factors Affecting Complexity of Value Verification: Purpose 
The second factor that can affect the degree of verification is purpose. We need to consider 
the degree to which purpose is relevant in verification of facts compared to values. For example, 
in definitely verifiable value claims there is a direct reference to purpose which does not exist in 
factual claims. Thus, one may conclude that this makes facts more verifiable. However, Lepley 
points out that when we consider the interactions necessary for verification (those problematic 
adjustments which are the catalyst for inquiry), it would not occur without purpose for there is a 
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desire to adjust the situation. There are also more specific purposes where there is a need to define 
the nature of a problem and find solutions. Lepley notes, “Delimitation of a problem and 
determination of techniques and procedures, even in scientific experimentation, are in each case 
matters of selection with reference to the most promising results” (1944, 58). Choices are 
necessary for any inquiry, and they are not unconditioned or unaffected by other elements in a 
given situation. Purposes and choices are formed, informed, and reformed by critical reflection, 
social criticism, and by the effects of previous actions (1944, 58).  
 The tendency to claim that factual claims are only descriptive while valuative claims deal 
only with purposes or ends, Lepley argues, is due to taking abstract descriptive or valuative 
judgments out of the setting in which they were formulated (1944, 59). This argument, as 
previously noted, is not distinct from Dewey’s claim that we ought not hypostatize claims or 
consider static propositions independently from the situation from which the propositions were 
formed as a judgment in response to a concrete problem. Purpose is an important factor in the 
motivation and direction of inquiry, and of the selection of suggestions for both factual and 
valuative inquiries. It can also affect eventual verifiability of a claim in that our aim may at times 
be to find a definitive factual claim where we might expect it, or it may be to propose something 
more tentative and hypothetical, or to help direct further inquiries (1944, 60). These purposes will 
determine if a claim falls more to the left or the right on the verifiability scale.  
In light of a potential objection that the subject matter of valuations reference purposes in 
the form of wishes (while factual judgments exclude wishes) and thus valuations fall on the right 
end of the scale, Lepley considers the role that wishes play in valuations. Comparing his views on 
the matter to other philosophical accounts of valuation is advantageous. Lepley doesn’t adopt the 
same technical description of wishes that Dewey does, using the term in a more colloquial sense 
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that could also include prizings or desires. However, he makes similar arguments to those 
previously discussed. We must “not confuse ‘wish’ as subject matter with ‘wish’ as a factor in the 
final determination of choice,” he notes (1944, 54). A wish is not isolated as an anticipated 
satisfaction, but rather something which if achieved will result in certain effects which can be 
judged as beneficial or detrimental when considering other wishes and long-term success. Thus, 
presence of a wish does not make a judgment inherently less verifiable. 
He argues that in an inquiry, wishes express themselves as criteria, of what is wanted in or 
from the subject matter of inquiry (1944, 59). As such they can be evaluated accordingly as 
adequate or not for adjustment of the problem that exists between the organism and its 
environment. Like Dewey, Lepley notes the importance that maturity can have on valuations. In 
the degree that one is mature about what they want, they will consider the effects of wishes as 
objectively and realistically as possible and inquiry and testing of wishes will inform choices about 
what wishes to fulfill. Thus, while Lepley employs the term “wish” in a way Dewey does not, 
Lepley treats wishes similarly to prizings which can be affected and transformed because of 
appraisals. A wish is also an event, which means that factual and valuative formulations are 
capable of being made with regard to it. So, while the subject-matter of valuations may often have 
reference to a purpose in the form of wishes, wishes as an objective event, are not inherently less 
likely to allow for verifiable judgments to be made about them.  
Given these points, Lepley argues that choices and wishes are a part of any inquiry. He 
argues, “Viewed thus as suggested goods undergoing verification in total courses of adjustment, 
facts and values will be equally verifiable so far as purpose or wish is a factor. All thinking is 
‘wishful’—pervaded by wishes” (1944, 59). However, wishes as a subject matter may be more 
prevalent in valuative problems than in factual ones, and it is also true that in such problems there 
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is a tendency towards “wishful” thinking in a bad sense of the term as uncritically trying to create 
a solution and the basis of a final determination of a choice. However, Lepley notes that this 
depends on individual habits which form the basis of a frame of reference. Purposes like other 
subject matters for inquiry can increase complexity and thus make verification more difficult. They 
are also subject to experimental expression and testing and can vary in their determinateness. Thus, 
purposes affect values according to the inclusive conception of values equally, while values 
considered under the fact-value conception of values may be more likely to be adversely affected 
by uncritical “wishful” thinking.  
It is crucial to recognize, however, the importance that wishes can have for inquiry. As 
they function as criteria for inquiry, wishes properly scrutinized and in interaction with other 
scrutinized events give rise to suggestions and assist in appraising the outcomes of further action 
within an inquiry (1944, 59). Lepley’s analysis is helpful because it provides a basis to distinguish 
between what can be meant by the term “wish” according to different accounts of value and the 
different contexts of valuation, and given these possible distinctions the necessity of “wishful 
thinking” in inquiry. In terms of Lepley’s examination of the nature of purpose, despite values 
being more likely to include wishes or purposes, the conclusion he reaches is that we have no 
reason to think that the subject matters of values make them inherently less verifiable. The 
immediate danger of a wish lies with it being interpreted as a terminal response. This will be 
relevant in later chapters as we consider the potential problem of values in science being a matter 
of “wishful thinking.” 
2.4.7 Factors Affecting Complexity of Value Verification: Frame of Reference 
The third factor which can affect the degree of verifiability is the frame of reference. Lepley 
notes that personal factors can affect observations and that experiments are created with reference 
to the interest of the investigator. Also, “facts themselves are different when viewed in different 
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frames of reference” (1944, 61). The frame of reference can affect verifiability because an inquirer 
or group thereof are finite and thus limited to particular times and places. Complexities and 
uncertainties regarding purposes, wishes, and meanings in addition to the physical subject matter 
affect the difficulties faced when it comes to verification. Thus, both kinds of factors can create 
degrees of indeterminacy.  
For the inquirer, the frame of reference denotes the personal factors which affect 
verifiability. Lepley notes, “scientific verification usually excels that [found] in other pursuits with 
regard to the care taken in building up and fostering the growth of sensitivities, habits, attitudes, 
and other personal elements which give shape to a total dynamic viewpoint” (1944, 62).30 This 
experimental attitude of flexibility, creativity, and critical-mindedness isn’t exclusive to science, 
nor always used there, and Lepley suggests that there are varying degrees of competency in all 
forms of inquiry. It requires that we “bring to each situation sensitivities, habits, interests, 
curiosities, modes of affective and reflective response, and powers of or persistence in inference 
which make possible such analysis and appraisal as are finely discriminative and widely 
sympathetic” (1944, 62). 
This attitude is the opposite of relying on dogma, routine, conventionality, and unfounded 
credibility and it is essential for verification. The ability to perform operations needed for optimum 
verification is in proportion to which the frame of reference of the inquirer has these attitudes. 
According to Lepley, this attitude’s higher prevalence in science is not inherent, but due to 
historical, environmental, and social factors. Because of this, scientific facts and values are more 
thoroughly and carefully verified. However, this is no reason to think that values falling under the 
                                                          
30 For these pragmatists, these would encapsulate a “scientific attitude” which is central not only to science, but 
also, as they urged, should be spread into the moral and political sphere as well (Silk 2018, 101).  
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fact-value conception of values or values falling under the ethical conception of values are 
inherently and forever less verifiable (Lepley 1944, 63). 
When it comes to ethical values, there is increased difficulty. Individuals and groups 
frequently disagree on evaluations of the affairs of life. To what degree can verification be 
possible? Lepley argues that we need to be careful about what is meant by science and verification 
when we claim that scientific facts and values are more verifiable. For instance, the conception 
that science only discovers invariant relationships or general averages and uniformities and that 
verification involves just those tested invariant relationships rather than considering context is 
inaccurate.31 He argues that when we consider the nature of verification more broadly in terms of 
the events which are subject matters of both factual and valuative formulations, irreconcilable 
differences “arise from the unique traits of each situation of choice”: traits both personal and 
environmental, both internal and external (1944, 64). Indeed, we have discovered from Lewis why 
this can be so. Despite this, however, there are many cases where there is more constancy among 
events to allow for discoveries of uniformity.  
Nor are all choices equally adequate. While some facts in each situation are dependent 
upon the individual needs and interests, it is also possible that the factors of the situation can be 
misjudged. In each situation there is some determinateness regarding biological needs, social 
conditions, and individual and cultural matters. It is also possible that an inquirer can be short-
sighted in their perceptions. We may verify that we have an immediate experience of good, but 
any further verifications of what is good will require critical reflection, discussion, and action.32  
                                                          
31 Note that Dewey makes a similar argument in Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality.  
32 Note the similarities to Lewis and Dewey.  
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2.4.8 Possible Differences as Functional Instead of Inherent Nature 
Lepley also responds to a series of arguments to the effect that logically speaking, value 
judgments are less verifiable than factual ones. Consider, for example, the claim that facts and 
values have independent types of meaning. He responds that while factual and value judgments 
can differ in reference and function, this does not support a claim that they are essentially different, 
particularly the claim that values are merely expressive. He argues: 
the tendency to contrast some valuative statements which commonly have a high degree of 
emotive stimulus-capacity with factual statements which ordinarily have a high degree of 
descriptive stimulus-capacity and then to regard this as an “inherent” or “irreducible” 
difference between factual and valuative statements shows failure to recognize that all 
events and relations may be subject matter for both factual and valuative statements and 
that in different contexts and with different intents each form of statement varies from the 
completely descriptive in reference and function to the completely expressive […] in 
reference and function. (1944, 82)  
In other words, we have no reason to assume that valuative statements are independent in the sense 
that they are only expressive, because the different kinds of both valuative and factual claims vary 
widely.  
In considering what a large survey of factual and valuative claims might look like if placed 
on a scale of verifiability, I have created some graphs where the x axis represents the degrees of 
possible verification and the y axis represents whether the claim could be considered more factual 
or more valuative in nature.33 Those who claim that facts are more verifiable than values would 
expect a clear trend towards unverifiability the more valuative the claims are (Figure 3). Lepley 
argues however that when we consider the three factors of subject matter, purpose, and frame of 
reference, that things are less clear. The same factors with respect to subject matter affect values 
and facts. With respect to purpose, wishes are a more common subject matter for artistic and ethical 
                                                          
33 Given Lepley’s argument that something can be experienced as both a fact and a value, it is possible that he 
would not so readily accept that something can be more factual or more valuative in nature. Yet, as we note from 
the quotation from page 82, he argues that we functionally distinguish between claims that are purely descriptive 
to purely expressive.  
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claims than scientific ones, but properly pay no greater part in intellectual inquiry than in science 
(1944, 67). With respect to frame of reference, science has the advantage of the experimental 
attitude. If we consider what is possible without reference to current limitations, then en masse 
facts and values have the potential to be equally verifiable (Figure 4). When we consider what 
current practices and limitations are, the inadequacies of outlook and methods in morality makes 
moral values less verifiable than scientific ones.  
Figure 3. A frequency distribution where facts 
are more verifiable than values. Claims which are 
more factual and verifiable fall in the top right 
while more valuative and unverifiable claims fall 
in the bottom left.
 
 
Figure 4. What Lepley believes a frequency 
distribution of factual and valuative claims would 
look like. Facts and values are equally verifiable. In 
current conditions, moral claims are more likely to 
be found in the bottom left. 
 
 
Thus, Lepley argues that once we consider the empirical and logical possibilities of inquiry, 
in so far as both factual and valuative claims vary in degree of their verifiability, we cannot 
conclude that facts are essentially different from values. Ruling out the idea of essential differences 
as affecting their potential for verification, Lepley examines the processes by which each 
formulation comes to be. It is generally thought that facts are formulated through a process of 
knowing, while values are formulated through valuation; the former is generally considered 
objective and impersonal, while the latter is considered to be subjective and personal (1944, 89).34 
                                                          
34 Lepley notes that these characterizations are not universally held and, as pointed out in the first chapter, are 
subject to change throughout history.  
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Both knowing and valuation as processes can both be conceived of in narrow ways (for example 
involving only the use of sensory data or self-evident ideas for knowing, and a final choice or 
preference for valuation) or they can be conceived of in broad ways, including the total process of 
inquiry involving complex processes of investigations into, and evaluations of, possibilities and 
effects, as it begins with the study of conditions, suggestions of solutions, and studies and 
appraisals of effects.  
2.4.9 Values as Terminal Responses Versus Broad Processes 
 It has been noted by Lepley, and by Dewey and Lewis, that many of the arguments which 
suggest that values are inherently subjective or unverifiable do not focus on the concrete organism-
environmental interactions in which valuation takes place. Lepley argues that historically we tend 
to think of valuation in that narrow sense, as a process confined to a mere choice or preference of 
a liking or disliking (as terminal responses) separate from any operations done which led to that 
choice. Thus, historically, valuation has been treated as a process of expression of personal interest 
or preference (1944, 92). On the other hand, on a broader conception of valuation including overt 
and non-overt operations of inquiry into a situation, the suggestion of solutions, the evaluation and 
testing of those solutions, the use of a mere wish or preference devoid of critical examination and 
testing is “not worthy of being called ‘valuation’” (1944, 92).  
 Because of the progress of scientific methods in the processes of knowing, we now 
generally conceive of knowing in the broader sense just described. Alternatively, the lack of 
similar experimental approaches to valuation means we tend to think of the valuation process 
narrowly. However, if we were to accept a broader conception, then the process of valuation would 
include all the perceptions, judgments, overt acts, feelings, desires, and preferences that are utilized 
in experimental operations aimed towards arriving at tested solutions. If so, then Lepley asks, does 
the distinction between knowing and valuation not blur or break down? Both function as “problem-
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solving movements” as “valuation as well as knowing involves or is constituted by a felt difficulty 
encountered and the attempts made to define or to locate the problem, to find suggestions, to 
elaborate and test these candidate solutions mentally, to act appropriately, and to note and profit 
from the effects of so acting” (1944, 94). The processes between knowing and valuation are 
similar, even if the purposes, subject matters, or methodologies differ.  
 For instance, while Lepley acknowledges that perception plays a stronger role in knowing 
while wishing and preference plays a stronger role in valuation, with those elements being 
emphasized to determine what is knowing and what is valuation, it would be a mistake to simplify 
things. We cannot claim that all knowing processes only involve perception or that all valuations 
involve only preference because of the varying complexity of cases which we face. Nor does 
perception take place in a vacuum independent of inferences. Given the complex processes of 
knowing and valuation, we should also be careful not to reduce either process to just perception or 
just to prizings (1944, 97). Perceptions are just as inherently part of the process of valuation as 
preferences and interests are part of the process of knowing. Differences between the use of 
perception and preference when it comes to valuation and knowing are relative ones.  
 Thus, when considering valuation and knowing in a broad sense, Lepley argues that we 
can determine relative but not absolute differences between facts and values. It is only when we 
conceive of these processes narrowly do we find that dualisms arise which leads to confused value 
theory (1944, 100). Knowledge is confused as a process emphasizing sense perception, intuition, 
and self-evident truths. When it comes to values, ends, duties, and standards become isolated 
concepts. Lepley notes:  
we only have to call the roll of such great historic theories of the good, the right, or the 
beautiful […] to recognize that rational insight, conscience, practical reason, will, self-
evident truth, pleasures, and consequences have for the most part been taken as having 
existence and determinate value apart from experimental interactions in total 
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situations.[…] Valuation, even more than knowing, has been treated as something sui 
generis, as cut off in existence and potency from the complex interactions through which 
probably all desires and ideas have their direct and indirect rise and testing. (1944, 101)  
This isolation of valuation is still present in views which isolate value propositions from inquiry 
and testing, or which suggest or affirm that judgments and its processes are something which can 
be studied apart from their conditions and effects. Worse yet, these dualisms between fact and 
value maintain the existence of conditions which gives this view credibility; without careful 
examination of the experimental processes of value formation, the process of valuation cannot 
advance in the same way that the processes of knowing have (1944, 104-5).35  
 What Lepley’s argument advances here is the important fact that insofar as philosophers 
of science who advocate for an understanding of scientific knowing as not being an isolated 
process, that knowing is a much broader process than sometimes conceived, and instead involving 
a reflection of various interests and values and which take place in a socially embedded world, and 
is not just a matter of marrying sense data for specified propositions, they need to extend that same 
understanding to the process of valuation. In other words, the more we advocate that values play 
an important part in the operations of inquiry which transform problematic situations into resolved 
ones, the more we need to recognize that a narrow conception of values is not only inadequate but 
a product of an inconsistent logic. If we can accept a broader conception of knowing, we can accept 
a broader conception of valuation, and thus have no good reason to believe they are determined by 
processes which are inherently different.  
2.4.10 Summary 
The themes discussed in this section have been found in the accounts of Dewey and Lewis 
as well. Lepley demonstrates how accepting that in actual contexts value claims and factual claims 
will vary in their complexity and possible confirmability, thus any arguments which attempt to 
                                                          
35 This is echoed by Hilary Putnam, who holds that such dualisms block the path of inquiry (Putnam, 2004).  
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provide a priori accounts of the nature of facts and values and their respective logics are 
inadequate. In addition, Lepley’s work tells us a great deal about how the terms that are associated 
with values and experimentation can also vary and thus discussion of value will be unclear unless 
we keep our meanings and terms explicit. This theme will continue in Chapter 3 and its 
applicability will be demonstrated in Chapter 4.  
2.5. Philip Kitcher’s Account of Value 
Philip Kitcher has taken steps to offer a naturalistic account of ethics and values in his two 2011 
books, “The Ethical Project” and “Science in a Democratic Society” in the spirit of the accounts 
discussed so far. What makes Kitcher especially interesting is his discussion of how a naturalistic 
account of valuation can fit within scientific inquiry. While The Ethical Project is primarily about 
ethics, there are elements of it that fit within a broader account of valuation, so I will begin there. 
Kitcher’s account of ethics is as a project began by our ancient ancestors to respond to the 
difficulties of social life, a position he calls “pragmatic naturalism” (Kitcher 2011b, 3). According 
to him, in a preethical age our hominid ancestors developed the capacity for psychological 
altruism: the capacity to adjust desires from what would normally be desired in solitary situations 
to match the desires of others for non-self-interested reasons (2011b, 21). The development of such 
capacities is explained through kin selection and a tendency towards reciprocation which would 
have been evolutionarily beneficial.36 With the eventual development of social cooperation, and 
community stabilization, the capacity for altruism also proved beneficial. Altruism enables, “the 
organisms to function as a population, to live in the same place at the same time and to encounter 
one and other daily without too high an incidence of social friction and violence” (2011b, 67). 
However, altruism also has its limits as various inequitable circumstances, environmental 
                                                          
36 Kitcher has an in-depth analysis as to how these two factors promote specifically psychological altruism, but I 
won’t discuss them at any length. See §8 of Chapter 2 for more details (Kitcher 2011b).  
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pressures, and the opportunity for exploitation can limit any potential for altruistic responses. 
When the stakes are high enough, altruism disappears entirely.  
 Kitcher argues that ethics is a response to the threat of altruism failure, a situation where 
one acts based on selfish desire instead of altruistically as they normally would (2011b, 74). He 
explains, “the tensions and fragilities of hominid (and chimpanzee) social life arise from limited 
altruism of the participants. Altruism failures lead to conflict, to pain inflicted, to rough discipline, 
and lengthy peace-making […] Remedying altruism failures is the original function of ethics” 
(2011b, 222). This potential problem was addressed by developing systems of normative guidance, 
early forms being rudimentary commands, guidance, and punishments to at least establish behavior 
that looks like altruism (2011b, 82). Eventually such guidance became internalized through 
processes of socialization, leading to a desire to follow commands either because of fear or a desire 
to fit within approved regularities of conduct (2011b, 94). The reaction to previous ethical failures 
and the desire to avoid new ones led to the establishment of ethical codes as a social product, with 
their internalization beginning “the ethical project” (2011b, 97). 
2.5.2 Values as Relational and their Possibilities for Judgment 
 As noted, the details of the ethical considerations are less relevant right now than what the 
account tells us about valuation. Kitcher discusses altruism primarily in terms of desires. He 
focusses on desires because, like Dewey, he believes that desires are connected with intentions 
and actions (2011b, 20).37 Additionally, Kitcher stresses that altruistic adjustments, or in other 
words, adjustments of what you desire, are a response to foreseeing consequences of what those 
actions would be; “Because you see the consequences for others of what you envisage doing, the 
psychological attitudes you adopt are different” (2011b, 20).  
                                                          
37 One will note how every account mentioned, from Dewey, Lewis, Lepley, and even Perry consider desire to be an 
active process, not merely an isolated mental phenomenon.  
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This stresses that at the heart of valuations of desires, not only are actions inherently 
relevant, but are judged by what consequences they lead to rather than by some a priori standard, 
or merely being a subjective terminal response. This idea is stressed in every naturalistic account 
mentioned so far. His account also admits of a range of various possible altruistic responses, from 
egoism to golden-rule altruism to self-abnegating altruism, requiring that we call attention to the 
weighing of values determined by factors like the definiteness of conditions, and whether a certain 
more assured but less preferred result is more overall valuable than a less assured but more 
preferred result both for me and for others. Thus, valuation is judged in terms of consequences 
actions are likely to produce. The degree of altruism that is or should be offered will require such 
value judgments (2011b, 24).  
 Value judgments are necessary because altruism does not always demand endorsing all 
possible desires of others. Like other accounts discussed, Kitcher recognizes that not all desires 
are the same or of equal value and that we should have some means of discernment. How altruism 
may manifest itself may differ in terms of responding to the mere wishes of the beneficiary or 
responding to what is in their best interest. Kitcher notes, “A current wish diverges from a real 
interest when the wish would give way to the preference marked by the interest, were the person 
relieved of some current misconception or form of ignorance, and when the modified preference 
would be retained in light of further knowledge” (2011b, 133).38  
According to Kitcher there are occasions where being altruistic in terms of what is in 
someone else’s best interest may be appropriate, such as a child who doesn’t want to take their 
medicine, and there may be cases where it isn’t. Evaluation of the best way to proceed would 
depend on whether there is evidence that the person in question has thought about their own 
                                                          
38 Once again, an account suggests that there is a vast difference in what may be immediately valued and what 
may be valued given a level of maturity where there is intelligent consideration of effects.  
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valuations of the outcome, whether they are missing crucial information and there is no opportunity 
to present facts and change desires (2011b, 134). This is relevant not only because our own 
valuations will depend on what evidence we have, but also because valuations in general can be 
distinguished based on whether reflection was involved in their formation or not. Such 
mechanisms of discernment also include questioning whether a desire is endorsable or not. In 
addition to asking ourselves whether it is what would be desired in a “cool hour” of reflection, we 
can ask whether it could be satisfied for all members of a community or is in keeping with adopted 
ethical codes. Desires to commit murder or to lie freely would not be endorsable.  
2.5.3 Constraints on Values and Ethical Progress 
 Kitcher also devotes significant effort to establishing the basis for measuring success in 
such valuations. On the topic of ethical codes, he resists the idea that such codes involve “mere-
change” without any upward trend; that changes to our ethical thinking involve no connection to 
truth, progress, or knowledge (2011b, 138). He suggests that for most philosophers the response 
to the mere-change view is to insist that ethics is responsible to some external constraints, and that 
ethical progress consists in replacing ethical falsehoods with truth. However, he also argues that 
the view that ethical truth is determined by some new insight is flawed in that it is not accurate to 
the historical record during times of what we would consider to be ethical progress, such as 
abolishing slavery or extending rights to women. He notes, “The psychological processes these 
people seem to undergo differ radically from the forms of evidence conjured in typical 
philosophical accounts of ethical justification. There are no special abstract forms of reasoning, 
nothing reported as a moment of ‘perception’ or ‘intuition’” (2011b, 179).  
 Kitcher argues against the idea that ethical truth is determined by some direct perception 
of an “ethical reality” which would act as an external constraint. For example, he rejects the notion 
that someone may see a boy dousing a cat with gasoline and igniting it and see the wrongness of 
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the act, form an immediate judgment, and gain knowledge in the same way we gain knowledge 
about cats, gasoline, and boys through similar perceptions. Such ethical perceptions providing for 
new insight of external constraints are not found in historical records of ethical reformers. He 
notes, “there is simply no evidence of times and places at which some sense of these constraints 
modified ethical practice, allowing for the institution of reliable techniques for everyday 
‘observation’” (2011b, 185). In attempting to explain the nature of any constraints on ethical 
thinking, Kitcher is critical of realist and constructivist approaches to ethical truth.  
 Kitcher characterizes the realist position as holding that there are preexistent divisions 
between what is right and wrong (2011b, 190). Kitcher argues that in discussing the idea of 
immediate perception of right or wrong, there are no satisfactory answers as to how one could 
perceive some ethical property and reliably convince others to do the same. In addition, changes 
that do occur can be better explained by social factors. In essence, Kitcher argues that realism is 
not accurate to the historical record, has an unclear account of how ethical perceptions take place, 
and must account for how social forces affect ethical deliberation. Thus, in rejecting a realist 
position that one can immediately perceive right or wrong, he rejects the idea of externally fixed 
truths or nebulous contact with some external standard (2011b, 190). The constructivist approach 
to ethical truth as he characterizes it holds that reference of ethical predicates is a matter of 
conventional determination, or in other words that we are the masters of what is ethically true or 
false (2011b, 191). Kitcher focusses on constructivist accounts that favor the determination of right 
and wrong through particular procedures such Kantian universal reasoning or a social contract. 
Here again, Kitcher asserts there is an absence of reliance on such procedures (even basic ones 
like “what if everyone acted like that?”) according to the historical record (2011b, 202).  
 
 
97 
 
 In failing to find a reliable external standard by which truth could be determined, the notion 
that progress occurs by replacing falsehoods with truth remains problematic. Kitcher contends that 
pragmatic naturalism endorses the idea that progress is prior to ethical truth; truth is what you get 
by making progressive steps (2011b, 210). For Kitcher progress in ethics is similar to progress in 
technology. Progress in technology is understood in terms of a problem and a desire to resolve it; 
it is this desire which grounds the function of the device. Functional refinement consists in 
satisfying the desire more reliably, completely, and by generating fewer problems for potential 
users. Normative guidance is a social technology responding to the problems faced by our ancient 
ancestors. Ethical progress consisted in functional refinement, first by solving original problems 
more reliably, but with this progress the background problem changed, which generated new 
functions for ethics to serve. For our ancestors, their focus shifted away from mere survival to 
eventually articulating a good life and addressing issues standing in the way of it.  
 Thus, for Kitcher, progress is articulated prior to truth. Ethical truth for Kitcher is 
conceived of similarly to the approaches of William James and Charles Peirce. He explains that 
ethical rules, “count as true just in case those rules would be adopted in ethical codes as a result of 
progressive transitions and would be retained through an indefinite sequence of further progressive 
transitions” (2011b, 246). Claims count as true in virtue of the fact that they have entered into and 
remain in ethical codes that have unfolded in an ethical sequence. We are never at the end of the 
ethical project. We can confidently assert some ethical statements, but those claims may not be 
enforced by our successors; nevertheless, the confidence is that what our ethical statements express 
will be upheld in later progressive transitions. This may be because certain themes are discovered 
and upheld repeatedly (such as banning murder and having some prohibitions on lying), or that 
certain rules make it difficult to conceive of a society having an ethical system capable of reducing 
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social tensions without them (2011b, 246). Ethical truth occurs to an idea in its practice rather than 
being a fixed relation. Kitcher notes, “There is no prior conception of ethical truth, so that people 
make ethical progress when they discover independently constituted ethical truths” (2011b, 246). 
2.5.4 Standards of Ethical Progress 
 Above all, Kitcher’s account of the development of ethics and its progress in terms of social 
development in response to social tensions and problems aims to avoid reliance on what he calls 
“spooks,” including concepts like a moral law within, faculties of practical reason, perception or 
intuition of the good, or an abstract realm of values (Kitcher 2011, 41). In Science in a Democratic 
Society, Kitcher ties the ethical project into a more general account of values as they relate to 
science. He notes for instance, that part of the mistrust of the use of values in science presupposes 
the idea that at bottom value judgments are subject to no standards at all, that valuing is a matter 
of taste. Instead what is needed are standards of valuation. He explains, “everything depends on 
the character of the value-judgment, on the schemes of values and how they are applied, on the 
ways in which schemes of values are adjusted” (2011, 40). With such standards we can separate 
religious opponents of evolution and hired guns of industry in science from genuine experts (2011, 
40). Kitcher believes that his account of ethical progress can more generally serve as an account 
of the standards that value-judgments should satisfy (2011, 45).  
As ethics progresses it responds to new problems and takes on different functions. 
Pluralism arises where in cases of functional conflict, there are alternative ways of compromising 
between ameliorating different problems with different priorities assigned to each. The fact that 
functional conflict can result in difficulty in reaching agreement is a potential cause of the idea 
that value judgments are subject to no standards at all (2011, 48).39 During the beginnings of the 
                                                          
39 Notice that this issue has been addressed both by Lepley and Lewis.  
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ethical project, the only vehicle available for the arrival of judgments about values was a discussion 
in which all participants come as equals and in which the goal is to satisfy all (2011, 49). Kitcher 
proposes, that our deliberations about values be similarly egalitarian. He argues that ethical 
conclusions to be endorsed are those that would emerge under an ideal conversation, one satisfying 
the conditions of mutual engagement, and that these conditions are the core of his proposal for a 
method of investigating values (2011, 51).  
In other words, ethical deliberations are adequate to the degree that they reach conclusions 
that would have “resulted from an ideal deliberation under conditions of mutual engagement” 
(2011, 51). Mutual engagement would require that participants not rely on false beliefs about the 
natural world, that they recognize the consequences of actions and arrangement, and can identify 
the desires of other participants. It would also require certain affective conditions; genuine 
engagement requires an expansion of sympathies so that the desires of others can be given equal 
weight to our own. These, and further proposals40 ultimately allow for the correction of altruism 
failures. Kitcher suggests that in areas of conflicting theories motivated by conflicting values, 
resolution to such conflicts lies in determining whether a conflicting scheme of values which 
supports a particular explanation would be sustainable in an ideal conversation (2011, 60). If it is 
not possible for a discussion under conditions of mutual engagement to endorse those values, they 
must be given up, and thus any reason to insist on conflicting explanations. Further discussions of 
how these matters relate to science will be eventually discussed in detail, but for now we can 
recognize how Kitcher attempts to fit a naturalistic explanation of deciding on values can relate to 
                                                          
40 Since my account here is merely to survey what naturalistic accounts of value entail, I will not go into as much 
detail here. Instead, further discussion of Kitcher’s specific proposals in terms of their role in science will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
 
100 
 
science. Conflicting desires and preferences can be determined through the same processes that 
shape the ethical project.  
2.5.5 Summary 
Kitcher’s account reiterates claims found in the other accounts I have discussed, namely, 
that values are relational. However, Kitcher’s account also serves to speak to more modern debates 
within meta-ethics, specifically realism and constructivism. As a naturalistic account, he reminds 
us that our understanding of values should echo our actual deliberation and changes in the way we 
value. He also tells us that the idea of values as a problem-solving adjustment allows us to speak 
of verification in a way that doesn’t require a correspondence theory, a theme that will be repeated 
in this chapter and in the next.   
2.6. More Precise Conceptions of Value 
This chapter has provided a survey of various accounts of value which aim to be scientific and 
experimental in nature. The purpose of this survey is not to insist that any one particular account 
is correct or to make some grand meta-ethical point, but to present the various possible ways we 
can think about values once we think about their concrete uses. Philosophers of science have the 
resources to think about values in nuanced ways. As I have previously noted, discussion of values 
in science tend to be associated with terms like “wishes,” “desires,” “likings,” “preferences,” 
“biases,” and so on. The survey I have provided tells us that, given the various possible accounts 
out there, we cannot just assume that values do or should always refer to these terms in the same 
way, nor treat them as interchangeable concepts all containing the same content or figure in the 
same way in a given reasoning process, without any ability to be more specific about our meanings. 
The phenomena associated with valuing is complex so we can’t just assume that these terms will 
always mean the same thing and perform the same function when considering the usage of values. 
Nor can we assume that any given term will always mean the same thing from one account to 
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another. Finally, we must pay careful attention to how any of these concepts as they are involved 
in concrete conditions affect, and are effected by, the situation in which valuation takes place.  
 To presume that values are uncomplicated and thus do not require much precision or 
nuance in our treatment of them is to beg the question. Philosophy of science has generally tried 
to provide precision to descriptive aspects of science, from what makes something a scientific fact, 
to the nature of evidence, to trying to articulate accounts of empirical, experimental, and predictive 
success. This is true of the earliest attempts of the logical empiricists to reduce scientific claims to 
observation statements to more modern attempts to articulate what is required for something to 
count as evidence (Longino, 1990), explaining the nature of explanatory, predictive, and 
experimental success (Solomon 2001) and empirical success (Lacey 1999), to explaining what 
minimal predictive competence entails (Douglas 2013). To argue that we should be (at least to 
some extent) precise about these concepts and what processes of empirical inquiry can account for 
factual or descriptive judgments because of their complexity, but that we do not need to be precise 
about what we mean by value and the processes by which value judgments are made because of 
their simplicity is to presuppose that facts and values are essentially separate. Even if we want to 
claim that values themselves are complex, but we only need a thin account for the purposes of 
science, it still presumes a difference between facts and values that would require further 
justification to validate employing any thin account. If we accept the accounts discussed in this 
chapter, the relationship between facts and values is already blurred and so such a distinction 
cannot be merely assumed, and as I will discuss in the following chapter, there can be no sharp 
dichotomy between facts and values.41  
                                                          
41 See Section 3.4 for Putnam’s discussion of dichotomies between facts and values and for the account of how I 
make distinctions between facts and values.  
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 Philosophers of science who have advanced the argument that values need to play a role in 
science have already done much to undermine the fact/value dichotomy anyway. As Mark Johnson 
notes, much of the history of philosophy of science has involved attacking the notion that science 
can be accounted for by appeal to foundational empirical claims; data is theory-laden and choices 
about what theories are accepted and thus what constitutes a scientific fact depends on values 
(Johnson 2014, 21). Much of these kinds of arguments undermine the original reasons for the fact-
value dichotomy in the first place. If philosophers of science are willing to argue that values need 
to play a role in science, and that descriptive facts are partially a function of (a result of) values, 
then they should be willing to accept the possibility that it goes both ways: that values are also 
partially a function of descriptive facts. If this is true, the risk of rampant subjectivism is reduced. 
Philosophy of science has been rigorous about the logic of science and its various empirical 
components and their meanings (vis-à-vis the nature of observation, reasoning, judgment, and what 
makes something a fact, a piece of evidence, etc.), so to admit a whole new component as necessary 
(social and ethical values), and then not be equally rigorous about its components and meanings is 
asymmetrical to a degree that requires explanation. One example which will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 4 can be found in the work of Helen Longino. Longino provides a detailed and 
sophisticated account of how something can count as evidence for something else but does not 
provide much analysis of what she means by value and why. One characteristic of philosophy of 
science is that it tries to provide as precise analyses as possible of the various factors that go into 
scientific thinking, and, especially given the potential for incommensurability in value discussion, 
we should aim for as much precision as possible in discussion of values in science.  
 However, even if one is not prepared to accept some of the claims of naturalism or wants 
to insist that facts and values are essentially different, there still needs to be further precision than 
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is typically offered about the nature of values. Unless one wants to be a relativist about values and 
claim that all value claims are equally adequate (even a cultural relativist would not assert this), I 
suspect most would accept the fact that we do have some ability to discern between certain values 
as being better than others. For example, we might claim the value I have for eating junk food is 
worse than the value I have for eating healthy foods. So long as we make distinctions between 
certain kinds of values, we need to account for how we can make such discernments and on what 
basis those judgments make sense because even this raises important questions for how we ought 
to think about how values are used in science.  
 This chapter has presented four detailed accounts of values, all chosen because they were 
intended to also account for how values can be used in science. Each of these accounts, in what I 
have chosen to emphasize, offers something unique and will prove useful. Dewey, for instance, 
provides an account allowing us to think about individualized deliberations and valuations. Lewis 
provides an account of how to talk about values in social terms and disagreements and the ways 
that various situations affect their realization. Lepley provides an account of the various possible 
kinds of values that exist, their relationship across various kinds of inquiries, and suggests the 
different possibilities for verification. Kitcher’s account reminds us that verification as a matter of 
correspondence is implausible because values are not eternally fixed parts of the world.  
All of these accounts offer something to a potential conception of values in science moving 
forward. This includes the ideas that values are not inherently subjective; they suggest the 
possibility that we have the capability through reason and intelligence to criticize value claims 
without relying on mysterious or nebulous criteria and that once we pay attention to the concrete 
conditions in which valuation takes place, we can judge value according to the conditions and 
effects involved. So, I will adopt the following as the basis of an account of values moving forward:  
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1. An account of value should focus not only on the terminal response or the immediate act 
of choice. Considering the concrete conditions of valuation will require us to consider the 
antecedent and consequent processes and conditions that valuation is a part of and 
responsive to.  
2. Valuation proceeds through a problem-solving pattern of inquiry. 
3. Valuation as a form of criticism involves, as described by Dewey and Lewis, both 
immediate experiences of value and appraisal, where appraisal is considered along an ends-
means continuum to come to a determinate judgment of what is valuable. 
4. Words typically associated with values such as “wish,” “desire,” “like,” “taste,” or 
“preference” are not all necessarily connected to valuing in the same way, and each may 
have distinct meanings which are testable. For example, for my purposes moving forward, 
I will use the terms “wish” and “desire” as Dewey tends to use the terms (with the former 
designating a non-active preference and the latter an active preference), however I may 
make reference to ways that Lepley uses the terms as well. 
5. There is a difference between what is valued (valuing) and what is valuable, where the 
latter is or could be determined by a process of valuation (inquiry), and thus I will adopt 
Lewis’ ideas about the difference between apparent and objective value. 
6. Values are not narrowly confined to the ethical. As Lepley points out, values can range 
from the narrow confines of ethics to a broad range including concepts like truth. 
7. Value judgments are not essentially different from other kinds of judgments and can be 
warranted or be considered true, but not, as argued by Lepley, Churchland, and Johnson, 
by resorting to a notion of correspondence or by relying on reductions to immediate sensory 
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perceptions. I will accept Lepley’s idea that values just like facts are relatively verifiable 
depending on the nature of the claim and the nature of the situation. 
8. Valuation can be a long-term process conducted by social groups which furnish us with 
generalized ends which have a history of being verified. “Value” can imply either valuing 
behavior, valuation (judgment), or a generalized end.42 Discussion of generalized ends will 
be examined in the following chapter. 
A conception of value entailed by these 8 points, and as further explicated in the following 
chapter, could always be more precise. However, the conception is precise enough for my purposes 
in that it establishes that values are complex, including many possible meanings, where the many 
concepts attached to it are conceptually distinct, and that values can vary in degree of objectivity 
and verification. In Chapter 4, when I discuss other conceptions of value these points are not as 
precisely put in those conceptions, and this lack of precision is problematic. As I further explicate 
this account it will be worth considering to what degree is it possible to employ scientific 
methodologies in such an approach to value. According to Abraham Edel, for scientific method to 
be applicable to values and ethics, there must be concepts of moral phenomena and moral 
experience which mark off an area of inquiry as distinctively valuative or moral, a set of moral 
and value terms which permit of definite ways for linking them to these phenomena, some meaning 
for generalization or systematization which would permit of possible regularities or law-like 
isolation of phenomena, and some modes of application and decision so that such generalization 
will have relevance to the application of values and morality (Edel 1961, 323). I believe that with 
the accounts discussed some of these conditions have been met, with further elaboration of the 
experimental nature of value to be discussed in the next chapter.  
                                                          
42 See Figure 5 for the eventual full description of these terms.  
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 An account of values like this is not to be taken as final or singularly “right.” My purpose 
in drafting such an account of values is not to stake a claim to ultimate meta-ethical correctness, 
nor to establish that this is the only correct framework for thinking about values in science, but 
rather to attempt to provide one way of providing precision to the concept of value in order to 
evaluate accounts regarding how values ought to be used in science and to help resolve potential 
conflicts and misconceptions when it comes to competing accounts. My notion of values thus has 
the status of a hypothesis and is affirmed on the basis of a practical decision. This is not to suggest 
that other potential accounts of values couldn’t or shouldn’t be used so long as they are coherent 
and fit with the practice of science at least to some degree. Ultimately to determine the test for 
validity of any account of values as applied to the values in science debate, I believe we should 
consider Lepley’s suggestion: that a viewpoint be tested by its ability to assist in clarifying, 
integrating, or extending theory with respect to any single issue (Lepley 1944, 18).  In other words, 
the test of my conception of values will lie in its ability to resolve or dissolve existing problems, 
integrate conflicting views in the field, and suggest further clarifications, and developments.  
 With regards to the final idea of my adopted conception of values, that values are warranted 
or verifiable and that such judgments are not essentially different from other kinds of judgments, 
it requires further explanation. If a conception of values like this is adopted, I believe it requires a 
radical rethinking of the nature of how values relate to the process of inquiry. It also requires a 
more specific account of how values can be verified, where any such account would be especially 
useful if it can be integrated into some of the contemporary discussions of the nature of scientific 
verification. Finally, it will require us to consider in what ways values can be distinctive at all. In 
the next chapter, I will discuss these issues through the relationship of values to forms of judgment 
both descriptive and normative and on what basis we can think of values as being verifiable. 
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Chapter 3: Judgments of Practice and the Verification of Values 
The account of value adopted in the previous chapter is one in which value is not confined to what 
is ethical but applies to many areas of deliberation such as to the sciences and to epistemic concepts 
like truth. Following the lead of Dewey, Lepley, Kitcher, and Churchland, it also affirms that value 
inquiries follow a pattern of problem-solving, and that value judgments are not essentially different 
from other accounts of judgments and can be verified in similar ways. In addition, the account 
affirms that verification will not follow based on a correspondence notion of truth. All these 
positions require further elaboration, both for the sake of clarifying how values are capable of 
verification, but also to consider what are the consequences of adopting an account of values like 
this when it comes to any kind of inquiries. This chapter thus has two aims: the first section will 
explain how the notion of values as a problem-solving mechanism allows us to understand how 
valuation is a broadly used phenomenon which applies to all forms of inquiry. To do this, I will 
utilize Dewey’s argument that all judgments are practical judgments and Lewis’ argument that 
valuation is essential to knowledge production as they explain these issues in the most detail. The 
second aim is to explain in what way values can be considered to be verifiable. To do this I will 
argue that we can best understand value verification through Dewey’s concept of warranted 
assertability, as it pertains to a pattern of practical judgment as the final outcome of a process of 
adjustment of a problematic situation. Once all this is understood, it will become clearer how an 
account such as this enables us to make better sense of the relationship between valuation and 
scientific inquiry.  
3.1. Judgments of Practice 
Dewey argues, “all controlled inquiry and all institution of grounded assertion necessarily contains 
a practical factor; an activity of doing and making which reshapes antecedent existential material 
which sets the problem for inquiry” (Dewey 1938, 160). Thus, there is a particular form of 
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judgment which functions in determining what to do to execute a needed controlled existential 
transformation of an indeterminate problematic situation into a determinate resolved one. An 
indeterminate situation is one that is questionable, ambiguous, confused, conflicting, obscure, and 
so on (1938, 105). Resolving such indeterminacy requires existential operations which modify 
objective matter to bring about a change in belief.43 Because such situations require that something 
should be done yet are indeterminate with respect to what might or should be done, one must 
therefore form a judgment as to how to act to facilitate such modifications. Thus, such judgments 
occur only where what to do is called into question and there is lacking a clear impulse to act in a 
particular way.  
The intellectual question of such judgment is “what sort of action the situation demands in 
order that it may receive a satisfactory objective reconstruction” (1938, 161). In other words, there 
are judgments which take place whenever we encounter a situation where resolution will require 
taking some action, and it isn’t clear what that action should be. As Dewey notes, these kinds of 
inquiries are not exceptional or infrequent as many deliberations in our daily lives concern what 
we should do, and to deny that such judgments occur would be to claim that action is determined 
either by impulse, habit, caprice, or convention. He explains, “Unless the decision is arrived at 
blindly or arbitrarily it is obtained by gathering and surveying evidence appraised as to its weight 
and relevancy; and by framing and testing plans of action in their capacity as hypotheses: that is 
as ideas.” (1938, 161).  
3.1.2 Basic Account of the Nature of Practical Judgment 
Practical judgments require descriptive claims regarding the nature of the situation. Dewey 
explains, “what should be done depends on the conditions that exist in the given situation and 
                                                          
43 Dewey explains that transformation of the situation, “cannot be attained by conjuring with mental states. It is an 
end brought about only by means of existential changes” (1938, 162).  
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hence require a declarative or enunciatory proposition: ‘The actual conditions are so-and-so’” 
(1938, 162). Thus, the business of inquiry is to “determine that mode of operation which will 
resolve the predicament in which the agent finds himself involved, in correspondence with 
observations which determine just what the facts of the predicament are” (1938, 168). Accuracy 
of the practical judgment depends on an accurate survey of conditions to determine obstacles to be 
overcome and resources to be utilized. However, this does not include every condition. Rather, 
judgments require that we determine what is relevant for deliberation. Thus, any declarative 
propositions are hypothetical with respect to their relevancy and adequacy for the judgment at 
hand; they function as instrumentalities for providing the needed control. For example, predicting 
the return of a comet does not just require accurate data, but determining which data is relevant or 
irrelevant (and thus used) for such a prediction (MW 8: 22). Declarative propositions involving 
facts or concepts are instruments to be used in eventual judgment and action.  
Lewis echoes this notion in his own work. According to Dewey, all judgments of fact have 
a reference to courses of action to be tried and to the discovery of means for their realization (MW: 
23). Such factual claims function as means within practical judgment to ground the judgment that 
a particular act is the one best determined to produce the desired effect on the basis that they yield 
probable predictions of possible outcomes. Lewis argues that the purpose of knowledge is to allow 
us to anticipate the future where action will make a possible difference (Lewis 1946, 4). Action is 
an attempt to determine or control a particular outcome and therefore knowledge is important. He 
notes, “The principle function of empirical knowledge is that of an instrument enabling transition 
from [one kind of situation] to the other; from the actual present to a future which is desired” 
(1946, 4). Thus, for Lewis any descriptive fact about the world has practical import and is part of 
practical judgment: “knowing is for the sake of doing” (1946, 3).  
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 Thus, in a case of practical judgment there is an indeterminate situation whose resolution 
will only take place with an existential change in current conditions. Something will happen, but 
exactly what will depend on conditions which will be determined by some action which can 
produce change. What should be done is in question, or is indeterminate, and thus the final outcome 
will be determined by some inquiry. In such deliberations, there will be observations of existing 
conditions and a tentative determination of descriptive propositions, concepts, or rules and their 
relevance as means towards resolution. Eventually a hypothesis or end-in-view will form which 
will suggest a plan of action which will introduce the conditions needed to yield a transformation 
of the situation into a resolved determinate one. The end-in-view or goal must be specific to the 
situation to be a means of continually regulating a specific behavior once a judgment is made. One 
does not have a goal of safety at large, for instance, but getting to a specific place of safety. Dewey 
notes, “unless the anticipation or end-in-view is idle fantasy, it takes the form of an operation to 
be performed” (Dewey 1938, 166).  
The final judgment will then serve as a determining factor in the subsequent form of events. 
If this hypothetical mode of action, when carried out, has the expected effect, it is verified. The 
final issue is, “some new situation in which the difficulties and troubles which elicited deliberation 
are done away with; in which they no longer exist” (1938, 161). This serves as the standard of 
judgment. The truth or falsity of such judgments is determined by the outcome since the subject 
matter of the judgment is the determinate situation (MW22). This outline will serve as the basis 
for understanding a logic built on the notion of a problem-solving adjustment to make such 
practical judgments and how experiences and concepts can serve in different logical functions 
towards those adjustments with further details to be filled in in section 3.2.44  
                                                          
44 It is worth noting that such a logic will borrow heavily from Dewey whose logic is uniquely distinct from 
traditional formal sentential logic. Dewey’s logic focusses on inference as a matter of problem-solving, with  
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3.1.3 Valuation as Practical Judgment 
We now have an outline of what the logical process of a judgment of practice is, and it is 
important to note that Dewey argues that evaluations are of this form. Values are not subjective, 
Dewey notes, but practical (MW 8: 34). Recall from the last chapter that valuation involves two 
essentially different components. Prizing describes a kind a behavior, a matter of finding a thing 
to be good such that we welcome it, dwell upon it and so on as a matter of organic reaction to 
immediate experience. To appraise something is a form of judgment, a process of eventually 
judging something to be good and eventually knowing it (MW 8: 27). Notice that outside of 
valuation in cases of affective-motor behavior, there are no propositions formed other than what 
is experienced, or what Lewis calls empirical value statements.45  
Where there is judgment, however, it is important to note, as has been pointed out by 
Dewey, Lepley, and Lewis, that “good” or “bad” as terms in a judgment are relational concepts, 
rather than being self-sufficient or irreducibly simple, we consider something in terms of the 
concrete situations in which they arise and the consequences they permit. The good that is 
experienced is because of an organic reaction, and thus involves relations to what caused such a 
reaction. Inference involves examination of the experiential finding of good or bad in terms of 
such relations. Judging that a thing actually is good instead of merely experiencing it to be good 
involves “ceasing to look at it as a direct, self-sufficient thing and consider it in terms of its 
consequences—that is, in its relations to a large set of other things” (MW 8: 29).  
In other words, an inference is made when we use the experience of good or bad to predict 
certain consequences; what Lewis would call terminating or non-terminating judgments. To make 
                                                          
various experimental operations employed in such inferences, and how such operations function within such a 
logical inference. References to the logical functions of various concepts may thus indicate a meaning that departs 
from traditional understandings. For more information see Brown 2012.  
45 See Lewis’ section of the previous chapter.  
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such an inference that a thing found good will actually bear out and be considered to be good in 
light of certain consequences is to form a practical proposition; to consider how something, if acted 
upon, will operate in promoting a particular course of action (MW 8: 30). In light of certain 
consequences, we are able to form judgments about the value of a thing despite this being different 
from how it is found now, just as we judge that getting a flu shot is valuable despite the discomfort. 
Such judgments involve comparisons between different potential consequences, determining 
which should be promoted or avoided, and whether we are capable of such promotion or avoidance 
or not. In other words, in appraisal we evaluate various prizings, which are behavioral in nature; 
thus, how we should behave. Since valuations are a determination of what to do, they are a form 
of practical judgment.  
In valuation, there is a determination of the desirability of separate potential actions as a 
means to separate possible outcomes. As Dewey notes, “valuing [valuation] denotes a passing 
judgment upon acts with reference to their connection to other acts” (MW 8: 31, emphasis 
added).46 Valuation constitutes a form of practical judgment. Because of this, value is not 
something previously given but is determined through inquiry and realized through action. 
Judgment is required because it is indeterminate in terms of what influence various qualities should 
have over our eventual behavior. In other words, because of conflicting tendencies between various 
possible actions, with each outcome and each means having an influence on us, valuation is not 
merely about recognizing the influence of something on us but determining the value of that 
influence relative to incompatible aims so as to determine what to do. So long as we know what to 
                                                          
46 It is important to note that Dewey here uses the term “valuing” to describe a judgment, whereas beginning in 
Section 3.3, I use the term differently to describe a behavior apart from judgment. An explanation for this 
discrepancy for this is owing to changes in how Dewey uses these terms over the course of his career.  
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do, there is no valuation needed and no determination of value made; valuation, and thus 
determination of value, is a matter of determining what we want.  
Dewey explains, “To judge value is to engage in instituting a determinate value where none 
is given. It is not necessarily the case that antecedently given values should be the data of valuation; 
and where they are given data they are only in terms in the determination of a not yet existing 
value” (MW 8: 36). This once again presents a warning sign when we use the term “value” as 
predicated of certain generalized terms like “honesty” or “simplicity.” Since valuation exists when 
there is indeterminacy over what should be valued between conflicting aims, it is not a matter of 
conforming to a pre-established ideal but comparing these options with one another (MW 8: 39).47 
The value can only be determined by determining what to do, by forming a practical judgment.  
As noted, an end-in-view is not a general concept, but specific to that situation. Every such 
situation is specific; it is not merely incomplete; the incompleteness is of a specific situation (MW 
8, 46). Thus, valuation is never merely a matter of applying a fixed or determinate value to be 
judged outside of the situation to the competing goods within a situation. As Dewey notes, the 
more completely the notion of an aim is fixed and formed, “outside and irrespective of the specific 
conditions which the situation of action presents, the less intelligent is the act” (MW 8: 40). Any 
standard we use will be determined within the judgment, otherwise if a standard is already given 
there only remains “its mechanical application to the cas e in hand […] genuine moral uncertainty 
would be impossible” (MW 8: 40).  
While existing standards can be formed prior to the process of judgment within a given 
situation, the usefulness of such standards is limited to the degree that those standards emerge from 
                                                          
47 It is important to note how this differs from the account of value from Hugh Lacey discussed in the following 
chapter.  
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situations similar to one being faced.48 As Dewey notes, “The experimental character of moral 
judgments does not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles exist as hypotheses with 
which to experiment. Human history is long. There is a long record of past experimentation in 
conduct, and there are cumulative verifications which give many principles a well earned prestige” 
(Dewey 1922, 239-40). Recurrence of similar situations allow for the formation of generic ends 
which possess some prima facie claim to use. However, “value-standards are only presumptive. 
Their status depends […] upon the extent to which the present situation is like the past” (MW 8: 
47). Thus, such standards are means of aid in deliberation (though do not replace it) which allow 
for examination of a situation, but Dewey stresses the dangers of allowing habits to overlook 
differences and presuming that the standard should apply when it doesn’t. This is because “every 
moral situation is a unique situation having its own replaceable good” (Dewey 1920, 163). Any 
prior standard is only as useful as it was critically formed and verified at the time, and as it properly 
applies to the situation at hand.  
3.1.4 Perceptions as Practical Judgment 
So, valuations are forms of practical judgments as Dewey defines them. However, there 
are other aspects of judgments of practice worth considering. For example, sense perceptions are 
involved in judgments of practice. As discussed in the last chapter, experience is active and so, 
“sensory quality becomes specific only in motor response. Red, blue, hot, ect. as immediate 
experiences, always involve motor adjustments which determine them” (Dewey 1903, 123). In 
other words, if you change your behavior or activity, the experienced quality changes.  Also recall 
that according to Dewey and Lewis, immediate forms of sense perception are not forms of 
knowledge; they exist and while statements about their occurrence can be false in the sense that 
                                                          
48 More on this idea will be taken up in the following section. 
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one could lie about them, the perceptions are neither true nor false (MW 8: 51). With this in mind, 
Dewey argues that most sense perceptions are functional within practical judgment in that the 
function of perceptions are to be taken as signs49 which suggest different possible actions. For 
example, the observation of a red light is a term within practical judgment suggesting that one 
should stop. In other words, we observe in order to perceive various signs which suggest what to 
do. As noted, immediate experience is not cognitive; experience only becomes cognitive in so far 
as we take what we observe to be a sign which suggests something besides the observation itself.  
Because perception has this capacity to present signs, perception becomes a practical affair. 
We may observe a great deal of content which is not cognitive, but which may become cognitive 
if we judge that it is a sign relevant to potential action. This is relevant not only because observation 
can suggest action, but that actions inform our observations. Certain activities will prioritize 
seeking certain kinds of signs and thus making certain kinds of observations in order to get certain 
specific information. For example, Sharon Clough notes that in primatology studies, a gender-
laden word like “harem” predicated to primate groups containing one male affected observations 
of researchers as passive female behaviors became overreported and aggressive female behaviors 
became underreported (Clough 2004, 112). If we recall Dewey’s arguments about the arc reflex 
concept from Section 2.1 of the previous chapter, observation and action are not distinguished 
from each other. Observation is not merely passive, but active in that a child may see-to-reach and 
so that observation and action guide each other. Even mere observation of a flame guides the eyes 
to observe in certain ways. 
Dewey’s argument is that sensory data only takes on a cognitive character because of its 
role within practical judgment. Lewis makes a similar point: taking an immediate experience as a 
                                                          
49 Here “sign” has logical significance as understood within the field of semiotics. Signs indicate something else.  
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sign allows for the regulation and control of an outcome through action. Judgments about 
immediate experience are for the sake of action and would have no use otherwise (Lewis 1946, 3). 
Sensory data is significant because it suggests consequences to be had, controlled, avoided, and so 
on. Actions thus drive the kinds of discriminations we make in how we observe phenomena and 
involve a process of determining what is relevant and what isn’t for future outcomes. Even 
scientific propositions about sensory data, which are used to determine causes and events, have 
reference to “inferences regarding consequences to be effected. They are means of securing data 
which will prevent errors which will otherwise occur, and which facilitate an entirely new crop of 
inferences as to possibilities—means and ends—of action” (MW 8: 57). Thus, sensory 
propositions are judgments of practice in so far as they function both within practical decision 
making but are also a result of ongoing action. In other words, sometimes perceptual judgments 
will be a practical phase of inquiry as a means to pursue some larger question (“to find an answer, 
I should look there in this way”), or sometimes inquiry itself will concern itself specifically with 
the question of where and how to perceive something (“the answer is to look there in this way”). 
3.1.5 Inference as Practical Judgment 
Even what questions we choose to ask are a form of practical judgment. When we are faced 
with an indeterminate situation, it may be so indeterminate that we are unaware of what problem 
we face and thus we need to judge what is the right question to ask. Dewey argues that 
determination of what questions to ask and how to ask them is a matter of determining what should 
be done to secure the materials, facts, and concepts necessary for the resolution of a problematic 
situation (Dewey 1938, 170). Not only are judgments of this nature common amongst every day 
judgments, but within many fields, such as law, medicine, mechanics, art, and agriculture, 
determining the right questions to ask is significant for progress in inquiry. So far, Dewey, has 
argued that everything from moral judgments, evaluations, everyday deliberations, sensory 
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perceptions, and judgments about what questions to ask are all forms of practical judgment. 
However, Dewey also argues that inference is ultimately a matter of practical judgment as well.  
According to him “instigation to behave towards the remote in time and space is the 
primary trait of the inferential act; descriptively speaking the act consists in taking up an attitude 
of response to an absent thing as if it were present” (MW8: 70). To clarify, inference is a matter 
of relating what is presently experienced to some future expectation. If one affirms the presence 
of a snake, we are affirming potentialities going beyond what is actually given, that what is given 
will react in ways characteristic of the concept. Concepts, are thus necessary for inference, and are 
practical in nature. This is because the concept of something is detached from the given thing it 
applies to. A concept “preserves the meaning-force of the situation and detaches it from the 
immediacy of the situation” (MW8: 76). As Dewey explains it, physical things do not have 
implications, but the idea or concept of things do. Seeing a light, we can accept it as a comet, but 
it remains light as given and thus does not imply anything. Such an inference can only be tested if 
something is implied by it. If we have a concept of “comet” it can tell us what a comet would be 
if it were there and what other things would be indicated if it were a comet (for example, that it 
will follow a certain kind of orbit, that spectrographic analysis will determine a certain chemical 
makeup, etc.). Concepts and ideas are thus tools of inference which prescribe and regulate 
operations of inference, where inference aims to determine how to orient oneself to something 
implied but not yet present. Refinement of such concepts are a practical means of guarding and 
improving inquiry and thus their development is a practical affair as well. This, of course, is 
relevant to science as well.  
3.1.6 Science as Practical Judgment 
Science also involves the use of abstract concepts to suggest possible meanings. Abstract 
conceptions are adopted for the sake of inquiry because they permit a greater control and greater 
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degree of testing and manipulating. Thus, focus is shifted away from immediate qualitative aspects 
of experience. Ideas used in science allow for manipulation and understanding of relationships 
which permit further experimental acts of inference that may not be relevant to common-sense 
inquiries. Identification of physical water and its immediate qualities allows for little inference, 
but “H2O” suggests all kinds of relationships which permit experimental testing.  
Dewey’s point is that measures of scientific safeguarding such as discriminatory analysis 
and the shaping and modification of abstract concepts are ultimately for the sake of practical 
judgment.50 Operations like breaking down experienced qualities and employing abstract meanings 
are tools which are designed for the sake of a better controlled inference. Thus, the concepts and 
methods of science are chosen for practical reasons; they exist to suggest and control operations 
of inquiry (Dewey 1903, 121-2). According to Dewey, science is controlled inference and yet the 
specific inferential tools developed by science makes it a “highly specialized industry. It is such a 
specialized mode of practice that it does not appear to be a mode of practice at all” (MW8: 79).  
 Yet Dewey argues, “The conduct of scientific inquiry […] is a mode of practice; the 
working scientist is a practitioner above all else and is constantly engaged in making practical 
judgments: decisions as to what to do and what means to employ in doing it” (Dewey 1938, 161). 
As noted, determining what question to ask is a practical decision, and this is true in science as 
well. But such decisions are not just about asking what is of interest for research, but also play a 
role in determining the best methods of observation, experimentation, and conceptual 
interpretation (1938, 170).  
                                                          
50 This point is echoed by others in philosophy of science such as in the operationalism of Percy Bridgeman (1927), 
and in the work of Philip Frank (1950).  
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In so far as judgment involves choosing concepts, deciding on subject matter, and 
determining methods of testing and verification, “activity shows itself at every critical point in the 
formation of judgment” (Dewey 1903, 121). According to Dewey the scientist: 
has to decide what researches to engage in and how to carry them on—a problem that 
involves the issue of what observations to undertake, what experiments to carry on, and 
what lines of reasoning and mathematical calculations to pursue. Moreover, he cannot 
settle these questions once and for all. He is continually having to judge what is best to do 
next in order that his conclusion, no matter how abstract or theoretical it may be as a 
conclusion, shall be grounded when it is arrived at. (Dewey 1938, 161)  
In other words, scientific inquiry proceeds on the basis of determining what to do when inquiring.  
Moreover, such judgments must be continually made as the scientist must decide the 
relevancy of any concept or observation, and whether and how to proceed through each step of the 
process. Thus, even judgments about purely theoretical concepts are practical judgments in the 
sense of how they should be utilized. Such judgments are only tentatively affirmed until a final 
judgment is made and an action can be taken towards resolving indeterminacy.51 Dewey explains:  
The scientific worker has continually to appraise the information he gathers from his own 
observations and from the findings of others; he has to appraise its bearing upon what 
problems to undertake and what activities of observation, experimentation and calculation 
to carry out. While he “knows,” in the sense that understanding, systems of conceptual 
material, including laws, he has to estimate their relevancy and force as conditions of the 
particular inquiry undertaken. (Dewey 1938, 174)  
Modern philosophers have also echoed this point, that methodological decisions about durations 
of studies, the appropriate makeup of test subjects, and the selection of biological endpoints depend 
on value judgments (Intemann and de Melo-Martin, 2010; Wickson and Wynne 2010). Thus, 
judgments of practice take place throughout the entire process, whether it involves judging what 
question to ask, what materials, observations, and concepts to invoke, what testing processes to 
make, whether such testing is sufficient, whether the results are sufficient and relevant to the 
                                                          
51 See 3.2.3 for more information on the difference between affirmations and final judgments. 
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original question, whether the original question is still well formulated, and so on. For example, 
standards of evidence are not “pre-theoretical” but evolve as theories and investigations evolve 
(Nelson 1990, 313). Since a standard is normative in nature, it means that valuation of what those 
standards ought to be occur throughout inquiry. Determination of whether something should be 
singled out as subject matter, or whether certain concepts will be used will be determined by the 
end-in-view as each are brought into a logical relationship with the other (Dewey 1903, 121). 
 Dewey holds that all inquiries involve judgments of practice, and that science is a practice. 
The process of scientific inquiry thus will always involve practical judgments. However, it is 
important to recognize that a scientific inquiry will not only involve practical judgment, but that it 
is a form of practical judgement itself. Recall that inquiry is about transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into a determinate one, and such a transformation is not a matter of 
removing personal doubt, but understanding what operations are necessary for responding to one’s 
environment and being able to do it. In the following section I will discuss judgment in more detail, 
but Dewey’s conception of judgment has been characterized as a matter of “attributing a predicate 
to some subject” (Burke 1994, 145). The subject of a judgment is the piece of the world the 
judgment is about, but for Dewey, “the predicate of a judgment will be the process or course of 
action settled upon as being what is appropriate and fitting for that situation” (1994, 145). 
Returning to the example of the comet, if a scientific judgment was primarily concerned with 
determining what a light in the sky is, the judgment that we can predicate the concept “comet” to 
the subject matter (the light), is a matter of putting us in a position to take the light as signifying a 
“comet” and, as just discussed, understand by that how one should respond, whether this means 
actual actions or potential actions. As Dewey reports, “To say that something is to be learned […] 
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is to say that something is to be done” (MW 8: 66). Thus, science not only involves practical 
judgment, but is itself a form of practical judgment. This carries true for all factual judgments. 
3.1.7 All Factual Claims as Practical Judgments, as Evaluations 
 Dewey presents several cases that would fall under the umbrella of a judgment of practice. 
Everything from moral judgments, to sensory judgments, deliberations, scientific judgments, 
evaluations, interrogative judgments, and so on all are practical. Early in his analysis, Dewey 
questions whether all judgments of fact remain hypothetical in that their relevance to a situation is 
not fully determinate until action is taken. He suggests that all factual judgments have reference to 
a determination of courses of action to be tried and to the discovery of means for their realization 
and these judgments are verified in so far as they produce expected consequences which occur as 
a result of intelligent action (MW8: 23). In other words, descriptive or declaratory propositions are 
not isolated or self-sufficient, but function within inquiry as hypotheses which suggest the need 
and advisability for performing certain operations as a means of resolving an indeterminate 
situation (Dewey 1938, 178). Thus, the validity of any such claim rests with their leading to the 
expected outcome; while the subject matter of the proposition may be purely declarative, the 
proposition itself is not. Dewey’s survey of this fact in various kinds of judgments serves to 
confirm his claim that “there is no inquiry that does not involve judgments of practice” (1938, 
174).  
While we may know certain facts, and certain rules or principles may be accepted as 
standards, they are not necessarily decisive in any particular judgment. Applicability of facts, rules, 
principles, and laws always enter into any judgment and choice has to be made among them. 
Consequently, “in order to obtain a grounded final judgment there has to be evaluation or appraisal 
of principles” (1938, 173). Because of this, Dewey remarks, “Such evaluative judgments are 
clearly an instance of judgments of practice; or, more strictly, all judgments of practice are 
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evaluations, [because they are] occupied with judging what to do on the basis of estimated 
consequences of conditions […] A point still more important for logical theory is that these 
evaluative judgments […] enter into the formation of all final judgments” (1938, 174).  
3.1.8 Judgments Are Evaluations 
 If Dewey’s analysis of judgments of practice are correct, we can confirm that all judgments 
involve judgments of practice, and that all judgments of practice are evaluations. This allows us to 
understand the claim from the previous chapter that value judgments are not inherently different 
from other kinds of judgments, for, “the net conclusion is that evaluations as judgments of practice 
are not a particular kind of judgment in the sense that they can be put over and against other kinds, 
but are an inherent phase of judgment itself” (1938, 179). Nonetheless, it is possible to identify 
certain judgments as being distinctly “value judgments.” Judgments about means and ends-in-view 
may be so pertinent that the evaluative aspect is more dominant and in this relative way a judgment 
may be called a value judgment, but since evaluation is an inherent phase of any judgment, the 
difference is in emphasis not in kind (1938, 179). This claim would validate Lepley’s suggestion 
that the difference between factual judgments and value judgments are a matter of emphasis rather 
than inherent difference. Thus, we can now understand the claim that value judgments are not 
inherently different from other kinds of judgments.  
3.1.9 Value Judgments Necessary for Knowledge 
 Perhaps more importantly, we can come to understand the necessity of value judgments 
being verifiable. Since practical judgments involve the existential transformation of a given 
situation, it is not the case that valuation is merely a personal mental exercise (Dewey 1938, 159). 
Judgment is concerned with an objective situation involving both the person doing the judging as 
well as various other conditions and consequences external to the self which are involved. It is on 
this necessary basis that we can understand that such judgments can be objective (MW8: 16). 
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Dewey notes, “deliberation, as a tentative trying-out of various courses of action, is outlooking. It 
flies toward and settles upon objective situations not upon feelings” (Dewey 1922, 202). According 
to Dewey, to doubt that such judgments are capable of verification, or to suggest that one couldn’t 
judge an objective situation and determine what is better to do is to deny that intelligence enters 
into any form of practice; that any judgment is irrelevant (Dewey 1938, 160). In other words, since 
inquiry requires judgments about what we should do, those judgments are either made out of habit 
or impulse, or they are made on the understanding of the effects that will follow from them and 
confirmed on the basis of those effects. Without such verification, successful inquiry would be a 
matter of luck.  
 Lewis, in accepting the claim that in the process of making practical judgments one must 
affirm certain facts and make use of them, argues in more explicit terms that the denial of verifiable 
value claims would lead to relativism. According to Lewis, “Knowledge, action, and evaluation 
are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance 
of action: knowing is for the sake of doing” (Lewis 1946, 3). An active creature is one who takes 
an interest in securing certain aims or desires and avoiding others, thus it aims to bring about 
certain outcomes. Determinations of what action to take is rooted in evaluation, while 
determination of how to secure those ends are rooted in knowledge.52 In the Quest for Certainty, 
Dewey makes a similar argument (Dewey 1929, 389). Recall that for Lewis, something presented 
as being cognitively significant is so because it signifies something else capable of being realized 
in future experience. To know, “is to apprehend the future as qualified by values which action may 
realize” (Lewis 1946, 4) Whether a particular action will be performed or not will depend on the 
                                                          
52 He notes that a creature who was incapable of altering the processes of reality would have no use for knowledge 
and would be incapable of comparing values. It would only be capable of esthetic enjoyment or suffering.  
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evaluative processes brought to bear in judgment and will be controlled by the degree that it makes 
reference to anticipated possible experience of something desired or to be avoided.   
 In the previous chapter, I explained how Lewis’ account made the case that value 
judgments are not completely distinct from other forms of judgment. However, Lewis’ argument 
that evaluation, action, and knowledge are connected makes the stronger case that evaluations must 
be verifiable for knowledge to have meaning. He argues: 
The denial to value-apprehensions in general of the character of truth or falsity and of 
knowledge, would […] invalidate all action; because action becomes pointless unless there 
can be some measure of assurance of a valuable result which it may realize. And this 
negation, if it be carried out consistently, likewise invalidates all knowledge; both because 
believing itself is an active attitude which would have no point if it were not better to be 
right than wrong in what one believes, and because knowledge in general is for the sake of 
action. If action in general is pointless, then knowledge also is futile; and one belief is as 
good as another. (1946, 366) 
In other words, if we were unable to verify whether one action is empirically better than the other, 
we would have no use for knowledge since we use knowledge to determine what effects an action 
is likely to take. If we were unable to verify a value judgment by gauging whether the consequences 
agree with the hypothesis, one belief would be as good as any other. As Cheryl Misak explains, 
“If it were not better to be right than wrong in what one believes, why bother about your belief or 
your grounds for it?” (Misak, 185). Dewey echoes this by noting that without an end-in-view, there 
is no guide for observation, there would be no control over the practice of inquiry and any fact 
would be as good as any other (Dewey 1938, 497). Lewis’ points also highlights a point similarly 
made by Dewey, that belief itself is a value-object, that beliefs are deemed good or bad based on 
the consequences which they give rise to if acted upon (Dewey 1925, 403-6).  
If we accept Dewey’s analysis of judgments of practice and Lewis’ argument regarding 
value, knowledge, and action, we thus come to the same conclusion. If knowledge involves 
practice, it must require verifiable value judgments regarding how to conduct ourselves within an 
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inquiry or else inquiry would be a process of impulse, habit, or convention. If knowledge is for 
practice, then values must be verifiable or else the declaratory propositions or knowledge claims 
that certain objects produce certain effects would be pointless. Thus, value verification is not only 
possible, but necessary for the practice of inquiry. Once we understand Dewey’s point that the 
practice of science includes determination of what experiments to perform, what apparatus to use, 
and what calculations to engage in, we understand that science is about establishing the controlled 
and intelligent regulation of action, for it establishes a method best suited to securing what is 
valuable (Dewey 1929, 36). Thus, science represents a sophisticated form of intelligent ways of 
acting and thus of making evaluations. In turn, science provides the knowledge necessary to 
improve our judgments about values, to regulate them, and make them more secure (1929, 39). 
Sharyn Clough has also noted this relationship between science and values (Clough 2004, 111). 
The notion that science is free of value judgment is thus not only false logically, but the argument 
here suggests the desirability of valuation in science. If intelligent action as a judgment of practice 
is a product of controlled evaluation, science does not become less objective by relying on such 
value judgments, for the alternative is reliance on habit, impulse, and convention; rather science 
becomes more objective the more we use evaluation in the practice of inquiry, so long as evaluation 
is itself subject to controlled and experimental processes and is verified.  
3.2. Value Propositions and the Meaning of Verification 
Recall from the last chapter that verification of values is an issue of contention. Verification of 
values doesn’t seem possible if it must be in terms of a narrow conception of fact or truth. As 
Lepley noted, verification is better captured in terms of adequacy rather than truth, and Kitcher 
argued that value verification can be understood as progress in resolving problems. The nature of 
the verification of value judgments and their relationship to judgments of practice can be further 
clarified using Dewey’s concept of warranted assertability and its relationship to the propositions 
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involved in inference. Eventually, I will argue why such a concept is not only beneficial for 
understanding the nature of verification of values, but also compatible with current thinking in 
philosophy of science. I will begin by explaining what warranted assertability is and its relationship 
to the rest of inquiry as it can pertain to valuations.  
3.2.2 Verification as Warranted Assertability 
 According to the broad conception of value adopted in the previous chapter, I affirmed the 
notion found in every account of valuation considered, which is that valuation occurs through a 
problem-solving pattern of inquiry. As Lepley suggested, verification can be limited to truth 
(however this may be defined) but he opts instead for a liberal meaning of verification which can 
include truth but also include adequacy and the ability to transform significant experiences. Lepley 
provides few details beyond this, so instead we will look to Dewey. According to Dewey, the 
recognition that inquiry is in response to some trouble, conflict, problem, or doubt means that it 
ends in the institution of conditions which removes that trouble, conflict, problem, or doubt.53 
Dewey uses the term “warranted assertability” to describe this objective state of affairs where the 
issue is no longer doubtful or indeterminate, but rather settled such that one is prepared to act 
(Dewey 1938, 7-8). In other words, warranted assertability describes the objective end or 
completion of an inquiry, and thus serves as the terminal state of inquiry rather than an end-in-
view (1938, 167). This will serve as a model of value verification.  
Two important aspects of warranted assertability are that it involves reference to a 
particular inquiry for which the assertion receives warrant, and that while it is a product of 
competent inquiries, the settlement produced by that inquiry is no guarantee that the conclusion 
                                                          
53 It should be noted here that my aim is to apply a Deweyan framework where applicable in order to clarify how 
values can be verifiable, rather than insisting on instituting Dewey’s logic as a whole. Thus, I will neither attempt to 
defend Dewey’s logic nor feel obligated to remain wholly consistent with it given that I am incorporating concepts 
from different accounts of value into my framework.   
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reached will remain settled. Thus, while warranted assertability designates a success term for 
inquiry, it is not permanent, nor fixed, but progressive. Dewey explains, “The ‘settlement’ of a 
particular situation by a particular inquiry is no guarantee that settled conclusion will remain 
settled […] It is the convergent and cumulative effect of continued inquiry” (1938, 8). This holds 
true for science as well since, “[i]n scientific inquiry, the criterion of what is taken to be settled, or 
to be knowledge, is being so settled that it is available as a resource in further inquiry; not being 
settled in such a way not to be subject to revision in further inquiry” (1938, 8).  
 With these two aspects understood, we can see that warranted assertability is potentially a 
broader concept than truth since it designates nothing fixed nor absolute, but something temporally 
determined to be successful based on the inquiries which have been conducted and operations 
which continue to be reliable. According to Dewey scholar Tom Burke, it is possible that an 
assertion may be warranted yet ultimately prove to be false. For example, if one judges that a 
certain mode of action will repair a broken vehicle, it is the continued moving of the vehicle which 
would contingently warrant the judgment that the problem has been resolved. In such cases the 
judgment, “is not necessarily made all of a sudden and once and for all, but is simply further and 
further warranted the farther and farther the car moves [….] but if the car soon stops moving again 
due to overheating, the warrantability of that judgment is undermined” (Burke 1994, 201-2). Our 
ability to determine the warrant of a judgment is based on its success so far, and further bolstered 
or hindered upon further and wider tests, thus warranted assertability admits of degrees rather than 
static binary values.  
Also, because warranted assertability is inherently connected to the inquiry from which it 
emerged, it avoids the suggestion of hypostatized claims about the nature of the world, but rather 
is a product of inquiry where certain perspectives, decisions, interests and so on are involved; a 
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warranted claim cannot be separated from them. Warranted assertability is to be understood as a 
logical concept, not as a metaphysical or ontological one. If we suggest that a judgment is 
warrantedly assertable, it is because it references concrete and objective conditions and operations 
as they pertain to the resolution of a particular inquiry. As Burke points out, “One thing that which 
recommends the notion of warranted assertability as a working concept in logic is that the 
warranted assertability of judgments is tangibly certifiable by means of one’s concrete actions in 
the world, whereas the truth of one’s assertions remains at bottom a metaphysical idea” (1994, 
239). Thus, the beauty of using the concept in this context of value judgment is that it does not 
demand a commitment to any one metaphysical or meta-ethical position regarding concerns like 
the ultimate standing of any truth claims. 
3.2.3 Propositions and Judgments 
According to Burke, a key element to understanding the concept of warranted assertability 
is Dewey’s distinction between propositions and judgments (1994, 157). According to Dewey, 
judgments are identified with the settled outcome of an inquiry.54 They concern themselves with 
the concluding objects that emerge from inquiry and thus have direct existential import (Dewey 
1938, 120). An example Dewey provides is a literal judgment found in a court of law. The 
judgment is a settlement of an issue initially taken to be problematic and the settlement is one of 
its existential consequences. While a judgment may take linguistic form, any sentence which 
captures the content of a judgment serves to direct future activities which bring about a 
determination of what was formally indeterminate when inquiry was taking place.  
 Judgment is distinct from propositions, which rather than being direct and existential, are 
intermediate and representative. According to Dewey, a proposition suggests something proposed 
                                                          
54 It is also noteworthy is that Dewey’s use of terms like “judgment” and “proposition” were formulated during a 
time when their meanings in contemporary logic were not so settled, and thus appear idiosyncratic (Brown 2012, 
67). Despite this, I think the distinction is logically beneficial.  
 
 
129 
 
or propounded for further consideration within a given inquiry (1938, 286). Propositions function 
to determine the facts of the case at hand, and thus have no status independent of inquiry. They 
include observed data which determine the material conditions of the problematic situation 
allowing for the consideration of possible interactions, and of conceptual matters that suggest 
possible operations that will yield additional data and solutions to the problem at hand (1938, 288). 
Propositions are symbolic and allow for consideration of possibilities without direct action being 
necessary, allowing for further deliberative consideration of outcomes before a judgment is made.  
 Thus, we see a significant functional distinction between propositions and judgments. 
Propositions function to determine that certain facts are facts of the case, to suggest the nature of 
the problem at hand, and to propose experiments and operations which will eventually yield a 
solution, while a judgment is a settlement on a course of action which will yield existential change 
and resolution to the problem. However, short of a final settlement of the issue, any proposition 
merely serves to suggest actions to aid in the determination of a judgment. Therefore, propositions 
are instruments or tools of inquiry in the sense that by articulating factual or hypothetical details 
of the situation they can suggest alternate courses of action or ends-in-view (Burke 1944, 202). 
Propositions as intermediate and instrumental are thus means, and therefore “since means as such 
are neither true nor false, truth-falsity is not a property of propositions” (Dewey 1938, 287).  
 Rather, propositions are affirmed in inquiry. Affirming a proposition suggests that 
something should be taken for use in connection with what it may lead to as a means to an end 
(1938, 120). Thus, propositions are determined on the basis of provisional evaluations of 
existences and conceptions as means of instituting a final judgment according to criteria of being 
“effective, or ineffective; pertinent or irrelevant; wasteful or economical” (1938, 120). For 
example, a proposition may be ineffective because it may insufficiently delimit the problem and 
 
 
130 
 
thus poorly indicate what kind of solution may be relevant. As Burke notes, the validity of an 
affirmation is not determined by truth, but relevance, salience, coherence, and persistence in 
further inquiry (Burke 1994, 206). An affirmation is only tentative; propositions function as 
suggestions meaning that they may be subject to revision as inquiry proceeds and previous 
affirmations may prove to be irrelevant or badly conceived. For example, if I am facing a computer 
problem, I may eventually affirm that it is a software problem. Such a proposition not only 
functions as a descriptive fact of the case and as a characterization of the problem itself, but by 
affirming it, it suggests certain courses of action to then take such as an operating system scan.55 
In time, however, it may be that I am forced to revise this and affirm that I am facing a problem 
that involves both hardware and software.  
While propositions are affirmed, judgments are asserted, where an assertion is taken to 
mean that there is a final determination in adopting a course of action. Thus, assertion is taken not 
in a purely linguistic sense, but in an active sense; one asserts a judgment by acting in accordance 
with its dictates (Burke 1994, 159). While a final judgment is the determinate factor in bringing 
inquiry to a close, inquiry can also involve many partial judgments which can determine 
intermediate propositions. For instance, in deciding that I am facing a software problem and that a 
scan would be an appropriate measure to take, the act of scanning will depend on a partial judgment 
which will yield further information56, and thus further propositions.  
3.2.4 Warranted Assertability as a Model of Value Verification 
So far, the framework of warranted assertability, with its distinction between judgments 
and propositions allows us to understand (1) the nature of the verification of a judgment such that 
                                                          
55 Notice that one understands the meaning of the proposition by the operations that follow from it. Thus, it forms 
the basis of an end-in-view.  
56 Burke goes to far as to claim that propositions just are symbolic units of information and that Dewey’s theory of 
logic is built around the notion of information (Burke 1994, 176).  
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it can be called warrantedly assertable, (2) why valuation is an inherent part of inquiry, and (3) 
why valuations must be verifiable. To the first claim, the reason why warranted assertability 
recommends itself as a model for understanding the verification of value judgments is that it is a 
success term that doesn’t rely on metaphysical assumptions, but rather is governed by logical 
considerations. A judgment is individual, or in other words, occurs in individual situations which 
governs the adequacy of the judgment. As I argued, all judgments are judgments of practice and 
so our understanding of the process of verification of a value judgment is identical. 
Recall from the previous section that such judgments take place where there is a need to 
bring about a transformed situation that is different from the problematic conditions which give 
rise to inquiry such that it is determinate. The benchmark for adequacy of a judgment is that the 
problem or indeterminacy which led to investigation is done away with as the situation becomes 
determinate. As Dewey explains when it comes to confirmation, while we may have an interest in 
seeing our hypothesis confirmed or disconfirmed:  
verification, or the opposite, is attained only because experimentation effects a transition 
of a problematical situation into a resolved one […] As far as the objective course of 
knowledge is concerned, as distinct from the personal interest of the investigator, this result 
is the important one; in comparison with it the verification of a hypothesis is secondary and 
incidental. (Dewey 1929, 190)  
In other words, while we have an interest in seeing a hypothesis confirmed, what is essential in 
terms of confirmation of a judgment is that it resolves the problematic conditions which 
necessitated judgment, and which provides added depth, range, and meaning to our experience.  
More specifically, the standard by which judgment is evaluated is a specific particular 
problem with concrete conditions and relationships; did the judgment resolve this problem being 
faced? Verification is not going to be a matter of personal interest or satisfaction, but it will be 
gauged in terms that are measurable and concrete in terms of whether there is resolution for a 
specific problem. In other words, the standard of verification is in terms of its success in resolution 
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of the problem which the judgment attempts. The question is less a matter of whether a value is 
true (whatever that may mean), but the question becomes “Does judgment resolve the problem for 
which the value is invoked to aid in resolving?” Thus, a notion of verification of a value judgment 
as a warranted assertion doesn’t rely on demonstrating the truth of trans-empirical value facts.  
3.2.5 Values Inherent to Inquiry 
To the second claim, that valuations are inherently part of inquiry, the distinction between 
propositions and judgments make this clear. Not only is the final judgment a form of evaluation, 
provisional evaluations are required to affirm a proposition. Propositions are affirmed on the basis 
of evaluations which determine whether a factual or conceptual claim is useful in the determination 
of judgment. It should also now be clear why judgments of practice are so necessary and 
indispensable in any inquiry, and why verifiable evaluations are the rule and not the exception in 
inquiry. Recall that even factual matters are a product of evaluation; declarative propositions are 
hypothetical with respect to adequacy and relevancy. As Dewey notes, “Facts may be facts, and 
yet not be facts of the inquiry at hand. In all scientific inquiry, however, to call them facts or data 
or truths of fact signifies that they are taken as the relevant facts of the inference to be made” (MW 
8: 23). He explains further, “The need for selective discrimination of certain existential or factual 
material to be data proves that an evaluative estimate is operating,” and this selection or weighing 
of data as facts of the case is a matter of evaluation (Dewey 1938, 497). Calling something a fact 
is the product of a value judgment concerning relevancy and adequacy concerning the situation at 
hand. This is similar to Lepley’s claim that something can be experienced as both a fact and value 
depending on whether the active response of the judgment is emphasized or the description of the 
event. 
As noted, propositions about matters of fact or courses of action are not self-determined or 
self-sufficient but are “determined with reference to an intended future issue and hence are 
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instrumental and intermediate […] their validity depends upon the consequences which ensue from 
acting upon them” (1938, 164). Information is selected and contextually determined, “for data, on 
this view, are always data of some specific problem and hence are not given ready made to an 
inquiry but are determined in and by it” (Dewey 1941, 180). As noted, evaluation requires the 
formation of ends-in-view which is why data must be situationally specific. In order for such a 
concrete determination of means, there must be an affirmation of resources available and obstacles 
to overcome. Such descriptive propositions are thus means to evaluation. When we deliberate, we 
tentatively affirm things during each step of inquiry which suggests alternative courses of action.  
Descriptive propositions are never purely descriptive. They are affirmed in functional 
correlation with other propositions suggesting a course of action as a means of forming an end-in-
view and a final judgment, and thus what is descriptive is never merely self-sufficiently 
descriptive; while the subject matter of a proposition may be descriptive, its logical function never 
is. For example, if one is faced with a situation in which they are having health issues, A 
proposition like “I am seriously ill,” “is without point if taken to be final and complete” (Dewey 
1938, 164).57 It is affirmed on the basis that one recognizes a problem and desires some resolution. 
In other words, the logical function of a proposition like that would be limited if it merely described 
a fact. Once such a proposition is affirmed, further propositions like “I should see a doctor” can be 
formulated and affirmed where it wouldn’t make sense without it. The relevancy and weight of 
factual propositions in a specific situation “is the matter to be determined by inquiry before an 
evaluative appraisal can be grounded” (1938, 174). Thus, because the logical function of a 
descriptive fact lies in its ability to suggest proposed courses of action, the test of their relevancy 
                                                          
57 Kristen Intemann has similarly suggested that what seems like purely descriptive claims in their meaning may 
have normative import. For example, the meaning of “clinical depression” may include “ought to be treated” 
(Intemann 2001, S512).  
 
 
134 
 
lies with whether those facts and suggested actions are well suited to address the matter at hand. 
Therefore, it is now clear why descriptive propositions are never purely descriptive for their 
importance is often not only whether the claim is accurate, but adequate. 
The affirmation of descriptive or factual propositions not only characterize the initial 
problem and thus allow for the proposal of various courses of action, but as experimental 
operations are performed, and new data becomes apparent, further operations can be suggested. 
Consider some problematic situation where it is determined that one must find something red. In 
such a situation, we may formulate a proposition like “the ball is red.” Dewey denies that this 
proposition has any true or false value, but rather that we deem that such a proposition is a useful 
characterization of a given perception to characterize a fact of the situation, and also we appraise 
that such a proposition is useful for the formulation of some proposed solution. Thus, we can see 
how strongly the notion of valuation plays a role in inquiry. Such a proposition is judged useful in 
formulating the end-in-view of the situation, the need to find something red, for example. Because 
of this, the propositions “the ball is red” and “I ought to pick up this ball” are linked within the 
situation as a means to a solution to the problem (needing something red) rather than being 
completely distinct, self-sufficient, or in the case of “I ought to pick up this ball,” as a terminal 
response interpreted as a mere preference. By acting in such a way, and having such an action 
resolve my problem, I can say that my judgment is warranted. 
This framework acts as a response to the notion that one cannot derive an ought from an 
is. In the previous chapters I noted arguments that undermine any sharp distinction between 
“oughts” and “is-es” but here we take note of the logical function of these kinds of claims. A 
factual or descriptive “is” claim is not purely descriptive, but hypothetical. They suggest that 
certain facts are relevant to the issue at hand. Their relevance lies with, and is tested by, their ability 
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to suggest various courses of action. Factual claims are means of making practical judgments, for 
the factual and normative claims develop in functional correlation with each other and are tested 
by the consequences they produce once a final judgment is made.  
Examples of how affirming various descriptive claims as relevant to addressing some 
problem can be found in the real world. Consider the example of Robert Ballard’s discovery of the 
Titanic. Prior attempts at discovery involved using sonar to scan for the ship itself using a laborious 
method of scanning back and forth across a search area called “mowing the lawn” (Yount 2009, 
43). Ballard’s team had only twelve days to scan and so didn’t have the time to conduct such a 
search. His prior successful discoveries involved looking for a debris field instead of the ship, 
which also necessitated the use of cameras instead of sonar. With conflicting information about 
whether the ship split during the sinking, Ballard affirmed certain then-controversial eye-witness 
evidence that the ship split which would mean that debris would have come loose during the 
sinking, and thus there would be a debris field to model and find. Upon affirming the fact that the 
ship split, the recorded ocean current became relevant in terms of suggesting how large such a 
field might be, and this became the basis of building a model. Using these facts, Ballard was able 
to avoid the need for a laborious scanning method by looking for debris instead of the ship and 
using video camera scanning instead of sonar. This example demonstrates the need for affirming 
that certain facts are relevant when determining a course of action. Upon affirming that the ship 
split, other facts like the current became relevant as well, and by affirming the fact that there would 
be a probable area where such a debris field would be, Ballard was able to decide that a less 
rigorous, but less laborious method would be better suited to the task.  
The point can be demonstrated in other fields as well. In medicine, a differential diagnosis 
requires that a list be made of the symptoms that the patient presents with. At that point the 
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clinician must decide which disorder to pursue in a selective fashion. They may choose to focus 
on what disorder is more likely, what is more serious if undiagnosed, or what is more responsive 
to treatment (Guyatt et al. 2008, 401). The clinician thus must first affirm whether something 
should be considered a symptom or not. For instance, a clinician may determine that certain 
symptoms are “all in their head” or the statistical unlikelihood of a serious but treatable illness 
which may lead to delayed testing (Kennedy 2013, 494). Whether abnormal behavior could be 
considered a psychological symptom or a neurological symptom will affect what tests will 
ultimately be conducted or other operations performed. If it is considered a neurological symptom 
in addition to other symptoms, then the explanation for all of the symptoms will change, and thus 
so will any proposed testing.  
In each case, the affirmation of a descriptive fact is not done merely for the sake of being 
descriptive. The ship splitting in two suggests searching for debris is a viable strategy; the 
observation of abnormal behavior suggests one should test for disorders with a neurological 
component; the statistical likelihood of an illness suggests whether it would be prudent to test 
given time and resources. The affirmations are not merely that a proposition accurately describes 
a fact, but that the fact so described is a fact relevant to some course of action one should follow 
to serve as a resolution. In some cases, it will be more tentative (such as Ballard’s example) 
whether the proposition should be affirmed or not, but the test for their inclusion lies in the results 
which their inclusion eventually leads to.  
3.2.6 Verification of Values 
Notice that warranted assertability with its distinction between propositions and judgments, 
and its requirement that we consider individual judgments in individual situations calls for careful 
attention paid to how we analyze values and what it might mean to “verify a value.” This concern 
is especially valid when considering a sentence containing a value claim; we must ask whether we 
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are talking about a value proposition or a value judgment and depending on which adjust our 
expectations accordingly so that we do not make a category mistake by asking whether a value 
proposition is true or not.  
Typical meta-ethical discussions center around whether value judgments can be 
propositions or whether such propositions can be true or false. According to Dewey, a value 
proposition, properly understood, is neither true nor false, but a value judgment can be. He notes 
that propositions, “are means, instrumentalities, since they are the operational agencies by which 
beliefs that have adequate grounds for acceptance, are reached as the end of inquiry […] truth or 
falsity are properties only of that subject-matter which is the end, the close, of inquiry by means 
of which it is reached.” (Dewey 1941, 175-6). A judgment is always particular; one can verify that 
this simple answer is correct, or that generous action was warranted, but does this mean that generic 
or universal value claims are unverifiable, and if not, what is their status?  
3.2.7 Generalized Ends 
When one judges what is best, they are judging an individual situation, not a generic or 
universal claim. Take, for instance, a value commonly discussed in the context of science like 
simplicity, which is taken to be a characteristic feature of good scientific theories (Kuhn 1977, 
323). When one affirms a value proposition like “simplicity ought to be a feature of scientific 
theories,” such a universal or generic proposition serves to suggest potential courses of action 
which may eventually become the end-in-view. In other words, simplicity suggests a course of 
action. One judges a simple theory, not simplicity at large. Thus, the decision to choose a simple 
theory is potentially warranted and verifiable, while simplicity itself doesn’t permit of verification.  
In Section 3.1.3, I discussed the fact that value was not previously given and that antecedent 
value claims are data used towards the determination of a not yet existing value. General values 
are never merely to be mechanically applied to any given situation, and to the degree this is done 
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is to the degree that action becomes less intelligent. Each situation is unique, and while general 
moral concepts or principles can be useful for the formation of an end-in-view, they must be 
evaluated in terms of their relevancy to the specific situation at hand. By contrast, the alternative 
to using values as instruments of inquiry is having them act as fixed ends to be attained. Dewey 
notes, “when ends are regarded as literally ends to action rather than as directive stimuli to present 
choice they are frozen and isolated […] Set up as complete and exclusive, as demanding and 
justifying action as a means to itself, it leads to narrowness; in extreme cases fanaticism, 
inconsiderateness, arrogance and hypocrisy” (Dewey 1922, 227). This may be particularly 
problematic in science, such as so-called epistemic values like simplicity, or in other situations 
with an ethical good like generosity.58 Such values are not “goods to be possessed as they would 
be if they expressed fixed ends to be attained. They are directions of change in the quality of 
experience. Growth itself is the only moral ‘end’” (Dewey 1920, 177).   
As previously noted, we never seek a value in general, but some concrete and specific 
action. Dewey notes, “To say that a man seeks health or justice is only to say that he seeks to live 
healthily or justly. These things, like truth, are adverbial. They are modifiers of action in special 
cases” (Dewey 1922, 169). So, judgments are never about the status of a generalized value, 
however there is benefit to analysis of such generalized ends. Dewey continues, “The value of this 
systematization is intellectual or analytic. Classifications suggest possible traits to be on the 
lookout for in studying a particular case […] they are tools of insight; their value is in promoting 
an individualized response in the individual situation” (1922, 169). This tells us that there is an 
alternative way to understanding values as fixed ends and that skepticism about whether a 
generalized value like simplicity can ever be verified is to commit a category mistake.  
                                                          
58 Dewey specifically says that the scientist would find no guidance in appealing to fixed ends (Dewey 1929, 264). 
Douglas has also suggested the dangers associated with using so-called epistemic values improperly. 
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It also tells us the function of such generalized ends in inquiry. In discussing the nature of 
generalized ends, Dewey explains: 
All principles are empirical generalizations from the ways in which previous judgments of 
conduct have practically worked out. When this fact is apparent, these generalizations will 
be seen to be not fixed rules for deciding doubtful cases, but instrumentalities for their 
investigation, methods by which the net value of past experience is rendered available for 
present scrutiny of new perplexities. Then it will also follow that they are hypotheses to be 
tested and revised by their further working. (Dewey 1922, 241) 
That a generalized value’s function in inquiry is not to be rigidly applied is also discussed by Kuhn 
who argues that the suggestive rather than deterministic nature of values are part of the essential 
nature of science (Kuhn 1977, 330).59 He argues that values function as effective guidance in the 
presence of conflict which specify, “what each scientist must consider in reaching a decision, what 
he may and may not consider relevant, and what he can legitimately be required to report as the 
basis of the choice he has made” (1977, 331).  
Thus, for Kuhn values are suggestive; they are not rules that determine choice. This echoes 
Dewey’s point that, “morals is not a catalogue of acts nor a set of rules to be applied like drugstore 
prescriptions or cook-book recipes” (Dewey 1920, 169). Short of an application to a specific 
context, the meaning of a value has limited content. Recall from the previous chapter that every 
judgment is a concrete judgment: “the activity of judging does not exist in general, but is of such 
a nature as to require reference to an initial point of departure and to a terminal fulfilment” (Dewey 
1939, 125). Thus, it is not generalized ends that we evaluate, but specific actions.  
As Kuhn notes, simplicity could suggest a theory which involves less labour than another 
theory, or it could suggest a theory which involves simplified conceptual apparatus (Kuhn 1977, 
324). Ballard’s hypothesis that the ship split in two and left a debris field was more complicated 
                                                          
59 It is interesting to note that Kuhn makes a similar distinction between rules and values and their logical function 
as Dewey does. According to Dewey, “Rules are practical; they are habitual ways of doing things. But principles are 
intellectual; they are useful methods of judging things” (Dewey and Tufts 1909, 334).  
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in that it required more complex modeling, yet it simplified the methods of search. So, any 
generalized value like simplicity, while helpful, is never by itself the basis of decision, but 
functions within inquiry. As Brown notes, Dewey’s use of the term “proposition” is closer to the 
etymological roots, where a proposition is taken as a proposal or a “provisional account of what is 
going on or what could be done” (Brown 2012, 67). Value propositions are therefore proposals: 
they propose potential responses, but they do not determine them. Simplicity is proposed as being 
relevant to a solution, and the validity of any such response is determined by its actual effects.  
A generalized end like simplicity thus develops overtime, where it is determined that 
looking for simple theories can often be beneficial towards warranted assertability. When one 
affirms a value proposition like “I ought to use a simple theory” (which itself may be the result of 
a partial judgment), they affirm that simplicity is relevant to a potential solution. This is an 
affirmation that the situation under consideration is sufficiently similar to other situations where 
simplicity was relevant and suggests what kinds of facts and hypotheses to consider. But that such 
a value is considered, and may even be relevant, doesn’t determine the judgment by itself. For 
example, if one were deliberating over seeing a doctor when faced with an illness, they may affirm 
that in past cases it was better to “let nature take its course” as opposed to going to a doctor, yet it 
is by no means obvious that the present situation is like previous kinds of cases. Even if one does 
affirm that a proposition like “if one is ill, they should see a doctor” is relevant, further 
considerations like whether one can afford it, or whether a good doctor is available may lead to 
further revisions and refinements, or even a rejection of the initial proposition before there is an 
inference made regarding a course of action (Dewey 1939, 163). The same is true of other values 
like simplicity as well, and the validity of using such a value is determined by the consequences it 
produces vis-à-vis its ability to aid in resolution of inquiry.  
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However, while such generalized values are useful for inquiry, they can also be dangerous 
if they are acted upon out of rigid habit instead of careful scrutiny. As Dewey notes, “Only with a 
habit rigid to the point of immobility could exactly the same good recur twice” (Dewey 1922, 212). 
Where a value is no longer taken in its suggestive force in inquiry, and instead a general value is 
habitually invoked as an end-in-itself regardless of the context, it becomes a fanatical pursuit. 
Dewey argues that subordinating every case to the pursuit of some general good leaves its specific 
traits shut out, leaving action to be dogmatic and rigid instead of flexible. He explains, “This ill is 
just the specific ill that it is. It never is an exact duplicate of anything else. Consequently, the good 
of the situation has to be discovered, projected and attained on the basis of the exact deficit and 
trouble to be rectified” (Dewey 1920, 170). 
The fact that generalized ends or values act as suggestive hypotheses regarding how to 
resolve a dilemma points to the development of an experimental approach to valuation. Valuation 
is not merely about immediately experienced value or prizing, but rather concerns itself with 
appraisal. The question becomes a matter of understanding the conditions which give rise to 
experienced goods and their consequences with a goal of understanding how to find a more secure 
and significant experience of value (Dewey 1929, 259). Recall that this is what distinguishes what 
is valued from what is valuable. Experimental application of generalized ends is a means to such 
an understanding.  
Dewey notes that qualities of values experienced are something to be investigated, and the 
more connections and interactions we ascertain the more knowledge we have; it is in this respect 
that values provide intellectual assistance in order to direct action; “judgments about values are 
judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects” (1929, 265). Generalized 
ends are thus operational, suggesting modes of action to take. However, “Such a causal and 
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operational definition gives only a conception of a value, not a value itself. But the utilization of 
the conception in action results in an object having secure and significant value” (1929, 259). In 
other words, part of the work of moral science is not only the development of generalized ends or 
values such as simplicity, but in the experimental application of them to understand the conditions 
and contexts in which they are warranted or require refinement. This is an important point which 
I will speak further on at the end of this Chapter. 
Dewey explains, “What is needed is intelligent examination of the consequences that are 
actually effected by inherited institutions and customs, in order that there may be intelligent 
consideration of the ways in which they are to be intentionally modified in behalf of generation of 
different consequences. This is the significant meaning of transfer of experimental method from 
the technical field of physical experience to the wider field of human life” (1929, 273). Such an 
experimental approach however requires fallibilism and eschews rigid or dogmatic application. 
Dewey continues, “A moral law, like a law in physics, is not something to swear by and stick to at 
all hazards; it is a formula of the way to respond when specified conditions present themselves. Its 
soundness and pertinence are tested by what happens when it is acted upon” (1929, 278). This 
view is similar to that of feminist philosopher of science Sharyn Clough, who argues that, “value 
judgments just like any other, just are empirical hypotheses” and that judgment about using a value 
is about its relevance to a scientific question at hand; whether a value is relevant is an on-going 
empirical question which needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis (Clough 2008, 273-8). 
Thus, the application of experimental and scientific logic to values becomes more natural 
under such a conception, and such an account may satisfy Rudner’s desire for the development of 
a science of ethics. That valuation may permit of the systematic experimentation with general or 
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abstract ends also satisfies one of Edel’s requirements which would allow for a scientific treatment 
of value and also the broad form of “experimental” as defined by Lepley. 
To summarize this view, propositions are instruments of inquiry, affirmed for the purpose 
of determining what facts are relevant and suggesting possible courses of action. Because of this 
function, descriptive facts are never purely descriptive but products of tentative value judgments. 
Value propositions, like any other proposition, are not true or false, but rather useful or not useful. 
Generalized value propositions like “one ought to use simple theories” or “one ought to be 
generous” either affirm that in similar cases such values were beneficial, or they suggest that they 
should be invoked in the case at hand. However, such affirmations are tentative, and subject to 
revision and refinement as other considerations are made. The logical value of such propositions 
lies in their determination of relative relevance and their suggestive force for forming an end-in-
view, rather than being deterministic or absolute. Thus, they are instruments of inquiry, and again 
not verified by any one judgment whose nature is particular. One verifies that a particular simple 
theory works out: one does not verify simplicity.  
Even an inference to a proposition like “I ought to use this simple theory” is merely 
affirmed. For in surveying all of the relevant data and considering possible modes of response that 
may lead to resolution, one may infer such a proposition. However, “while to infer something is 
necessary if a warranted assertion is to be arrived at, this inferred somewhat never appears as such 
in the latter; that is, in knowledge. The inferred material has to be checked and tested” (Dewey 
1941, 173).60 Thus, the judgment must be actual and concrete in order to be warranted, where the 
warrant stems from the actual conditions that follow action taken to resolve the problem at hand.  
                                                          
60 This point will come up again in Section 4.1.5. 
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This analysis of generalized ends as values introduces a third meaning of the term “value” 
as necessary to distinguish. In The Fate of Knowledge Helen Longino uses a tripartite distinction 
of the term “knowledge” to help diagnose problems that occur when thinking about social and 
rational factors of knowledge: knowledge as knowledge productive practices, knowledge as a 
cognitive attitude, and knowledge as content (Longino 2002, 77-85). In the previous chapter I drew 
attention to the distinction between “value” as valuing, which primarily is concerned with prizing 
and non-cognitive affective-behavior, and “value” as valuation, which is primarily concerned with 
appraisals or value judgment. The analysis of value judgment in this chapter provides for yet 
another distinct sense of “value” which is value as generalized ends. Perhaps not surprisingly, each 
can correspond to the three senses of knowledge as well. Valuing denotes primarily a 
cognitive/behavior attitude, appraising is concerned with value production, and generalized ends 
are stored content of previous judgments which can serve as hypothetical heuristics for future 
inquiries. Just like Longino, I will argue in coming chapters that making careful use of these 
distinctions will serve to resolve problems in discussions about values.  
3.2.8 Warranted Assertability and Science 
Having made clear the distinction between propositions and judgments, we can now understand 
the nature of the verification of a value judgment. Only judgments, which are particular, are 
verifiable in the sense that they can possess the property of warranted assertability. Warranted 
assertability is a success term where success is relative to the problem any judgment sets out to 
resolve and which any inquiry is conditioned by. Dewey explains, “Inquiry, as the set of operations 
by which the situation is resolved […] has to discover and formulate the conditions that describe 
the problem in hand. For they are the conditions to be ‘satisfied’ and the determinates of ‘success’” 
(Dewey 1941, 181). Everything from the data collected to the concepts used and eventual judgment 
is determined with reference to the specific problem at hand. What warrants any judgment is its 
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ability to satisfy as a resolution of the problem. As Matthew Brown explains, “this is not the vulgar 
pragmatism that would measure the truth of a claim according to whether the consequences of 
believing it are congenial. Rather, the consequences in question are tied to the consequences 
intended by the judgment” (Brown 2012, 69).  
 Because judgment is determined to be successful where success is operationally defined in 
terms of some specific existential outcome, it becomes clear why this is naturalistic and why 
judgment must be active rather than being purely intellectual. As Burke explains, warranted belief 
is not a middle ground between the problem and doing something; rather, it is the resulting state 
achieved by virtue of modifying activities until a solution to a problem is settled upon (Burke 1994, 
117). We do not achieve knowledge and then act, but rather we achieve a state of knowledge in a 
given inquiry by stabilizing the situation which ensures that the consequences of ongoing actions 
continue to agree with given as well as expected experience (1994, 119).  
This understanding of warranted assertability and the function of propositions is applicable 
to science as well. According to Burke, whatever existing knowledge we have from past inquiries 
can be drawn upon in its application to some novel situation. He explains, “A nuclear physicist 
will use basic knowledge about mathematics, about familiar features of macrophysics, even about 
some more or less resolved aspects of microphysics, in the course of inquiring into unresolved 
aspects of microphysics; but none of these more basic pieces of knowledge, alone or lumped 
together, constitutes knowledge about these unresolved aspects of microphysics as such” (Burke 
1994, 118). One cannot assert that any of these broader claims constitutes knowledge about 
particular microphysics problems until such time as they are applied to test their relevancy and 
warranted application in novel situations. This applies to application of generalized values as well.  
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Warranted assertability is to be understood as a naturalistic conception of success that 
allows us to understand the nature of the verification of value judgments. Whether the concept of 
warranted assertability, a success term that designates testable relationships between a judgment 
and an intended outcome, has room within a philosophy of science is the issue. The temptation 
may be to suggest that science deals with what is true or false and that other success terms are not 
needed or wanted. However, there is good reason to think that this is not the case.  
 As noted in the previous chapter, Kitcher believes that we must understand ethical progress 
as existing prior to ethical truth, and thus insofar as values play a role in science, it would 
necessitate a success term indicating progress in value judgments besides truth. Kevin Elliot argues 
that besides truth as a goal, science can ask pragmatic questions about the relationships between 
scientific representations and their fit with a user’s needs (Elliot and McKaughan 2014, 6). This 
raises questions about the adequacy of a theory overall, rather than just whether it is true or not.  
Other philosophers of science such as Helen Longino have argued, just as Lepley did, that 
truth is too narrow of a term and that other success terms should be understood as playing a role 
in science. She argues that the concept of truth works quite well in certain contexts, but less so in 
others. For example, we know what it means to say “the cat is on the root” is true or not. Beyond 
easily ascertainable facts, however, truth becomes more complicated. For instance, the laws of 
physics, if taken literally, are false. Laws are idealizations and to count as true, they would require 
an indefinite number of qualifying clauses that would specify those ideal conditions (Cartwright, 
1983). Doing so, however, would destroy the explanatory value of these laws as they apply to the 
real world where non-ideal conditions exist. Despite being literally false, however, we wouldn’t 
deny that such ideas about relations do not count as knowledge.  
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 According to Longino such laws are representations which are “supremely successful at 
what they are intended for—to guide our interactions […] in order to produce from it what we 
want” (Longino 2002, 110). She explains: “the role of laws in physics, and hence their utility, is 
such that they cannot correspond in the sense of directly conforming to some single matter of fact 
or collection thereof in the physical world without forfeiting their utility” (2002, 112). What 
Longino is describing fits with Dewey’s claim that propositions are affirmed on the basis of their 
use in inquiry rather than because they are true or false. The laws, however, warrant the individual 
judgments that make use of them.  
In addition to problems like this, there are scientific theories which she argues cannot be 
best understood as formulated in linguistic propositions but are better understood as models to 
which the standard understanding of truth or falsity are difficult to apply. Instead, we can 
understand adequacy of a model in terms of the structure it represents being identical to a structure 
in the world. Thus, the models aim at isomorphic or homomorphic success.  
 To discuss the success of non-propositional content, of isomorphic, homomorphic success, 
as well as truth, approximation, fit, and similarity in terms of representative success, she argues 
for a more general encompassing notion that she calls “conformation” (2002, 115). She explains, 
“This term conveys in a less tendentious and less problematic way than does ‘true,’ what the 
relation between some content—a representation—and the object of that content might be. It can 
apply to laws and to statistical claims that are not literally true, but can capture the relations in 
which we are interested” (2002, 115). The arguments of Longino and Elliot tells us that there are 
ways of thinking about success in science that do not reduce to truth as commonly understood and 
thus there is wiggle room for other ways of gauging success in science, potentially including 
warranted assertability as it applies to value judgments. Thus, even if we are unprepared to declare 
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that a value or value judgment is true (given whatever is metaphysically and metaethically 
understood by that), we can articulate a success term that permits us to declare that a value 
judgment can be verified.61 Thus, warranted assertability can function within a scientific 
framework so long as it captures a degree of adequacy that scientists may find useful.  
3.3. Three-Fold Division of Value 
If we are trying to determine the meaning of value verification, it will depend on what the 
function of any value claim is. A general value proposition like “one should be generous” is merely 
suggestive, and its warrant is only a function of its being relevant to an individual judgment or 
assertion that is warranted. Any value judgment, properly understanding what judgment is, is 
individual and is warranted to the degree it resolves the conditions the judgment aims to redress. 
Warranted assertability, once understood, allows us to articulate how value judgments can be 
verified in a scientific context since it is operationalized in terms of observable and experienced 
effects of concrete actions in concrete situations. Thus, it better satisfies the need for an account 
of value compatible with scientific methodology.  
It also introduces yet another important distinction we must be careful about when 
discussing values; in addition to the distinction between valuing and valuation, we must take note 
of whether a value is being affirmed or asserted. In order to capture these distinctions, I suggest an 
elaboration of point 8 to the account of value adopted in the previous chapter into a three-fold 
division of the meaning of value: “value” can now designate, valuing, valuation, and generalized 
                                                          
61 Comparing conformation to warranted assertability can also be beneficial. For example, Dewey’s conception of 
proposition does not require that it be linguistic and thus could include models. Nor does Dewey require that a 
proposition count as literally true, but merely useful and thus a law of physics just like a generalized value serves a 
function within inquiry as suggestive in nature. One could either claim that warranted assertability can do the 
same work as conformation, or if that is too far, that warranted assertability can be included among the other 
success terms as part of conformation.  
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ends, and these divisions allow us to understand what logical function each possesses.62 
Understanding these distinct meanings not only will allow us to avoid misunderstandings, but 
reminds us that values can be experimental. Generalized ends are affirmed in inquiry, while 
valuations are asserted. Valuing constitutes an affective attitude towards something, however this 
can also be distinguished between valuing as prizing and valuing as impulse or habit. 
 
While the division between valuing as prizing and valuing as non-reflective behavior is 
meant to capture the fact that valuing can designate any affective-motor behavior, for my purposes 
moving forward, given that prizing overlaps with valuation, when I refer to “valuing” I will be 
referring to the non-reflective behavioral form that it takes. It is important to also bear in mind that 
this division is not meant to be fixed or absolute; there may be a number of useful ways to make 
such distinctions. With these divisions in place, and with an account of logical judgment clarified, 
I am now in a position to clarify the fact-value distinction.  
                                                          
62 My distinction here is my own, and so while the language borrows from other accounts discussed in the previous 
chapter, I do not necessarily use it in the way they might.  
Figure 5 
“Value” meaning Valuation Generalized 
End 
Valuing 
Logical status Judgment  Proposition Valuing as prizing.  
Involve reflective 
consideration of 
what is valued as 
an end-in-view: 
Affective-
ideational-motor 
behavior. 
 
Valuing as an 
unreflective habit or as 
an impulse.  
As merely affective-
motor behavior, it is not 
logical.  
Propositions about values possible (i.e. Mary 
values X).  
Logical function Asserted Affirmed Overlaps with 
valuation. 
Impulses or habits can 
give rise to prizings. 
They are non-logically 
asserted (but not 
warranted). 
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3.4. Fact/Value Distinctions 
The previous chapter outlined the meanings of values and valuation, while this chapter has 
developed the logical functions of values and their verification. In doing so, the line between facts 
and values has blurred. Here I will discuss the issue of the fact/value distinction directly, and, now 
that I have distinguished between different meanings of “value,” will close this section with how 
I will be drawing distinctions between facts and values moving forward. Hilary Putnam has argued 
against the fact/value dichotomy, suggesting that it is one of the final dogmas of empiricism. He 
notes, “The idea that ‘value judgments are subjective’ is a piece of philosophy that has gradually 
come to be accepted by many people as if it were common sense” (Putnam 2004, 1). Yet, he rejects 
this thesis that value statements are outside of the sphere of reason. The historically presented 
reasons for such a dichotomy are in fact reasons that most philosophers would reject despite still 
supporting the thesis itself (2004, 14).  
For instance, Hume’s argument that all ideas are “matters of fact” or “relations of ideas” is 
ultimately a metaphysical distinction, and on this metaphysical basis he concluded that an “ought” 
cannot be derived from an “is.” In other words, it is not due to canons of formal inference that 
Hume distinguishes “ought” claims from “is” claims, or why he argues that we cannot derive and 
ought from an is. Instead, an “is” claim is one that describes a “matter of fact” and on that basis, 
we cannot derive an “ought” from the “is”, so the argument depends on how “matters of fact” is 
conceived. According to Putnam, Hume presupposes a “pictorial semantics,” a conception of an 
idea that it can only represent a fact if it is picturable. While something like an apple is picturable, 
a concept like right or good is not, and thus cannot represent a fact (2004, 15). In other words, his 
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distinction of fact and value depends on “discredited seventeenth-and eighteenth century talk of 
‘ideas’” (2004, 15).63  
According to Putnam the later arguments of the logical positivists that value claims are 
cognitively meaningless rely on similar arguments. For something to be cognitively meaningful, 
it must be analytically true or “factual,” and the logical positivist’s confidence that values are not 
factual was derived from their confidence that they knew what a fact was; “it is the conception of 
the ‘factual’ that does all the philosophic work” (2004, 21). Yet, as they were forced to revise their 
notion of “fact” further and further, they destroyed the very basis of their fact/value dichotomy.64 
Hume’s notion of a “fact” is something of which there can be a sensible “impression” and on this 
basis, since we do not sense value, they cannot be factual.65 While the logical positivists in similar 
fashion initially insisted that a fact must be certified by observation, scientific progress in atomic 
theory forced an eventual liberalization of the notion of “fact” as more than just a sensible 
impression (2004, 22). By 1938, the notion that an individual fact must be observable, or even 
reducible to observable predicates was given up. Putnam notes, “the logical positivist fact/value 
dichotomy was defended on the basis of a narrowly scientistic picture of what a ‘fact’ might be, 
just as the Humean ancestor of that distinction was defended on the basis of a narrow empiricist 
psychology of ‘ideas’ and ‘impressions’”(2004, 26).  
                                                          
63 Putnam notes that in contrast to this idea of experience as value neutral, and thus that values must be a product 
of the mind, “pragmatists in particular have always emphasized that experience isn’t ‘neutral,’ that it comes to us 
screaming with values” (2004, 103). 
64 Don R. Bowen (1977) echoes this point that the debate about the need for value-free science is a function of the 
distinction between facts and values articulated by Hume and Max Weber, and later reinforced by the logical 
positivists. The philosophical underpinning of value-freedom on the basis that science only deals with what is 
verifiable and thus values should be excluded was undermined by the positivists themselves just as this notion of 
value-freedom came to prominence.  
65 Putnam notes the irony in that people who believe that Hume “showed” that there was no such thing as an 
ethical fact used the same reasoning to demonstrate that there was nothing factual about the notion of causation 
either (Putnam 2004, 22).  
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The collapse of the various initial grounds on which the fact/value dichotomy was defended 
has not led to the demise of the dichotomy. Instead, Putnam asserts, the reasoning behind it has 
shifted to metaphysical grounds (2004, 40). The most prominent metaphysical account he 
discusses is physicalism and the arguments of Bernard Williams. This is the view that the world-
in-itself is independent of all observers and can only be discussed using the scientific terms of 
physics. According to Williams, the only convergence of conclusions will have to be in the 
language of physics, and thus would describe the world in primary qualities alone; since value 
judgments could not be part of any such absolute conception of the world, independent of any 
perspective, they are not capable of being true. However, Putnam argues the dichotomy between 
what is absolutely true and what is only relatively true (relativism) is indefensible (2004, 42). He 
suggests, “recognizing that our judgments claim objective validity and recognizing that they are 
shaped by a particular culture and by a particularly problematic situation are not incompatible. 
And this is true of scientific questions as well as ethical ones” (2004, 45).  
Putnam suggests in a manner similar to Dewey that we can recognize objective truths in 
value judgments through intelligent inquiry as a means of resolving problems through criticism of 
what is valued, and that for such solutions to be reliable they must be related to objective reality. 
One can accept the possibility of objective truths without believing that such truths must be 
absolute or represent an Archimedean point or the absolute conception of Bernard Williams (2004, 
45). He suggests that the fact/value dichotomy is tempting because it is much easier to claim that 
“that is a value judgment” means “that’s just a matter of subjective preference” than it is to “do 
what Socrates tried to teach us” and examine our convictions to see if they hold up to scrutiny 
(2004, 44). The danger with the fact/value dichotomy is it may lead us to give up on attempting to 
resolve value disputes through further discussion and examination. He notes, “the worst thing 
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about the fact/value dichotomy is that in practice it functions as a discussion stopper, and not just 
a discussion stopper, but a thought stopper” (2004, 44). To put it in Peirceian terms, assuming 
values are just subjective blocks the path of inquiry. 
 Given Putnam’s argument, and those covered in the previous chapter, are we to conclude 
that there is nothing distinctive about values and that our linguistic habits of discussing facts and 
values separately ought to be abandoned? There is a sense in which Lepley suggests an affirmative 
answer to these questions given that according to his view, factual judgments and value judgments 
judge the interrelations between conditions and their effects, thus the two “are actually but different 
modes of expressing the same properties, or interdependencies, of the same events” (Lepley, 216). 
He even suggests that factual formulations and valuative formulations can be translated into the 
other without adding or losing anything and that retention of the notion of a difference is a matter 
of habit. That is one possible answer. Alternatively, Putnam insists that abandoning a dichotomy 
between facts and values does not mean that there may not be useful distinctions to be made, so 
long as we understand that such distinctions are instrumental and logical in character rather than 
fixed or absolute (Putnam 2004, 9).66 
 For example, Putnam notes that there is a useful distinction to be drawn between ethical 
judgments and other judgments just as there is a difference between chemical judgments and non-
chemical judgments, “but nothing metaphysical follows from the existence of a fact/value 
distinction in this (modest) sense” (2004, 19). We can recognize a modest distinction between 
claims that are trivially factual in nature and trivial valuative in nature.  
                                                          
66 We may be skeptical whether Putnam and Lepley really disagree here; it may come down to a matter of 
emphasizing the importance of different formulations, or the interim sociological importance of drawing 
distinctions given our habits.  
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 When it comes to choosing some position ranging from modest distinctions to no 
distinctions, nothing for my purposes in this dissertation requires me to claim that we can never 
make any distinctions between facts and values. Also, affirming that there is no distinction to be 
made and giving up those linguistic habits risks adopting a position that will seem so foreign to 
the modern discussion of values in science so as to seem completely inaccessible. Given this, what 
distinctions are there between facts and values? One important reason not to give up the distinctive 
language of values is because it includes both valuing and valuation. Lepley’s remarks are targeted 
towards the fact-value conception of values, which specifically relates to judgment or valuation. 
However, values as valuing are distinct from facts in that one relates to behavior specifically while 
the other relates to events. Thus values, including valuing, can be distinguished on this basis.  
 How we choose to distinguish between facts and values further is open to future possible 
uses, so long as we do not make absolute distinctions. There are no judgments which are purely 
factual and no judgments which are purely valuative. This follows from the account of judgments 
of practice I previously discussed since valuation is required for facts to be facts of the case for a 
given inquiry, and likewise valuation will depend on us understanding the factual relationships 
between means and consequences to formulate an end-in-view. With this in mind, I will distinguish 
between facts and values according to the logical functions they perform within inquiry. 
Valuations function to determine the nature of the problem and select those aspects of experience 
as relevant to a possible solution judging what to do on the basis of estimated consequences of a 
proposed action, while the function of facts is to serve as determinate subject matter for such a 
judgment. Whereas values are in a sense future oriented, considering behaviors needed to be 
changed or maintained, factual formulations of subject matter are concerned with past or present 
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events or what will follow from those events given what is known. This will be further elaborated 
in Chapter 5 when I discuss the relationship between values and evidence.   
 It may also be useful to distinguish between facts and values as they relate to a specific 
subject matter of the judgment. Any scientific judgment contains a moral element of honest 
inquiry, but there are specific issues and problems that are more easily identified as ethical in 
nature. For example, ethical standards of experimentation are usually matters more easily 
identified as ethical rather than factual and so in this way we again may wish to make distinctions.  
 For my purposes, focusing on distinctions such as valuing behavior as distinct from 
judgment, of the different functions that facts and values can play within judgment itself, and of 
the general subject-matter of the judgment is sufficient. These are functional and not absolute 
distinctions, and these distinctions could be collapsed or distinguished in different ways for 
different inquiries. However, once a value judgment is tested and verified, there is a factual claim 
in saying that the behavioral response did “in fact” resolve the problem (thus warranted judgments 
count as a subset of facts), and likewise any factual claim is affirmed in inquiry because it is 
considered suitable for its purpose. We cannot detangle facts and values completely, even as we 
do make distinctions. Thus, the motto is distinctions if necessary, but not necessarily distinctions.  
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter had two central aims: the first was to better explain the process of valuation and its 
place within inquiry as a problem-solving mechanism. The second was to explain how values and 
value judgments can be verified. Neither aim is completely distinct from the other and their 
elaboration further clarifies the logical meanings of values. According my account, valuations as 
judgments of practice are an inherent part of all inquiry because all inquiry aims at determining 
some course of action. The fact that in any inquiry it is not sufficient to state the facts, but to 
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evaluate that the facts are indeed relevant to the case at hand demonstrates that valuation is 
inherently part of any inquiry.  
Value judgments are the basis of controlled activity in inquiry and thus are indispensable 
to it. The concept of warranted assertability is well suited as a means of understanding the process 
of value verification given that it fits with the problem-solving pattern of value affirmed in the 
previous chapter, and because it is compatible with various ways of understanding verification in 
science. It also requires that when we consider a value judgment, we consider the concrete 
conditions in which judgment takes place and is warranted. This is doubly beneficial in that it not 
only provides a context by which to understand verification, but also reminds us not to understand 
values as terminal responses, thus tempting us to consider them as mere preferences, or desires. 
With an account of values as described in the previous chapter now better articulated, we can now 
consider and compare this account with respect to the various approaches of value management.
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Chapter 4: Values and Value Management 
According to Michael Scriven, “If there is one set of arguments worse than those put forward for 
‘value-free science’, it is those put forward against it. Both sets have one common characteristic 
[…] and that is the failure to make any serious effort at a plausible analysis of the concept of ‘value 
judgment’” (Scriven 1972, 219). Taking Scriven’s point seriously, this Chapter will address recent 
accounts of values in science to consider how the concept of value judgment fits. Previous chapters 
have been devoted to outlining a way to think about values, particularly in terms of the concrete 
conditions in which valuing takes place, and the logic behind such valuing. It is my view that any 
account of how values should be used in science presumes, and is to an extent justified by, a certain 
conception of what a value is, and if that conception of value is imprecise or lacks sufficient 
justification, then the account will require logical reconsideration of the relationship between 
values and science. As noted in Chapter 1, differing accounts of what a value is can affect what is 
considered problematic about values and thus the prescribed role for values in science. If the 
conception of value used lacks precision or justification—indeed, insufficient attention has been 
paid to what is meant by “value” when discussing their usage—it undermines the justification for 
the understanding of the problem and the prescribed solution. In some works, there is no explicit 
mention of what “value” means. In others, it is only briefly discussed. For example, a paper by 
Daniel Steel on the subject gets half way through before mentioning, “Finally, I should say 
something about how the term ‘value’ is used here” (Steel 2010, 21). If the conception of value 
can affect the validity of the argument, we should be more clear and upfront about it.  
 This Chapter has three primary aims: the first is to point out that there is insufficient 
attention to what is meant by “value” despite entire arguments being formulated regarding how 
they should be used. The second is to try and unpack how the concept of value is being used in the 
various accounts of value management previously discussed in Chapter 1. The third is to compare 
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these conceptions of value with the account of value outlined in the previous two chapters and to 
demonstrate that problems are understood given a conception of values and motivations for 
accounts of value management dissolve once the conception of value I have adopted is replaced 
with their own, or, at the very least, require further qualification to only apply to certain kinds of 
values. In other words, the aim is not to demonstrate that other potential accounts of value are 
necessarily wrong (or that mine is necessarily right), but that what is taken to be problematic about 
values and what is understood as a good way of managing them are not necessarily appropriate 
when a conception of value is traded for another such as my own. Because of this, it raises 
questions like what justifies using one conception of value over another? How might a value 
management account require qualification if a conception of value is limited? And, what revisions 
might a value management account need? I will thus unpack the various conceptions of value that 
value management account rely on, and how these conceptions affect the account. I will consider 
some potential problems with the conception of value used, and how alterations to the initial 
conception of value can affect how we appraise the ideal that relies on it. 
4.1. Survey of Discussion of Values in Philosophy of Science 
Scriven notes the concept of value has had some questionable ideas attached to it. Value 
judgment has often been synonymous with a “dubious, unreliable or biased judgment” or one that 
is identified with “prejudice or intolerance” and this view has supported the value-free ideal 
(Scriven, 219). I have already discussed historical examples of how values have been characterized 
in philosophy of science, but since the recent emergence of challenges to the value-free ideal, there 
has been more modern attention paid to how values can play a role in science, either in defense of 
or in criticism of the ideal. By examining recent discussions, we can consider how values are 
characterized and how they differ with each other. Thus, I will provide a survey of these accounts 
whose focus will be specifically on characterizations of value rather than an evaluation of the over-
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all epistemic projects of the authors discussed, and while it’s focus isn’t intended to be critical, I 
will discuss potential areas of contention that arise when these accounts of value are compared to 
my own. 
4.1.2 Values as Biases, Tastes 
Starting with some more straight forward instances, some philosophers adopt an implicit 
conception of values when expressing concern over their use in science, but do not explicitly define 
values. When feminist scientists began using feminist values in place of sexist values to influence 
their research, there was a concern that this made feminist science just as subjective as the sexist 
science it was to replace, and according to Kourany, some accepted that this was the case and that 
objectivity is an impossible goal (Kourany 2010, 57). Susan Haack is critical of this “cynical” 
abandonment of objectivity, arguing for the value-free ideal and against the idea of values 
determining theory choice. Even if we cannot be entirely without prejudice, she claims, “It doesn’t 
follow that it is proper to allow prejudice to determine theory choice” (Haack 1993, 36). While it 
is unclear in her paper whether Haack’s characterization of values as a prejudice is her own 
characterization of value or it is how she believes those she is criticizing would characterize values 
(as Kourany suggests), we need to be careful about how we characterize the problem; values need 
not be merely prejudices and we do not need to accept that it would ever be “proper” to allow 
prejudice to determine theory choice.  
Scriven argues that the notion that values are mere prejudices is a flawed understanding of 
values, and, as we have learned from the previous two chapters, it doesn’t follow that all values 
are a form of prejudice. Prejudice can occur in cases of valuing without appraisal, in other words, 
where one acts according to impulse without judgment. It can also occur in appraisal where it 
becomes a matter of rigid application of fixed general values instead of the careful appraisal of 
competing ends-in-view. Valuation, however, understood in its logical form is about the 
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determination of value where it is indeterminate, so a value judgment is the opposite of prejudice 
since the value does not exist prior to judgment. Valuation that takes place where value is already 
determined is valuation in name only. So, there is no reason to assume that all valuation results in 
prejudice determining theory choice. With this in mind, the discussion is clarified because we do 
not need to be compelled to accept that advocating the use of values in theory choice in science 
means that we have to accept that it is proper to allow prejudice to determine our choices.   
Other examples of values characterized this way can be found as well. In his 2009 paper, 
Torsten Wilholt argues that in weighing cases of inductive risk, scientists are susceptible to 
preference bias, or unduly having results reflecting the researcher’s preference. However, 
identifying preference bias requires that we be able to grasp some impartial balance between two 
judgments of inductive risks independent of a researcher’s preference. It is interesting that Wilholt 
sees Rudner’s arguments for value judgments in cases of inductive risk as undermining a possible 
impartial balance, and thus our ability to recognize preference bias. He explains, “The 
controversial aspects of preference bias would seem to arise on the level of value-judgments. […] 
It seems to follow that we could only accuse [a biased researcher] of having made a mistake or 
having applied an improper test procedure in the same sense in which we might also be prepared 
to say that someone makes a mistake or acts improperly by not holding the same values we do” 
(Wilholt 2009, 95). He rejects this notion, urging that epistemic shortcomings cannot be a matter 
of “personal value-judgments.” Once again, given the outline of values affirmed in previous 
chapters, we have no good reason to conclude that values are merely personal, or would lead to 
relativism, or the inability to detect bias.  
Robert Hudson’s defense of the value-free ideal affirms the notion that (at least non-
epistemic) values are a matter of taste, bias, and personal likes and dislikes, citing Kuhn to support 
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his argument (Hudson 2016, 174). However, we do not have to conclude that values are merely a 
matter of taste, bias, or likings, and this doesn’t reflect Kuhn’s position either since in the passage 
cited Kuhn doesn’t address non-epistemic values, but instead states that values as evaluations have 
the character of judgment, that judgments about values do not reduce to mere matters of taste, and 
that the invocation of idiosyncratic factors in the application of values does not mean setting aside 
facts and deferring to personal likes or biases (Kuhn 1977, 336-7). 
Gregor Betz seems to claim that values are a matter of “arbitrary choices”, coming into 
play to help make decisions that are not empirically or logically determined, noting that “one 
inevitably buys into non-epistemic value judgments by making an arbitrary, non-objectively 
determined choice with societal consequences” (Betz 2013, 210). Perhaps paradoxically, he also 
claims that value judgments need not be arbitrary in the sense of being irrational or unjustifiable, 
that they can be supported and justified through moral reasoning, and are “non-arbitrary from a 
broader, non-epistemic perspective” (2013, 210). It’s unclear whether this means that values can 
be justified, but not in an epistemic way (i.e. values are not epistemic), or that values can be 
justified in an epistemic way, but “epistemic” is being used in a narrow sense in this context. Either 
way, suggesting that values are epistemic or can be legitimately counted as part of a “non-epistemic 
perspective” raises more questions than it answers when it comes to how values and sciences 
interact or what it means for values to be arbitrary from an epistemic perspective but non-arbitrary 
from a non-epistemic perspective. The notion that values must be arbitrary, a matter of taste, bias, 
or personal likings, seems to be implicitly presumed rather than defended, and it reduces values to 
mere terminal responses instead of being responses to, and responsible to, a context. 
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4.1.3 Values as Socially Esteemed 
Moving beyond implicit conceptions of value that arise in discussion, there are also cases 
where direct discussion of the nature of value has been limited and imprecise. Steel67 defines values 
in the following way: “Values are factors that motivate decisions in a particular direction, are 
positively regarded within a community or population, and which tend to be relevant to a variety 
of contexts” (Steel 2017, 50). Why this definition of values? It comes from the paper mentioned 
in the introduction of this chapter. There he takes up Miriam Solomon’s argument that values 
function as one of many kinds of decision vectors that influence the outcome of a decision (Steel 
2010, 22). Unlike Solomon, however, Steel specifically points to social esteem as a quality values 
have.68 On this basis, he would exclude sexism as counting as a value in a population where sexism 
is frowned upon (2010, 21). 
This conception is difficult to employ for several reasons. It is unclear whether one can 
find a meaningful distinction with this conception between what is valued and what is valuable. If 
we assume Steel means that something counts as a value if a population values it, then the 
definition he provides leaves no room to understand what is valuable instead of just what is valued. 
If a population valued being wasteful of natural resources, it would not follow that this is valuable 
nor that we would not be able to identify it as such. It would be a form of relativism, where what 
counts as a value is based on what the population subscribes to. There is nothing in the definition 
that would seem to allow for legitimate criticism of values held by other populations, or even by 
individuals or minorities within that population. Also, if an individual preferred racist ideas in a 
population where racism is frowned on, then it would seem odd to claim that that person did not 
value racism. On the other hand, if what is meant is that if something is positively regarded in a 
                                                          
67 I will be further discussing Steel’s work on epistemic and non-epistemic values in the following chapter.  
68 See the following subsection for further clarification.  
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population then it is valuable, and not just valued, it would solve the issue of claiming that the 
racist did value racism, but it isn’t clear why well regard of the population makes the difference 
between that and what is valued, nor is it clear what is the benchmark for what counts as valuable; 
is it unanimity, consensus, a majority favored position?69 Answers to these questions would need 
to be forthcoming before we would be in a position to evaluate to what extent “social esteemed 
motivating factors” is a precise enough characterization of values and their associated phenomena 
when considering how values should be used in science and what its limitations might be. 
4.1.4 Values as Decision Vectors 
As mentioned, Steel takes his concept of value from Miriam Solomon. Solomon considers 
values to be a subset of what she calls “decision vectors” which influence the outcome of a decision 
in science (Solomon 2001, 53). She coins the term after noting that in addition to traditional so-
called epistemic values like simplicity or fruitfulness, other “biasing factors” can be conducive to 
empirical success such as competitiveness, desire for credit, or ideology. And since she affirms 
that any practice which can lead to empirical success is scientifically rational, these factors should 
count as rational (2001, 52-4). Wanting to avoid the irrational connotation of “biasing factor” she 
opts for “decision vector” instead. But why is value only a subset of such vectors? She argues that 
decision vector is broader than the concept of value, and that concepts like cognitive bias or 
motivational bias are not value driven.  
To clarify with some examples, cognitive biases include decision vectors like availability 
of data (preference for a theory with data), while motivational biases include egocentric bias 
towards one’s own data. In addition, there are “social factors” such as ideologies, and 
“motivational factors” such as pride or competitiveness. Amongst the vectors classified as values 
                                                          
69 This is a point that will come up again in Section 4.2.5 in discussion of Longino where I will recall Lewis’ point 
about what is valued by a majority.  
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include examples like elegance or simplicity. How are values then differentiated from these other 
kinds of vectors? Unlike Steel, Solomon does not claim that values are vectors that are popularly 
well regarded. When she does discuss values, she refers to things like “traditional scientific values” 
(theoretical values) and claims that these “function as heuristics drawn from plausible theory or 
pragmatic goals” (2001, 21). Given this and given that she characterizes motivational biases as not 
value-driven, I presume that her conception of values is restricted to these general values which 
she characterizes as functioning as heuristics. Because of this characterization, values function as 
generalized ends that arise from past inquiry and are intellectual and logical in force. They are not 
a priori or fixed but are testable according to their ability to produce empirical success and can be 
given up if they do not (2001, 20).  
This, however, raises the question as to whether this is a good characterization of values 
and what limitations it may face if used in the broader values and science discussion. I would argue 
that biases are value-driven in that they are a form of valuing. As noted from Chapter 2, valuing 
or prizing is an important element of the concept of value. Behavioral attitudes like prizing, 
cherishing, dwelling upon, and so on (or their opposites) were widely recognized as a form of 
valuing by those I discussed at length, in addition to the accounts of value of Perry and Scriven. 
According to Solomon, a decision vector is physical rather than abstract, that is, it physically or 
materially “influence[s] the outcome (direction) of a decision” (2001, 53-4). This is consistent with 
the characterization of valuing since it is affective-motor rather than being merely mental, and 
according to Dewey, bias is a tendency to behave in certain ways rather than another since 
“preference is originally only bias in a given direction” (MW8: 33). Immediate experience of value 
occurs wherever there is a liking, interest, or bias, and thus any form of bias constitutes valuing 
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(Dewey 1925, 429). Therefore, if motivational biases or cognitive biases manifest in our physical 
behavior, it is because their object is an experienced value and so such biases are value-driven.70  
The fact that we prize something just means that we are biased towards it until such biases 
are held in check by other valuings or by inquiry (Dewey 1922, 193). Other factors she identifies 
such as birth order is the factor most predictive of scientific choices between competing theories 
(Solomon 2001, 60). Birth order is not a value, but it does, as Solomon notes, affect our tendencies 
towards radicalism, and this is a form of valuing. The fact that values are not just generalized 
concepts is belied by Solomon’s frequent language which suggests that scientists “value” things 
(rather than just adopting general values). All decision vectors as Solomon defines the concept are 
a form of valuing, and recognition of this can avoid ambiguity and confusion about why certain 
general ends qualify as values. In essence, her account can be improved by including all of the 
distinct meanings of “value” which can also include valuing and valuation. 
One obvious example of how her account can be improved by including all the distinct 
meanings of “value” in her definition of the term involves her arguments regarding the values as 
an empirical or non-empirical vector. I just mentioned Solomon’s point that theoretical values like 
simplicity are testable, yet when she distinguishes between what she calls empirical versus non-
empirical decision vectors, values are categorized as non-empirical. Empirical decision vectors 
cause us to prefer theories with empirical success, while non-empirical decision vectors are other 
causes or reasons for choice (2001, 56). An empirical vector must be directly tied to the empirical 
success of the theory rather than happenstance or luck. Preferring a complex theory over a simple 
                                                          
70 It is also helpful to keep in mind that bias is not always negative (in the same way) since it merely describes a 
behavioral tendency. As Dewey notes, “bias for impartiality is as much a bias as is partisan prejudice, though it is a 
radically different kind of bias” (Dewey 1998, 212).  
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theory is non-empirical because whether a theory is true or not is independent of its complexity 
(2001, 57).  
Nevertheless, she also claims that whether a vector is empirical or not is itself an empirical 
question. She notes, “if simple theories could be shown to be more successful than complex 
theories (either as a matter of logic or by induction), then simplicity would count as an empirical 
decision vector” (2001, 59). Speaking to this matter, Sharyn Clough argues that certain values, 
such as those used by feminist scientists, have already demonstrated that they are empirical in that 
their use has directly led to more empirically successful theories (and not through luck) (Clough 
2008, 269; also see Clough, 1998). Lynn Hankinson Nelson also argues that feminist scholarship 
has demonstrated the unfoundedness of sexist values by subjecting them to empirical control, thus 
establishing the point that not all values are equal, and that science can be improved by consciously 
evaluating the values it does use. (Nelson 1990, 248-9;).71 Focusing on the fact that value 
judgments are responsive to and tested against our experience of the world, Clough argues that 
value judgments cannot only be informed by, but can be used as evidence in support of, other 
judgments (Clough 2008, 274). If so, then values are directly relevant to empirical success. 
However, lumping all values as non-empirical risks treating feminist values and sexist values as 
equally irrelevant, despite the success that feminist values have had (2008, 270).  
Clough’s argument suggests that the question of whether values as decision vectors are 
empirical or not will depend on what kind of value we are talking about as well as its subject 
matter. Valuing will not count as empirical (unless we are talking about propositions about valuing 
such as “Mary values X”) because liking something doesn’t make it any more likely to be true. 
However, value judgments can be empirical, and general ends may have a better track record for 
                                                          
71 Also see 4.2.5. 
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empirical success as we will recall from Lepley’s spectrum from Chapter 2. Therefore, if we 
include all three conceptions of value we can clarify in what cases values will count as empirical.  
Justin Biddle does not employ the term “decision vector” but employs Neurath’s concept 
of an “auxiliary motive” to similar effect in discussing factors that affect epistemic decisions that 
are broader than values. Biddle uses this concept to argue that values are one of many contextual 
factors that can influence our epistemic appraisals.  He notes that “some of these factors might be 
properly characterized as values, while others clearly are not” (Biddle 2012, 131). He considers 
certain factors like tradition to be a value, but when it comes to something like doing “something 
or other” or “waiting to see,” “Clearly, these motives are not properly characterized as values” 
(2012, 131). Like Solomon, he claims values are one amongst many factors that affect decision 
making.  
Some of these factors “might be consciously adopted ethical or political values; they might 
be unconsciously held subjective preferences or ideological assumptions, and so on. Some of these 
factors, again, are properly described as values, while others are not” (2012, 132). If we take this 
approach, it is unclear when something would count as a value. It would seem that a value must 
either be a general end taken from tradition or be consciously adopted. Contextual behaviors like 
“having a hangover” or waiting to see do not count. However, I would suggest that any of these 
factors are valuative. For example, having a hangover isn’t a value but does affect what and how 
we value, both in terms of our valuing and our valuation. “Waiting to see” can be a valuing 
behavior, it can be an end-in-view decided to be the best course of action after careful assessment, 
and or it can be a general response given habitual prudence. Either way, these all involve values 
of one form or another and they don’t always perform the same function in coming to a judgment. 
The benefit of recognizing all such factors as values is that it avoids the need to concern ourselves 
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if a factor is a value (and why that might be) and provides a framework by which to assess the 
logical status and function of such factors.  
4.1.5 Values as Personal Desires 
Hugh Lacey has the most advanced articulation of values out of all the accounts I will 
discuss. An in-depth analysis or criticism of his account may be fruitful but is not necessary for 
my purposes here which is to survey some of the ways that values have been discussed in the 
literature. Nevertheless, it may also be useful to point out how his account of value differs from 
my own. Lacey has defended the value-free ideal, however he devotes significant effort to 
discussing the nature of value. He notes the historically meta-ethical and logical views of value on 
their influence on science. The meta-ethical view that values are subjective preferences which are 
not open to rational appraisal was as source of argument for value-freedom (Lacey 1999, 6). The 
logical view holds that statements of fact do not entail values and statements of value do not entail 
statements of fact. He argues that one view does not entail the other, noting, “’Value does not 
imply fact,’ seems to me to be correct and not dependent on accepting the above metaethical view” 
(1999, 7). The separation of fact and value influences Lacey’s later account. His account also 
sharply distinguishes between personal and epistemic values, so I will discuss the former first.72 
In his chapter devoted to the topic, Lacey notes that “value” has varied uses, including ends 
that one pursues, a quality that gives goodness, or an object of value that is constitutive of a 
worthwhile life and one’s personal identity (1999, 23). His account of value starts with an 
understanding shared by many already discussed, namely that values are linked to desires which 
influence our actions. However, his account differs in important ways. According to Lacey, a value 
is a reflection on our desires. He explains, “Holding values, then involves second-order desires 
                                                          
72 Lacey also distinguishes between personal and social values. However, for my purposes here it is sufficient to 
discuss his interpretation of personal values and their relationship to science.  
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[…] which represents one of a person’s fundamental goals” (1999, 24). In the case of a personal 
value it is that one’s first-order desires be the kind that produce a life marked by a quality that 
makes it fulfill, and is constitutive of, one’s identity. Values are personal and are thus tied to one’s 
“most fundamental desires and to one’s deepest feelings” (1999, 24).  
Because values are reflective, they are objects of investigation, of reflection, of discussion, 
and critical argument. They are also expressed in modes of action. Lacey points out, “values have 
no reality apart from these modes […] personal values cannot be reduced to mental representations 
or simple conscious phenomena” (1999, 27). They develop over time, they are not merely given. 
Because values are about actions and are goal oriented, they must be consistent with constraints 
imposed by reality to be intelligible. One can be critical of values by taking note of the effects they 
produce and whether they meet expectations. There can often be a gap between what we intend 
and what is possible, and failure to take note of constraints in action will lead to bewilderment and 
a failure to realize desires (1999, 30). While some of these elements are consistent with my account 
developed in previous chapters, there are important ways in which this account is at once both too 
broad and too narrow.  
Firstly, it is too broad because Lacey’s account of value is tied to the notion that they affirm 
something about what we conceive of the good life, or function as the core of our personal 
identities. While it is certainly plausible some values fit this definition, he doesn’t demonstrate that 
this describes all values that relate to personal endeavors. My evaluation that I should buy a 
cheaper suit that is compatible with different occasions over a more expensive one that isn’t 
doesn’t necessarily reveal something deep about my personal identity or how I understand the 
good life (or that I even have such a conception); valuations of this sort may merely be about 
addressing local contextual problems not relevant to one’s ideal life or one’s deepest feelings. 
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More evidence is required in concrete contexts to establish that all personal values should have 
such a broad scope or be reflective of one. Alternatively, to deny that determination of what suit 
to buy constitutes evaluation since it may not appeal to deep feelings would seem counter to 
ordinary uses of the concept since to appraise and determine the value of an item is a common 
element of the concept of valuation.73  Second, his account is too narrow because it only includes 
reflective values. For instance, in his 2005 book he claims that holding a value is considered 
equivalent to a value judgment that a certain quality be manifested in something (Lacey 2005, 61). 
Holding a value involves desiring that something have a particular quality, that this is constitutive 
of a good, and we are committed to enhance or to maintain this manifestation. This is certainly 
consistent with prizing, and since prizing is connected to (although not equivalent to) valuation 
this is partially consistent with my account, but it doesn’t include non-reflective valuing.  
Further, Lacey suggests that a value is constitutive of a good, where good tends to imply 
an ideal: a general comprehensive good (2005, 63). Something has value in so far as it manifests 
this ideal. But it isn’t clear how ideals with respect to personal values, are objective. For example, 
if an ideal is constituted74 by a collection of personal values, whose main criterion is that they must 
be deemed good and that they be intelligible according to empirical facts, then their warrant seems 
to be based on the fact that they are consistent with concrete conditions concerning their possible 
manifestation (they are intelligible), and they are desired according to our deeply held beliefs and 
our personal fundamental goals. This may be why he claims that personal values can express 
                                                          
73 It may be that Lacey and my account may simply then have two very different and incompatible conceptions of 
value. However, I believe mine is more suitable to discussing values in science because it specifically looks to 
verifiable relations between events and experiences rather than deep personal feelings which is precisely what 
tends to make many skeptical of their legitimate usage in science.  
74 Lacey claims that values are constitutive of (or subordinate to) an ideal (Lacey 2005, 63).  
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differences but not disagreement. As Lacey points out, empirical investigation can inform but not 
entail whether something is valuable (2005, 64).  
In contrast, my account requires that values are adequate to the extent that they resolve the 
objective difficulties encountered between an organism and its environment; empirical 
investigation in the form of valuation does entail what is valuable.75 In other words determination 
of what is valuable goes beyond the fact that it is intelligible and consistent with some conception 
of human nature and that it is desired. Because of this, my concern is that when Lacey claims that 
values are personal, he gives the impression that they are merely personal (as I will explain). It 
would be no surprise then that he doesn’t believe they are relevant to determining whether to accept 
or reject a theory. Further evidence that he sees personal values as merely personal arises in his 
characterization of personal and epistemic values.  
Epistemic values are similar to other kinds of value except that they pertain to second order 
desires about what we desire our beliefs to be like (2005, 46). However, these values are not 
personalized, but rather apply to everyone impartially. He notes that unlike personal values “where 
holding different values represents only difference and not disagreement, since different people 
properly aspire to lives into which different personal values are woven, differences in the cognitive 
values that are held always represent disagreements. One’s personal identity is not linked with 
having one’s ‘personal’ set of cognitive values” (2005, 52). For him, what constitutes a good theory 
has to be independent of what constitutes a good life, and since cognitive values are impartial in 
this respect, they are necessary for science to be impartial. In fairness, I should note that Lacey 
explicitly states that values are not subjective preferences (and I am not necessarily saying this is 
                                                          
75 This only points to difference in our accounts. It does not, nor is it intended to, imply correctness of my account. 
In depth criticism of his account of value is outside of the scope of this dissertation, however it is worth 
considering the methodological differences between our accounts; my account began with values in experience, 
whereas his began with a series of definitions.  
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his position), but the way he sometimes characterizes personal values, such as disputes being 
differences rather than disagreements, I believe suggests too strongly that personal values are 
merely personal. This will become relevant in the following chapter when I discuss his account of 
cognitive and non-cognitive values.  
4.1.6 Values as Empirical Statements 
Elizabeth Anderson argues that philosophers have taken value judgments for granted. She 
notes, “This undertheorization of value judgments has made it hard to identify precisely the 
concerns of advocates of value-free science. It has impeded the development of criteria to 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of values in science” (Anderson 2004, 2-3).76 She has 
argued that the case for value-free science depends on the notion that value judgments are science 
free, or that empirical observation can’t count as evidence for a value claim, and that “arguments 
for neutrality depend on contradictory or crude models of how value judgments work” (2004, 7). 
The real worry when it comes to using values in science is not that they are used, but that value 
judgments can be made dogmatically (2004, 9). 
According to Anderson, there is nothing inherent in the nature of value judgments that a 
judgment be asserted regardless of evidence that can be brought to bear for or against them. She 
argues that we can appeal to “emotional experiences” which are affectively colored experiences 
of persons or events. These experiences can constitute evidence for a value judgment if they have 
cognitive content, exist independently of value judgments they are taken as evidence for, and are 
accountable to the way the world is. For example, one may judge that politics is worthwhile, only 
to have this judgment undermined upon taking office (2004, 10). We are also capable of 
determining that our interpretation of an emotional experience is defective. One may find that a 
                                                          
76 Note that this echoes Putnam’s point about blocking the path to inquiry.  
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certain experience is too limited or narrowly interpreted to stand as evidence for a value judgment, 
and a more long-term outlook is needed. Because of this, she argues that value judgments need not 
be dogmatic, and that we can recognize evidence that may undermine them or drive inquiry to a 
predetermined solution. To demonstrate a valid use of value judgments in science, she uses a case 
study of feminist research on divorce. The study spearheaded by Abigail Stewart adopted 
conceptions of divorce that included both positive and negative dimensions (as opposed to only 
negative conceptions) and this informed the kind of study conducted to include a longer temporal 
perspective than in previous studies. Despite this, Stewart’s team made every effort to be as 
rigorous in their analysis of unwelcome findings as welcome findings (2004, 17). 
Anderson’s work on the subject is interesting and consistent with some of the positions I 
have adopted. However, her point can be further refined by noting that dogmatic value judgments 
(valuation) are not the only problem that can occur when using values in science. Dogmatic 
judgment is an obvious concern, and perhaps a major component as to why philosophers are so 
wary of their use, but it isn’t the only concern. Valuing without a value judgment is also a concern; 
one may act on impulse, habit, or be capricious in using values without reflection. So, a legitimate 
concern about using values is that they are not being evaluated. Second, even when there is 
judgment, the risks extend beyond just dogma. For instance, like any judgment, evaluation may be 
improperly done. For example, one may be fallible about the ends to be pursued but misjudge how 
to pursue them. Judgment may be too narrow or too broad, it can be done carelessly; this isn’t the 
same thing as being dogmatic. A careless inquirer may not come to a pre-determined answer; they 
might change their minds if they considered evidence they didn’t bother to consider.  
Her account of emotional experience, while valid in some ways, can also be improved with 
further explanation. As we have learned from Lewis, whether one may experience certain values 
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while others may experience another may be highly dependent on environmental factors that don’t 
necessarily bear on the objective value. Value may require certain existential conditions to be 
realizable. Thus, the emphasis must not just be placed on the experience as experienced (or 
interpreted), but on what operations and consequences stem from how those experiences are 
interpreted and the potential for idiosyncratic value predication. The account that we get from 
Lewis can aid in further elaborating Anderson’s argument that our emotional experiences can be 
held accountable to the way that the world is. 
4.1.7 Competing Meanings of Value 
Some of the issues and accounts discussed in this section will be addressed in the following 
chapter. The survey just provided including to the authors above, as captured in Figure 6, 
demonstrates a range of ways of thinking about value. For some of these philosophers only 
generalized ends may be recognized as values; a decision like “waiting to see” may count as a 
value to one (being a valuing), but not to another that doesn’t recognize such valuings as being 
values. Thus, as I suggested in Chapter 1, there is a real risk that philosophers wouldn’t identify 
the same things as values. These accounts can also be too imprecise and limited compared to the 
accounts described in the previous two chapters. This is not to suggest such accounts are wrong or 
mistaken merely because they differ from my account, but that there is insufficient attention to 
important conceptual elements and phenomena that go into values that my account does address. 
While this gives us an idea of how values are considered in philosophy of science as a whole, next 
I will turn to how they are treated in the accounts of value management discussed in Chapter 1. 
Particularly, I want to consider the connection between what is meant by “value” to what is taken 
to be problematic about values in science and how this influences the perceived need for 
management and the prescriptions offered.  
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Before I begin, consider Hugh Lacey’s claim that if values are allowed in science “We 
would be thrown back on merely ‘wishing’ the world to be a particular way or ‘the back and forth 
of biases with only power to settle the matter” (Lacey 1999, 214-5). This claim would only make 
sense to someone else if they shared that particular notion of value.77 If one does not share that 
conception, if one thinks that the concepts of values and wishing are conceptually exclusive, the 
claim won’t make sense. If I say, “Don’t go see a university-trained doctor; we can’t merely wish 
the world a certain way” such a claim will be puzzling unless one sees a conceptual link between 
what a university-trained physician does and mere wishing. A claim about the dangers of values, 
and thus how we should use them, will only make sense if we can assume the person reading a 
claim understands values like they do, and they would only agree with the claim if the conception 
is justified. Thus, when faced with alternative plausible and justified conceptions of value, we must 
ask for justification when a particular conception is used. In the remainder of the chapter I will 
explicate the conception of values that value management accounts presume and will compare 
them to my own account. I will argue that if my conception of value is used, many perceived 
problems either dissolve or change. This suggests that further use of a conception of value requires 
justification, or that the prescriptions offered require qualification given that they may only work 
given certain conceptions of value. 
4.2. Value Management in Helen Longino 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, Helen Longino’s ideal of a well-functioning science emphasizes the 
use of social criticism to ensure that science can both use values and maintain objectivity. In this 
analysis of values in Longino’s work I first consider her explicit discussion of value, and then try 
                                                          
77 I discuss the problem of wishful thinking directly in the next chapter. 
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to articulate what conception of value she uses. Longino is correct in explaining that evidence is 
an outcome of both factual and valuative considerations. However, when I compare her conception 
of value to my account, I will demonstrate that Longino doesn’t always clearly distinguish different 
meanings that values can have, that this can make her arguments regarding the potential problems 
of values require further justification. However, modifications to her account consistent with my 
conception of value can strengthen her position.  
4.2.2 How Values Are Characterized 
Longino does not explicitly define what she means by “value” in the way that philosophers 
such as Lacey or Steel do. Thus, I will begin with what direct analysis she does provide of values 
before attempting to ascertain what she means by the term. Longino identifies certain values that 
stem from the goals of scientific activity called constitutive values (Longino 1990, 32-5). In 
contrast to these are contextual values, which are values that are personal, social, or cultural in 
nature. Longino’s central claim is that not only are “scientific practices and content on the one 
hand and social needs and values on the other are in dynamic interaction but the logical and 
cognitive structures of scientific inquiry require such interaction” (1990, 4-5). 
The only other direct discussion of values comes from her 1996 paper “Cognitive and Non-
Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy” where she challenges the notion that 
there can be purely cognitive (or epistemic)78 values and argues that we cannot maintain the 
dichotomy between cognitive and non-cognitive values. Cognitive values are values which are 
conducive to truth, while non-cognitive values are values that are political and social in nature 
(Longino 1996, 41). When she compares traditional cognitive values to values utilized by feminist 
                                                          
78 Longino, and many other philosophers use these terms interchangeably. This is especially unfortunate given that 
in meta-ethics cognitive values and cognitivism denote something different entirely.  
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science, both sets of values have a political and social valence and thus we cannot maintain that 
only one set is purely cognitive while the other is political and social (1996, 51). 
In many occasions there is overlap between the two types of values as cognitive values are 
identified as constitutive, and contextual as non-cognitive. In Science as Social Knowledge, she 
characterizes values like truth, accuracy, simplicity, predictability, and breadth as constitutive and 
later as cognitive values, while contextual and non-cognitive values are characterized as social, 
political, and personal. So, what is the difference between the two sets of distinctions? 
Longino argues that contextual factors like social and value-laden assumptions can affect 
science as the “very character of reasoning in science makes it vulnerable to the influence of 
context” (1990, 83). Nevertheless, Longino notes that a “contextually fixed” set of goals “provides 
some measure of protection against individuals’ idiosyncratic values […] community adherence 
also protects the daily practice of science from contextual incursion, especially from the direct 
encoding of socio-economic needs into scientific hypotheses” (1990, 100). So, constitutive values 
are internal to a scientific community and can include non-cognitive values. While they can vary 
over time, they are more stable than external values. So, despite overlap, the cognitive/non-
cognitive distinction deals with whether values are purely truth promoting, while the 
constitutive/contextual distinction deals with values internal or external to a scientific community. 
Longino’s comparison of traditional cognitive values and an alternative feminist set of 
values is a second major explicit discussion of value. In her criticism of the distinction between 
cognitive and non-cognitive values she claims that her aim is to “cast doubt on the very idea of a 
cognitive value or virtue, where we mean by that a quality of theories, models, or hypotheses that 
can serve independently of context as a universally applicable criterion of epistemic worth (1990, 
42). Her argument is that traditional cognitive values “in certain contexts of scientific judgment 
 
 
179 
 
imports significant socio-political values in those contexts […] I don’t want to say that traditional 
values are always politically regressive, but the fact that they sometimes are means that we cannot 
treat them as value-neutral grounds of judgment” (1990, 54). 
Longino’s criticism that all values are contextual is an important one. When we compare 
her discussion of the use of values to the account affirmed in previous chapters, it should become 
clear that the use of any value should be context dependent. If not, then the value is treated as a 
fixed end-in-itself rather than an end-in-view and inquiry becomes closed and thus action becomes 
less intelligent. However, her point should have gone further by arguing that no value should be a 
ground for judgment (as a fixed end), since the point of a value judgment is to determine a value 
where it is previously indeterminate. Her argument that both traditional values and her alternative 
values are desiderata suggests “value” in this context is meant as a generalized end. The values 
mentioned like consistency, novelty, simplicity, and ontological heterogeneity are general (or 
generalized ends).  Yet, Longino also seems to imply that generalized values, such as cognitive 
values, are deterministic of choice such as in her claim that we ought not be “hamstrung” by 
traditional sets of values (1990, 51). In other words, general ends are treated as something to be 
asserted, rather than affirmed. This contrasts with my argument in Chapter 3 that generalized ends 
are suggestive, not a fixed end-in-itself and this folds the notion of “value” as a generalized end 
with “value” as a judgment.79 Thus, her point can be expanded by explicitly distancing herself 
from values being used in this way. Her explicit discussion of value does not obviously indicate 
what she means by the term. Next, then, we will have to move beyond explicit discussion of values 
and consider how values are characterized in her work.  
                                                          
79 I will return to this point later.  
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4.2.3 Logical Status of Values as Characterized 
The previous section addressed Longino’s specific characterization of different functions 
of values within inquiry, but it is still unclear how Longino would characterize the concept of value 
and its related phenomena. Thus, I will attempt to articulate a best guess of such a conception using 
her discussion of values in science. Longino never clearly connects values and interests. When she 
discusses the use of values in science, she is always careful to list values as separate from interests 
(1990, 12, 13, 48, 51, 83, 143, 184, 193). Previously discussed accounts of value define valuing 
through interests, where interest implies an active impulse to make some change or preserve some 
state of affairs. Recall that when values are tied to interests as behavioral phenomena, whereby 
they imply valuing, other philosophers have been able to make a distinction between valuing and 
valuation. When we consider her discussion of preferences, we find something closer to these 
accounts. 
As mentioned, Longino believes that cognitive values are supposed to function as grounds 
for preferring one theory over another (Longino 1996, 44). That the values are grounds for 
preferring and not a preference in themselves suggest that values are intellectual rather than 
something that can be described as purely behavioral (i.e. they have a logical function). However, 
after arguing for the need for background assumptions not reducible to observation, her primary 
concern (and the reason for her criteria of a well-functioning scientific community) is the need to 
block “subjective preferences” (Longino 1990, 51, 64, 65, 73, 82, 216). Should we conclude, then, 
that Longino treats values and preferences as distinct? I do not believe so.  
The idea that preferences are not a form of values can be rejected since the chapter where 
she presents her criteria for blocking subjective preference is entitled “Values and Objectivity”; 
clearly, she believes that preferences are a form of value, although at this point it is not yet clear 
how they are related to those values that are a ground for judgment. If we accept this, then we must 
 
 
181 
 
accept that values can act both as grounds for preferences, but also as preferences themselves. All 
accounts discussed in Chapter 2 (from Perry80 to Dewey to Lewis and Lepley) tie valuing to 
preferring, where preferring is usually taken as a behavioral matter of selection and rejection. If 
we accept this idea of preferring here, then for Longino value can count both as a motor-affective 
preference, but also as an intellectual concept used to determine preference. Thus, it is possible 
that she makes distinctions in the term “value.”  
What evidence is there for the fact that Longino believes that there is more to the concept 
of value than mere preference or valuing, and how does it figure into her normative account? The 
only aspect of her work which suggests that there may be a difference between what is valued and 
what is valuable lies in her analysis of the process of transformative criticism. The idea is that by 
subjecting scientific research to transformative criticism, we can minimize “the influence of 
subjective preferences” (Longino 1990, 216). Longino states “the greater the number of different 
points of view included in a given community the more likely it is that its scientific practice will 
be objective, [and] less characterized by idiosyncratic subjective preferences” (1990, 80).  
Given that she clearly sees that individual values are idiosyncratic and harmful, while 
social values are those that inform, and presumably are informed by, transformative criticism, it 
may be that this is the basis for finding what is valued and what is valuable. Idiosyncratic values 
are merely valued, while social values are valuable. However, there is a problem here because 
while she prescribes a process by which social values either are, or are what determines what is, 
                                                          
80 Perry makes a distinction that the others discussed do not make. He notes that when someone says, “I prefer A 
over B” this can either imply a judgment that “A is better than B” or it can imply a motor-affective liking; in other 
words preference can imply both valuing and valuation (Perry, 597). However, this would be problematic for 
Longino since if what is considered a value is a grounds for a preference, then the value would no longer be 
identified with the judgment (instead as a grounds of one) or the valuing. If the value can no longer be identified 
with either “value” as valuing or valuation, it isn’t clear how it could be considered a value at all.  
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valuable, she does not state what is entailed in a value judgment as such and thus what criticism is 
responsive to.  
Longino discusses various general values, claiming they are grounds for preferring a 
preference, and if “grounds” is interpreted as “reason for” then, according to the account I have 
affirmed, value can designate generalized ends and have the status of propositions. Preferences as 
she describes them seem to mirror the concept of value as valuing, thus values can take on the 
form of assertions either arbitrarily or through habits. Mere valuing has no logical function since 
inquiry doesn’t occur in such cases. But then where is the discussion of the third understanding of 
value as valuation or value judgment?  
As I will argue, Longino’s discussion of social criticism is insufficient in terms of how it 
allows for the determination of what is valuable. Without a precise way to determine the difference 
between what is valued and what is valuable, it undermines Longino’s argument that social values 
are any better than an “idiosyncratic value,” why an individual value must be idiosyncratic, or why 
idiosyncratic values are problematic to begin with. Thus, lacking a precise account of value 
judgment opens the door prematurely to a potential harm presented by value use. However, she 
uses this potential harm to justify her normative account.  
4.2.4 Value Management 
Longino uses an argument from underdetermination to advocate the use of values in 
science. The general structure of scientific inquiry is shaped by theoretical frameworks which are 
necessary to engage in the construction of reasoning and without them there is a gap between what 
is present to us and the processes we suppose produce the world that is present to us. Thus, data 
alone (for the most part) can be consistent with different and conflicting hypotheses (Longino 
2002, 125-6). Data by itself points nowhere since states of affairs do not carry labels to indicate 
that they stand as evidence for some other proposition. Data can be taken as evidence for a 
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hypothesis only using a general relation or “background assumption” which provides for the link. 
For example, the assumption that red spots are a symptom of measles allows for observations of 
red spots to counts as evidence for the conclusion that someone has measles (Longino 1990, 41).  
According to Longino, background assumptions are not empirically reducible to 
observation, and this leaves an opening for values to justify their usage. While philosophers might 
object that background assumptions are empirically verifiable themselves, she argues that projects 
that have attempted this such as the logical empiricists’ attempts at reducing or translating 
theoretical claims into observational claims have been a failure once we move beyond rudimentary 
observational generalizations (Longino 1990, 52; 2002, 125). Further, reliance on empirical 
confirmation of all background assumptions would be too restrictive. Scientists do not confirm 
every assumption, but rather they select background assumptions based on their relevance to the 
explanation of phenomena under consideration rather than on their being directly confirmed. Also, 
processes for direct confirmation of such hypotheses are often not available until after a theory has 
been developed and adopted (Longino 1990, 51-2).81   
Without direct empirical support, “there are no formal rules, guidelines, or processes that 
can guarantee that social values will not permeate evidential relations” (Longino 2002, 50). Notice 
that her argument suggests that values can only legitimately come into play into theory selection 
where evidence leaves off, suggesting not only a fact/value distinction82, but it also echoes 
Brown’s point about a lexical priority of values mentioned in Chapter 1.83 While she ultimately 
argues for the legitimate use of values in science, on numerous occasions she notes that without a 
                                                          
81 Notice the similarities of this analysis to the analysis of propositions from the previous chapter.  
82 Longino’s work doesn’t always suggest this, however. In The Fate of Knowledge she details a number of cases, 
for example of how scientists make observations which suggest that what counts as facts will depend on values 
(Longino 2002, 99). On the other hand, at no point does she suggest the alternative, that values can be factually 
verified.  
83 It also echoes points made by Intemann, de Melo-Martin, and Nelson discussed in the following chapter. 
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guarantee against the use of values in science, (at least at first) there “seems no way to block the 
influence of subjective preferences” (Longino 1990, 48 50, 61, 73). In other words, if one opens 
the door to choosing background assumptions by using values, there seems to be an immediate 
danger of the influence of subjective preferences, necessitating some normative ideal. According 
to Longino, “My aims are to show both how broadening our conception of that inquiry from an 
individual to a social activity enables us to see that the sciences are not, nevertheless, hopelessly 
subjective” (Longino 1990, 37).  
This is clear evidence that her conception of values as being connected to subjective 
preferences motivates her perceived need of a normative account, and this need is recognized on 
the basis that using values presents a problem; in other words, her conception of values motivates 
her need for value management. In laying out her account of social criticism as a solution to this 
problem, Longino states that it aims to “block the influence of subjective preferences at the level 
of background beliefs” (1990, 73), and that criticism is a way to make sure that authors have 
interpreted their data free from such preferences (1990, 69).  
4.2.5 Subjective Preferences and the Logical Functions of Values 
If we reject the premise that there is an immediate threat of using subjective preferences as 
values to determine choices of background assumptions, then the need for such account seems less 
obvious. Because of a lack of precision in terms of how valuing relates to mature valuation, it is 
less clear how values present a threat to science. Longino doesn’t provide enough justification for 
a conception of value such that, short of her prescribed critical process, all choices should count 
as subjective. In essence the issue isn’t that subjective preference can’t be a problem, but in how 
Longino characterizes the problem. It is important to point out that it doesn’t follow from 
Longino’s argument that science must be at risk for subjective preferences just because we accept 
the need for background assumptions. Longino’s argument that we choose background 
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assumptions based on their relevance to a solution, that we affirm rather than confirm such 
propositions, is entirely consistent with the account of practical judgment adopted in the previous 
chapter. Thus, Longino’s argument does not demonstrate that science must be (or is even likely to 
be) at risk of subjective preferences.84 What it does prove is that there is a practical element and 
thus a need for practical judgment in science (emphasis on the judgment). Only if we accept that 
practical judgment is (or is likely to be) connected to subjective preferences, particularly in cases 
without her normative criteria being followed, can we conclude that subjective preferences are a 
threat merely because a practical choice has to be made.  
Unfortunately, Longino hasn’t said anything about the nature of practical judgment to 
allow for that conclusion. As Sharon Clough has argued, Longino’s construal of how background 
assumptions are chosen requires that values emanate from subjective, internal minds (Clough 
1998, 106). However, on my account even though practical judgment can be influenced by 
subjective preferences, as described in Chapter 2, it does not follow that there must be, or even is 
likely to be, a significant threat that this will be the case. There is always the potential for risk of 
reliance on subjective preferences, but so long as value judgments are objectively verifiable, then 
then mature valuation is the best option to limit reliance on subjective preference. Thus, if 
background assumptions are chosen using values, the threat to science is a lack of, or bad, value 
judgment, not values in and of themselves and good value judgment may not depend on communal 
criticism. If we were to say that the proper recourse when selecting background assumptions is 
mature valuation and never mere valuing, then the motivation for her normative account as a means 
of mitigating subjective preferences dissolves, particularly if communal criticism isn’t required for 
                                                          
84 This could take the form of an empirical study regarding how likely it is a scientist would proceed by subjective 
preference when faced with a practical decision instead of valuation. And even if most value judgments were 
poorly made, it still wouldn’t follow that they are following subjective preferences.  
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mature judgment. However, much of her account of communal criticism can be built into a 
methodology of making objectively verifiable mature value judgments.   
The fact that there may not be direct evidence for a background assumption does not mean 
that there isn’t evidence for the decision to use it. Thus, it does not follow that because background 
assumptions are not empirically confirmed that a reasonable alternative is using subjective, or as 
she characterizes them, idiosyncratic preferences. Longino makes the distinction between what is 
individual and thus idiosyncratic, and what is social and objective (or more accurately 
intersubjective). But, recall from Lewis’ analysis that idiosyncrasy in value predication is more 
complicated than just being an individual matter. Whether an individual will have an idiosyncratic 
value experience will depend on a number of factors of a given context, and even if they do, they 
may still be able to predicate values in a way that we deem objective. By contrast, it isn’t obvious 
why what a social group or community finds valuable will be any more objective: “majority votes 
prove nothing—except concerning what is relative to majorities” (Lewis 1946, 526).85  
Nor is it clear what is inherently wrong with a value being a matter of an individual 
preference. Only if we take preference as being a mere preference as a terminal response does this 
seem like an immediate problem. And, as Dewey notes, we cannot take desire to be inherently 
subjective once we take note of how it arises in concrete situations. Preferences should not be 
thought of as preferences at large, but as relationally responsive to some situation. Preferences 
formed in response to objective factors of the situation allow for objective criteria by which to 
judge that preference. Preferences, if acted upon, produce consequences by which we can test a 
potential solution. It is here, as I will discuss, where social criticism can be helpful.  
                                                          
85 This point isn’t necessarily confined to majorities, but rather what is valuable to a group.  
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As noted, Longino doesn’t sufficiently clarify the distinction between subjective 
preferences which are valued and value judgments. Presumably, valuation is implied at the point 
that values become social values because they have been criticized; they are what is preferable 
rather than what is just preferred. If not then the only significant difference between idiosyncratic 
values and social values are the number of people involved; criticism, it seems, is employed to 
determine fitness. But without precisely articulating the nature of value judgment in this way, we 
have no reason to accept that an individual scientist wouldn’t rely on carefully considered value 
judgments when adopting a background assumption rather than relying on subjective preferences. 
If this is so, values seem less problematic and the need for the social ideal Longino prescribes 
seems less necessary. Also, without a clear conception of what goes into a value judgment, it isn’t 
obvious why a social value is any better than an individual one (as I will soon argue).  
While we have no reason to assume that scientists will rely on subjective preferences 
instead of considered value judgments, there is no guarantee that they won’t either. Just like 
calculation errors, or failure to follow proper procedures, scientists can fail to judge, or evaluate 
badly, but this doesn’t mean that the use of values in science are an inherently more problematic 
factor than any other way that a scientist could go astray. However, Longino’s prescribed critical 
process is not incompatible with one that makes clear room for value judgments, for as articulated 
in Chapter 2, experimental and critical analysis of various prizings is part of what valuation entails. 
Using my conception of values, it becomes clearer why criticism can be key to better value usage.  
When we analyze valuation, we find that social critical analysis and widespread 
experimental testing of value judgments allows for stronger verification of such judgments. 
Dewey, for instance, reports that conceptual frameworks (what Longino would call background 
assumptions) “tend to be taken for granted after they come into general currency. In consequence 
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they either remain implicit or unstated [and failure to examine them is] the greatest single defect 
that can be found in any field of inquiry” (Dewey 1938, 507).  These conceptions can be 
experimented with and tested by the consequences they produce. He adds that an inquirer will 
depend on a community of fellow inquirers for confirmation and correction of results and without 
this “the conclusions that are announced by an individual inquirer have the status of an hypothesis” 
(1938, 490). This mirrors Longino’s point that the social practice of science allows for the 
correction of defects and modification of findings, and for the graduation of a hypothesis into an 
accepted piece of knowledge. This point also echoes Lepley’s point from Chapter 2 that choices 
and purposes can be formed, informed, and reformed by critical reflection and social criticism. 
While Longino’s social process is, thus, not invalid, it is insufficient without a more precise 
articulation of how social criticism leads more adequate value usage. Longino does not establish 
how verifiable value judgments are reached through social means, other than the fact that there are 
more diverse perspectives, and in fact it isn’t clear whether she believes that such judgments are 
empirical in most cases. She notes that background assumptions may not be supported by “the 
same kinds of data” that would confirm empirical testing of a hypothesis. The kinds of support and 
criticism that will be offered will be conceptual or metaphysical in nature rather than empirical 
(Longino 1990, 73). When we compare her reasoning for this to the account of value judgment 
described in Chapters 2 and 3, it is clear why background assumptions can be based on empirical 
adequacy and that her account of social criticism makes more sense because of this and thus is 
improved by it.  
 Longino’s argument regarding the limitations of empirical support for a background 
assumption assumes a reductive account of confirmation found in the work of the logical 
empiricists. She notes that background assumptions “may not be subject to empirical confirmation 
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or disconfirmation” and since they are “infused with metaphysical and normative considerations, 
it would be a mistake to identify the objectivity of scientific methods with their empirical features 
alone” (1990, 75). Her reasoning follows her criticisms of the logical positivist model of syntactic 
and deductive relationships between hypotheses and observational data. Lynn Hankinson Nelson 
also attributes Longino’s position that evidence cannot be brought to bear in deciding between 
background assumptions to a skepticism about whether values are subject to empirical control, but 
holds that Longino’s view is unfounded (Nelson 1990, 248). 
Indeed, the model of verification of values described in Chapter 3 does not follow a 
positivist empirical conception. For example, Lepley’s liberal notion of verification claims that 
scientific testing is not confined to observation and experimentation, but exercises in critical 
thinking and social discussion as well. Dewey argues that it is problematic to think of conceptions 
being formed or “proved” based on summaries of what has been observed for the value and 
function of such conceptions are retrospective: “Such ideas are dead, incapable of performing a 
regulative office in new situations” (Dewey 1929, 166). Concepts, should be thought of as 
hypotheses: as anticipatory plans for future reconstruction (hence ends-in-view) of the situation 
and “their worth has to be tested by specified consequences of their observation” (1929, 167). As 
such, they are confirmed to the degree they permit transformation of the situation. As mentioned, 
choice of background assumption is ultimately a practical choice, and like all practical judgments 
they can be empirically confirmed based on the consequences they are fitted to produce.  
Thus, even though Longino argues that there are no formal rules to choose background 
assumptions, it does not follow that we should reasonably expect choice to be based on subjective 
preference; successful value judgments are what shield science from such preferences. Once we 
amend Longino’s account to include the precepts of practical judgment developed in previous 
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chapters, we now have a clear justification for the claim that social values are better than subjective 
preferences where they are interpreted as valuings. Criticism can be made validly based on the 
practical consequences which follow from using certain background assumptions and conceptual 
schemes which have a chance to be more widely tested and criticized by a social community than 
by an individual alone.86 Thus, my account strengthens Longino’s, but at the cost of requiring 
some modification to her scheme. In addition to the four criteria of Longino’s social critical 
approach we can add that their criticisms must be empirically adequate; in other words, criticism 
must be based on whether a conception proves itself in the way of producing expected 
consequences determined through a process of valuation leading to warranted assertability.  
In fact, others have already made the point that Longino is wrong to relativize choice of 
background assumptions because they rely on evidence. Lynn Hankinson Nelson argues that 
sociological or political claims or theories can constitute evidence for a theory and that feminist 
scientists have demonstrated this (Nelson 1995, 405). Sharyn Clough argues that feminist political 
values are beliefs with empirical content that can provide good reasons for rejecting other 
background assumptions. When androcentric values influence theory choice, she notes, “analysis 
of past scientific practices has revealed what is by now a well-documented pattern, namely that 
theories of human bodies and/or behavior that ignore women’s bodies and/or behavior have proven 
to be inaccurate” (Clough 1998, 107). 
While some may argue that my account proves no better than the logical positivist model 
since empirical adequacy means that tests of background assumptions requires further background 
                                                          
86 In fairness, Longino’s concept of conformation could allow for this. She argues, for example, that the adoption of 
a method of reading tea-leaves is unlikely to allow for conformation of content to its intended object (Longino 
2002, 160). However, she applies this to knowledge claims, not to judgments about background assumptions or 
value decisions. Criticism of them will be conceptual and metaphysical rather than empirical. 
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assumptions, and so on, it is worth noting that my account isn’t supposed to be reductive or 
foundational in anyway. I don’t consider it problematic that empirical testing of the practical 
choice of using/affirming background assumptions may require further background assumptions 
since I am not promoting understanding their empirical adequacy as a matter of a formal 
relationship between observation and hypotheses.  
Finally, it is important to pinpoint why Longino’s account can be problematic because she 
does not always precisely distinguish between the three interpretations of the term “value” and as 
a result, her argument that her account is needed because science is at risk to subjective preferences 
since we must choose background assumptions is not warranted. Values as generalized ends are 
treated as valuations, as self-affirming judgments by which we are “hamstrung.” Because of this 
the distinctive notion of “value” in terms of valuation, as distinct from such general ends, is absent. 
This is in turn further difficult since her arguments about the problematic use of cognitive values 
as generalized ends leads to the further collapse of “value” into values as valuing. This is evident 
at the end of the 1996 paper where she concludes that since cognitive values can’t be the self-
affirming universal concepts they are supposed to be, that there is the risk of “cognitive anarchy” 
to which her answer is to reaffirm her normative criteria (Longino 1996, 55). In other words, since 
the general value chosen must be contextual rather than self-justifying, their choice is a matter of 
preference. If Longino had better distinguished the three interpretations of “value” then none of 
these conclusions follow; generalized ends are not self-affirming, and their affirmation is through 
a process of judgment. Thus, by carefully analyzing Longino’s approach to value I have shown 
that Longino’s arguments are not always warranted, but alternatively, once we do carefully pay 
attention to the concept of value, her account can be modified and improved.  
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4.3. Value Management in Janet Kourany 
Recall from Chapter 1 that Janet Kourany’s ideal of socially responsible science (SRS) emphasizes 
that science should be an ally for the struggle for the equality of women, exposing prejudices and 
rooting out sexism and androcentrism by being informed by egalitarian social values. According 
to this ideal, science ought to be evaluated according to whether it is both epistemically successful 
and socially successful. While rarely discussing the nature of values directly, it entails a more 
robust use of value than other accounts. Like the previous section, I will begin articulating an 
explicit conception of value consistent with her discussion. When we analyze Kourany’s 
conception of value, we will find that it directly shapes her approach to value management, and 
that lack of a clear conception of valuation leaves her account open to dogmatism. 
 Kourany’s primary goal is to appraise science in terms of an egalitarian ideal in which 
human flourishing is central (Kourany 2010, 13-5). This is different from other accounts in that it 
doesn’t start with an analysis of scientific reasoning and conclude that values in science are either 
necessary or desirable, but rather insists on value usage to fulfil the aims of SRS. Her benchmark 
for an ideal is whether it can satisfy certain epistemic and social criteria, and it is this broader 
concern that motivates her criticisms of alternative ideals and her support for her own account.   
4.3.2 How Values are Characterized 
Kourany seems to be of two minds when it comes to the nature of values. Initially, her 
characterization of values is similar to the one discussed by Haack, suggesting that they are merely 
biases or forms of prejudice. The reason she considers the value-free ideal promising is because it 
specifically promises to root out political commitments like sexism and androcentrism, which lead 
to “biased science” that jeopardizes it “as a source of objective knowledge” (2010, 54). Values 
like racism or sexism function as biases and prejudices, and their effect in research are considered 
in the examples of studies of heart disease and PMS. Feminist scientists responding to this seek to 
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eliminate them from science (to “avoid the problem of bias”) as they lead us away from the truth 
(2010, 6, 51-3, 55). So, since commitments like sexism and androcentrism count as values, and 
since they are dangerous as forms of bias and prejudice, it follows that some of the problems with 
values are that they can be forms of bias and prejudice.  
However, Kourany doesn’t discuss all values as a form of bias, and this is important to her 
overall argument. She describes values as a perspective, and ultimately what she wants is the 
replacement of prejudice with “a more adequate perspective” (2010, 4). This is why, despite her 
relative praise of it, she rejects the value-free ideal for it casts all values as equally subjective and 
bias. She argues that adequate science has been produced by feminist scientists informed by 
feminist values, but “if feminist science was shaped by feminist values, then according to the idea 
of value-free science this should have made feminists’ science just as subjective and inadequate as 
the sexist and androcentric science it was designed to replace” (2010, 56). Notice two important 
things in this point: the first is that she clearly believes that not all values are subjective, and 
secondly it is this specific understanding of the nature of values that leads her to reject the value-
free ideal rather than whether it is practically workable.87  
She rejects the empiricist ideal of science for similar reasons. It holds that we should look 
to successful science instead of a priori reasoning to determine acceptable value use in science. If 
a value contributes to scientific success it would therefore count as scientifically rational. 
Kourany’s problem is that this “treats feminists’ egalitarian values as merely causally relevant 
‘social factors’ or ‘social biases,’ on a part with other factors such as competitiveness or the desire 
for credit or other values such as sexism or racism” (2010, 66).  In other words, she believes that 
                                                          
87 Kourany does discuss how practically difficult it is to apply the value-free ideal in practice and that value-
informed science is “all but inevitable,” but this does not tarnish its reputation for her because it still recommends 
removing sexist values (2010, 55-6).   
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feminist values are not only “more adequate” than sexism, but she clearly rejects the notion that 
all values are a form of mere bias. She rejects Longino’s ideal as well for its neutrality that entails 
potentially accepting any value. Longino’s ideal counts as neutral since it welcomes and 
encourages all social values, and that they all be subjected to criticism. Yet, Kourany argues that 
there is no guarantee that the values she deems more adequate will be reflected in scientific inquiry, 
and this lack of a guarantee leads her to reject both Longino’s and the empirical ideal. Kourany 
insists that we choose specific values to enter science instead (2010, 68-9, 79). Thus, she 
characterizes values in two ways: those that are mere biases and make science subjective, and those 
that are adequate and are acceptable in science.   
While Kourany believes that certain values are the right values to adopt, while others are 
the wrong values to adopt, it is unclear, based on her account, how we determine how to choose 
which values to adopt. Her account of the justification of values acknowledges that inquiry can 
play a role. She notes that the development of codes of ethics will begin as an empirical project, 
collecting information from various disciplines including their aims, funding arrangements, 
structural and institutional conditions, and the concerns of those affected, however she states that 
the development of codes is “first and foremost—a normative project” (Kourany 2013, 95). The 
fact she compares something beginning as an empirical project and then contrasts it as an overall 
normative project suggests that she doesn’t see valuation as entirely an empirical affair.88  
In addition, development of codes of ethics can be a complex interdisciplinary exercise. 
However, this presents a problem, because whether values are chosen because of their explicit 
inclusion in a code of ethics or by general agreement, there is the possibility that the agreed upon 
values may not be egalitarian. Thus, agreement or discussion in the formation of a code of ethics 
                                                          
88 This is in contrast with my view that adequacy of values is an entirely empirical matter.  
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can’t be a sufficient criterion of whether a value is justified or not. The process she describes may 
help us determine what values to adopt, but it doesn’t justify the values themselves. So, what does 
normative justification consist of according to Kourany?  
4.3.3 Logical Status of Values as Characterized 
Two clear characterizations of value emerge from Kourany. Values are either biased or 
prejudiced perspectives, or values are perspectives which can be adequate and not be a mere social 
bias. This also establishes two clear logical functions that values can have in inquiry. First, values 
can function as biases which serve to lead us away from the truth and can produce inadequate 
science (Kourany 2010, 9-12). In discussing values as a form of bias, she quotes Ruth Hubbard 
who links these biases to implicit or unconscious beliefs (2010, 55-6). That these values are biases 
which are unreflective (prejudiced) and informed by implicit beliefs suggests that they can take 
the form of habits. That values function as habit which leads to selective emphasis and bias towards 
certain aims, suggest that Kourany’s first characterization of values is a form of values as valuing. 
As such, these values allow for arbitrary or habitual assertion of action.  
 Her second characterization of values as adequate suggests that they do not function as 
biases, but are intellectually directive in inquiry, chosen as tools of inquiry in the aim of achieving 
epistemic and social success. They become “inner resources” that direct theory choice such as 
novelty, fruitfulness, fertility, progressiveness (2010, 25). The first time Kourany mentions values 
positively contributing to science, her examples are either the traditional so-called cognitive 
values, or feminist alternatives like novelty, ontological heterogeneity, and complexity (2010, 54). 
In her own ideal values perform a “controlling function” over scientific programs, and the values 
are adopted on the basis that they fulfil social objectives. So, values are no longer biases, but 
“standards,” “principles,” and “codes.” That values are supposed to function as intellectual 
instruments for the control of a situation is consistent with values as generalized ends and as such 
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propose directions in inquiry through the use of propositions. Given her characterization of general 
ends, it seems like they have the logical function of being affirmed rather than being judgments by 
themselves to be asserted.  
 But what about values as valuations? Is there discussion of particular value judgments? 
The examples of values that she believes have a positive influence over science are generalized. I 
have already mentioned values like novelty, but even more specific values mentioned like “Black 
women deserve the same opportunities as white women to live in such partnerships” are general; 
they formulate ends, not ends-in-view. It is telling that Kourany begins her book by suggesting 
that if we are willing to put aside the idea that values do not belong in science, her first question is 
“which values belong?” rather than something like “on what basis can we determine how to 
appropriately make value judgments in a scientific setting?” As I will argue in the following 
chapter, the latter is a more fruitful question. 
Kourany does discuss values as ethical codes. But the question for her is how might 
“adequate ethical codes be developed?” (Kourany 2013, 95). For example, what constitutes 
“fraud” in the case of scientific research isn’t always clear (Kourany 2010, 110). Most of her 
discussion of vague codes, however, is concerned with making these codes more specific, and as 
I previously mentioned specific general values are still general and not substitutes for value 
judgments. Kourany seems to recognize this as she states that a code of ethics cannot function “as 
a comprehensive algorithm for ethical decision-making” (Kourany 2013, 98).89 Yet, the solutions 
she addresses include developing conference sessions, workshops, publications, curricula, and 
educational materials. While education is likely going to be important in developing skills of 
valuation, this isn’t going to be helpful without understanding valuation in the first place.  
                                                          
89 Although it is still unclear whether “decision making” should include decisions about ends to pursue, or just 
about how to practically fulfil pre-determined ends prescribed by the code. 
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4.3.4 Value Management 
Kourany’s SRS Ideal is a response to the questions that are posed by the goals of SRS, 
some of them being “what entails scientific objectivity, and what threatens it?” (Kourany 2010, 
14). She thus considers a new “adequate understanding of scientific objectivity” that is better 
equipped than the value-free ideal and then argues for her own ideal (2010, 57). Her account aims 
to not only understand what scientific objectivity entails given the use of values but is especially 
concerned with what values will be used. Because her conception of values distinguishes between 
values that are already deemed adequate and those that are bias, and we must root out biased 
values, using values in science presents a problem. This is consistent with the articulation of value 
management in Chapter 1.   
Kourany’s division of values into those which are mere biases and those which are 
adequate affects how she understands what a well-organized science looks like and thus her 
approach to value management. At the outset, certain “morally justified” values should be adopted, 
and other values should not (2010, 78). Egalitarian values that promote social justice and human 
flourishing should be adopted (2010, 68). So, unlike Longino, who treats all values (initially) the 
same and suggests that values can only be objective to the degree that they survive intersubjective 
criticism, Kourany deems that certain values just are acceptable and others unacceptable.  
Because Kourany differs from Longino in her conception of values, she has a different 
conception of the role that values should play in science. Unlike Longino’s approach where values 
need to be accountable to a certain process to be acceptable in science, for Kourany science needs 
to be accountable to certain values to be acceptable.90 Values for Longino are naturally subjective 
and thus they must be chosen, revised, and used carefully, whereas Kourany believes she has 
                                                          
90 As noted successful science needs to meet both social and epistemic objectives. 
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identified the values we ought to use and those we would be wrong to use. Thus, values play a 
more prominent role in Kourany’s account than that found in other accounts.  
Both Longino and the empirical ideal treat values in a neutral way initially and grant that 
their legitimate use in science can be demonstrated: in Longino’s case by surviving social criticism, 
and in the empirical ideal’s case, by being utilized in successful science. In Kourany’s case her 
favored values are already deemed adequate and better than other values. For example, in her 
analysis of the empirical ideal, while acknowledging that feminist values have contributed to 
successful science and thus would count as scientifically rational, she rejects the idea that feminist 
values should be taken as serving the same functional role as any other value. The adequate values 
she describes can serve the function of being generalized ends, but also important is that her ideal 
requires that science fulfil both epistemic criteria and the social criteria supplied by these values. 
In other words, they serve as an end-in-themselves, as they “control” programs by establishing 
criteria rather than being merely instruments of inquiry, or by having such criteria determined 
within inquiry as a process of adjustment of a problematic situation, and this leaves her account 
open to the charge of dogmatism.  
4.3.5 Dogmatism and Ends-in-View 
That Kourany’s conception of values are pre-determined is pointed out by Brown who 
notes, “SRS requires that values are settled ahead of time […] value judgments are prior to, rather 
than a part of inquiry” (Brown 2013a, 74). Because value is determined prior to inquiry means that 
Kourany blends “adequate values” to function as both generalized ends and as value judgments. 
Brown’s concern is that SRS does not appear to sanction revision of our values in order to resolve 
potential conflicts in inquiry. Kourany compares using values in the way she prescribes as 
motivating a Lakatosian research program where the values are part of the “hard core” of its 
theoretical assumptions, and that according to this view, it can be rational to abandon such 
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degenerating research programs yet still uphold the value. However, Brown points out that while 
it can be rational to abandon a degenerating research program, it is never irrational to stick with it 
either (2013a, 75). Also, Kourany has such a sharp distinction between biases and adequate values, 
she doesn’t seem to acknowledge that the outcomes she favors can either be prescribed by 
generalized values or by valuings; in other words, that they could also be a matter of biased pursuit 
without adequate consideration or possibility of revision. Thus, dogmatism is a concern. Because 
their adoption isn’t to be based on their critical defence or empirical success, but rather by their 
own pre-determined adequacy, there is a risk of absolutism and a weakening of intelligent inquiry. 
On the other hand, if she argued that the outcomes she favors as being anticipated results of 
following warranted value judgment, her account can avoid some of these problems.  
Recall from Chapter 2 that empirical adequacy of a value judgment requires noting of the 
concrete conditions under which desires arise and their adequacy as a response to a doubtful 
situation. Kourany’s account seems incompatible with this. Valuation is about determining the 
adequacy of valuings as prizings, but her account rejects the notion that adequate social values can 
count as valuings because they would function as social biases. If the values that she supports can’t 
count as valuings at all they lose their connection to concrete situations in which desires arise and 
conflict for it is in such situations that prizings arise, thus making formulations of ends-in-view 
impossible. Despite her efforts to spell out the development of value codes, nothing specifies their 
application in concrete conditions, what conditions they should respond to, and what actions they 
should stimulate, and their potential limits. Recall that in a specific situation one judges a place of 
safety (and end-in-view), not safety (a general end) itself; the same is true for any value judgment, 
and this is going to be relevant no matter what account of value one adopts. This gap in her account 
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makes it difficult to understand how values can be adequate or what adequacy in a given context 
even means, an issue I will address shortly. 
Without a clear sense of the concrete conditions that values are responsive to, and with 
values being held up as valid external to inquiry, values become fixed ends. As noted in Chapter 
2, this makes inquiry less intelligent. A doctrine of fixed ends limits intelligent examination, 
encourages insincerity, and “puts a pseudo-stamp of moral justification upon success” (Dewey 
1922, 231). It establishes a situation where judgment is merely about apprehending and 
determining the means to a pre-determined end, and it can cause narrowness and fanaticism.  
This problem is enhanced because an unclear understanding of value judgments means that 
not only are general ends not questioned, but how they are to be achieved and understood in 
specific situations can be a matter of dogmatic interpretation. For example, Kourany’s cites values 
like “Black women deserve the same opportunities as white women to live in domestic 
partnerships.” She believes that in application the value mandates that any study must assume 
differences between black communities and white communities can be explained by factors like 
racism and poverty and not by perpetuating the stereotype that black Americans are inherently 
more violent than other groups (Kourany 2010, 70). The important question she considers is what 
if the stereotype is true? Kourany responds that this could eventually be discovered since 
differences must be explained as far as empirically possible in terms of other social differences.  
But we should not assume the stereotype is true until necessary since studies demonstrating 
inferior intellectual abilities in women is more likely to encourage the view that inequalities in the 
participation and lack of success of women compared to men shouldn’t be troubling and we 
shouldn’t bother to change that situation (2010, 6). However, this doesn’t follow as a value 
judgment any more than the judgment that since humans don’t have wings, they shouldn’t try to 
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fly. Indeed, like all decisions about what to do given new information, everything depends on the 
quality of the value judgment made. Kourany even acknowledges this point, arguing that the truth 
of the stereotype could lead to a redoubling of efforts against domestic violence in black 
communities given that they deserve the same opportunities as whites (Kourany 2013, 101). If the 
stereotype were true and we did redouble our efforts, then these efforts may achieve our social 
ends more effectively than by assuming the stereotype is not true. If that were the case, then 
assuming the stereotype is not true could make society worse off than assuming it is and would 
not be socially successful.91 
If this is true, then it isn’t clear a priori that we should understand the values that Kourany 
favors as being applied in the way she favors, especially without a clear understanding of valuation. 
Without an account of how values are to be judged in practice, dogmatism can creep in not only 
in that the value as a general end will always be affirmed, but even how it is to be pursued in 
practice as an end-in-view. Kourany acknowledges that values cannot be applied algorithmically, 
but given that the same general value can generate conflicting ends-in-view where each could 
consider the other to be socially unacceptable, this is a significant problem. And, so long as each 
can declare their adequacy without critical or empirical criterions like we find in Longino’s and 
the empirical ideal, each is free to be dogmatically pursued. Kourany’s account makes sense to her 
because she has a pre-conceived notion of what an adequate social value is and what it means in 
application, but without an account of valuation, then what makes these values and ends-in-view 
adequate could be a matter of dogma and fanaticism.  
                                                          
91 This is a simplistic point I am making. It is hypothetical and would also depend highly on what social responses 
we could reasonably expect. There are also factors to consider such as the fact that if the stereotype is false, then 
giving it the credit if a study can lend credence and legitimacy to it even while proving it wrong. My point, 
however, is merely about the logic of value judgment itself; general values can be understood in conflicting ways 
when applied in practice. 
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In fairness, Kourany does respond to the charge of dogmatism. For instance, she argues 
that debates and discussions can lead to provisional codes of ethics that can be open to continuous 
reassessment and revision to reflect diverse perspectives. Where there is disagreement, there are 
examples such as the development of codes of ethics where discussion has led to agreement and 
consensus to help justify choices (2013, 97). Although, as mentioned, consensus won’t guarantee 
egalitarian ends. In response to Brown, Kourany suggests that certain findings would lead to the 
revision of values. She suggests that if efforts to deal with violence in black communities yielded 
no benefits to black women, or if black women always instigated violence in the black community 
and that they had the power to change this behavior without significant loss, it would lead to the 
revision of the value that black women deserve the same opportunities as white women. She thus 
concludes that there is no dogmatism in her ideal (2013, 101-2).  
This response is problematic for two reasons. Despite claiming that one could give up 
values in the face of evidence, she also states that one could retain those values even if a research 
program begins to fail, so she hasn’t answered Brown’s concern that it would never be irrational 
to give a value up. On the other hand, if values can be given up as she claims, then her ideal no 
longer can do what she wants it to do. Recall that what sets her ideal apart from the others is that 
it guarantees social success according to her values if science is to be considered successful. She 
wanted this guarantee because she wanted science to be an ally in the fight for the equality of 
women. If any value could potentially be given up, then there is no guarantee that “social success” 
will continue to mean what she intended it to mean. This means it is no longer a guarantee that her 
ideal will meet her expectations. The more dogmatic the ideal, the stronger she can make that 
guarantee, but if it isn’t dogmatic, if any value can be given up, then there is no guarantee. One 
cannot be a fallibilist and make guarantees. A value would have to prove its muster through 
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criticism and empirical success which would make the SRS ideal no better off than Longino’s or 
the empirical ideal in those respects. 
According to the account of values affirmed in previous chapters, something close to the 
empirical ideal may be an advantage to Kourany’s situation. Values would be tested by their results 
in making for epistemically successful science, but not merely (as Kourany criticizes) their results. 
She argues that we should consider other factors like who the scientists involved were, training, 
resources at the disposal, and any other factors that can explain why otherwise good values can 
lead to bad science, and bad values can lead to good science.  
Warranted assertability, I believe, requires this since warrant is tied to the situation. As we 
have learned from Lewis, consideration of values in the concrete situations in which they are 
employed allows us to understand how objectively good values can fail to yield positive results 
and vise-versa. According to my account, general values are only affirmed, and this affirmation 
may be highly dependent on how unique a case might be. Kourany worries that if Nazi values92 
can yield successful results, they would count as scientifically rational, but since warranted 
assertability requires that we consider the long-term effects, and the likelihood that such values in 
the long run would prove more detrimental to science than beneficial, the issue doesn’t obviously 
present a major threat. Once again, the lesson to be learned is that any account must develop an 
understanding of valuation and understand how it relates to valuing and generalized ends to 
understand how values function in specific concrete contexts and this can improve her account.  
                                                          
92 Notice that a term like “Nazi values” is broad. According to the account of values I have affirmed, we would have 
to be clear about the specific values as generalized ends being employed, and how they function in formulating an 
end-in-view. A specific “Nazi value,” for example, might be that “one should prioritize efficiency in research over 
concern about rights, particularly if research subjects are of an inferior race.” While a value like this can, and did 
produce, some epistemically successful results (see Proctor 2000), it is more likely to be detrimental to research in 
the long run, particularly in democratic societies, and difficult to formulate as a clear scientifically operationalized 
end-in-view since “inferior race” has no clear empirical standing.  
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 4.4. Value Management in Heather Douglas 
In Chapter 1 I discussed Heather Douglas’ rejection of the value-free ideal and her desire to 
“articulate a new ideal for science” required in the face of recognition of the moral responsibilities 
of scientists and centered on the notion of a distinction between a direct and indirect role for values 
in science. In this analysis I will, like the others, try to articulate the conception of value she is 
working with starting with her explicit discussion of value. When we substitute her conception of 
value for my own, some of the perceived problems with values dissolve or are transformed into a 
problem concerning how best to engage in valuation. Thus, further justification is needed for using 
such a conception of value.  
4.4.2 How Values are Characterized 
 Before getting into the technical arguments that Douglas provides, I will consider the 
explicit ways in which she characterizes values themselves. They reveal why, while she believes 
values should be used, she is cautious about their use without restrictions, and they motivate her 
prescriptions. Throughout her work Douglas associates values with “interests,”, “biases,” 
“blinders,” “desires,” “wishes,” “likes,” “preferences,” and “wants” (Douglas 2009, 63, 87, 96, 
100, 102). What seems especially troubling to her is that these values so characterized are also 
“not evidence” but can function as “reasons,” “direct motivations,” “decisions,” and can “provide 
warrant” to do something (2009, 87, 96). So, values are crucial for some decisions, but in their 
usage they “must be restricted to certain decisions made in science and excluded from others” 
(2009, 96).  
 Douglas argues, like Longino, that we cannot make sharp distinctions between epistemic 
and non-epistemic values because “epistemic values end up reflecting the non-epistemic values of 
the day” (2009, 90). Unlike Longino, whose explicit discussion of value focused on different types 
of values (cognitive, constitutive, non-cognitive, contextual) and allowed for the potential 
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importance of such distinctions, Douglas insists that this issue is not important to determining how 
values should be used in science. 
 Douglas argues, “The crucial normative boundary is to be found not among the kinds of 
values scientists should or should not consider […] but among the particular roles for values in the 
reasoning process” (2009, 88). She distinguishes between two roles for values, a direct and indirect 
role. In a direct role values act as standalone reasons in and of themselves to accept a claim, and 
“provide direct motivation for the adoption of a theory” (2009, 96). Indirect use of values involves 
weighing the importance of uncertainty about a claim. Because findings can be uncertain, and 
because decisions based on those findings could lead to (for example) terrible consequences, 
scientists have a moral responsibility to use values when accepting or rejecting a conclusion. 
Indirectly using values means that where there is uncertainty, a choice needs to be made about 
what counts as sufficient evidence for a claim by considering the potential consequences of a 
wrong choice (2009, 97). The value is indirect because “values in this role do not determine the 
choice on their own” (2009, 97).  
 Douglas’ ideal for value use in science mandates that values can serve a direct role only at 
certain stages of inquiry, such as what projects to undertake, how they should be funded, and 
certain aspects of the methodology to be used (2009, 98-103). Where there is uncertainty, values 
can indirectly play a role in determining standards of statistical significance and characterization 
and interpretation of data. The key to her ideal is that values serving a direct role should be 
restricted to certain stages of research such as where one is deciding what to do and how to do it, 
and not to be used when there is a decision about which empirical claims to make (2009, 101). 
Alternatively, values can be used indirectly throughout the research process (2009, 88). 
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 So, considering the roles that values can play in science is key to protecting its integrity. 
Nevertheless, while there are no strict distinctions, her topology of values allows for different kinds 
of values. There are ethical values, which focus on the good or the right; social values which focus 
on what a society values; and there are cognitive values which assist scientists in their cognition 
of science. However, cognitive values aren’t necessarily truth-preserving; a simple theory may be 
wishful thinking in a complex world (2009, 107). However, she argues that there are also epistemic 
values which are “distinct from cognitive values, [and] should not be thought of as values at all, 
but rather as basic criteria that any scientific work must meet” (2009, 92). These epistemic 
“criteria” include internal logical consistency, and predictive competence.  
4.4.3 Logical Status of Values as Characterized 
 Douglas’ analysis of the roles that values play tell us something specific about the logical 
functions that values can have. However, much of what is meant by value remains implicit. Further 
articulation of what she means by value is still needed and as well as how it compares with the 
account of the logic of values developed in the previous chapter. Thus, like Longino and Kourany 
I will attempt to reconstruct an explicit account of value that Douglas seems to be working with.  
Sometimes, Douglas characterizes values as generalized ends. For example, in her 
discussion of cognitive and epistemic values, she mentions general values like simplicity, scope, 
external and internal consistency, or predictive precision (Douglas 2009 92-5; 2013, 798). 
Sometimes she argues that they can be suggestive aids in inquiry, something to be affirmed. A 
simpler theory may be easier to test, a broadly scoped theory may allow for more diverse 
opportunities of test (Douglas 2013, 800). We may strategically choose a broader theory over a 
narrow one, even if there is less evidence for it, because we may be more likely to find problems 
(Douglas 2009, 108). In this respect values function as proposals and take on the status of 
propositions in inquiry. On other occasions, Douglas suggests that what matters is manifesting the 
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general end in a theory and the generalized end itself is sufficient for the decision; they determine 
assertions. Her criticisms of cognitive values being used directly imply that a scientist would 
choose a simple theory as an end-in-itself, selected “for its own sake” (2009, 107) rather than 
aiding in the formulation of an end-in-view. This folds the notion of “value” as a generalized end 
into “value” as a judgment. However, this use of generalized ends says less about the dangers of 
their direct usage, and more about the dangers of dogma and the failure of intelligent valuation 
since, as I have previously discussed, valuation should not be about pursuit of fixed ends; valuation 
requires consideration of ends-in-view.  
Douglas’ characterization of the direct roles for values strongly imply the notion of “value” 
as valuing. When values are used directly they seem to be an expression of a preference, a wish, 
an interest, or a desire, and they are directly motivating. The reason they can motivate choices in 
this way is because they place “value on some intended option or outcome, whether it is to valorize 
or condemn it” (2009, 96). This characterization of values allows for the inclusion of valuing, 
particularly in that being motivating in themselves suggests they are asserted based on what the 
felt preference is. But does her account allow a distinct sense of value as “valuation”?  
It may seem so when considering her treatment of value being directly used. While she 
claims that values are desires, wishes, and interests, she also claims that they can act as “reasons” 
to accept a claim, and can “provide warrant” for choice (2009, 96). However, I don’t think we can 
accept that her characterization of direct values counts as valuation in the distinctive sense. For 
one thing, she characterizes values as providing reason for or directing decisions rather than being 
decisions themselves (2009, 100). Used in this sense, it can be equally consistent with merely 
invoking values as generalized ends. Recall that what is distinctive about valuation is that the value 
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is indeterminate until there is a judgment, whereas Douglas frequently discusses values as already 
being determinate, so much so that they will compete with and override all conflicting information.  
According to Douglas, in their direct role, the issue is not whether the “choice will 
somehow come out wrong in the end [which is usually what judgment is concerned with], but 
whether the choice […] is what we want” (2009, 96). This disconnects values from the context 
which would determine their adequacy and reduces them to terminal responses; this is consistent 
with valuing but not valuation. Also, importantly, Douglas doesn’t claim that the direct use of 
values can sometimes be problematic because they reflect our wishes, desires, or preferences (for 
example they take the form of valuings); they are problematic because science would be “merely 
reflecting our wishes, our blinders, and our desires” (2009, 102, emphasis added). This suggests 
that directly used values can only reflect desires, wishes, and blinders, and nothing more. She 
explains, “A direct role for values […] would allow scientists to reject data if they did not like it 
[…] even if the evidence did not support such an interpretation” (2009, 102). While this would be 
true of valuing, if valuation is included then there is no justification offered to claim that this would 
always be true and thus science would merely reflect desires in all cases. Thus, I do not believe the 
direct roles for values as she characterizes them reflects values as valuation. 
One unique way in which Douglas’ treatment of values is, to an extent, consistent with 
valuation is in discussion of indirect roles for values. In these cases, we are required to consider 
competing options and the consequences they lead to; we must consider both ends and means 
together and weigh various possible ends-in-view rather than following a predetermined value. 
Consideration of competing ends-in-view cannot be fixed from the start but is dynamic and occurs 
throughout the research project (2009, 73-4). It isn’t based on perfect knowledge, but rather on 
 
 
209 
 
what we can reasonably foresee (2009, 83). This is consistent with valuation. Thus, all three 
meanings of “value” are reflected in her conception of value in some ways. 
One final contribution in terms of the logical consideration of values that Douglas provides 
is that there is good reason for thinking that values and objectivity are not mutually exclusive. She 
articulates seven different kinds of objectivity that are all distinct and not reducible to each other 
(2009, 129). For example, a claim might be objective because it allows for repeatable successful 
manipulations of the world, or because anyone who investigates a claim may come to the same 
conclusion, or because we may give up the claim in the face of contrary evidence, or because there 
is a complex interactive communal process to expose potential biases. Each kind of objectivity can 
bolster our confidence in a claim, yet objectivity is no longer absolute, but a matter of degree 
(2009, 117). This reconstruction of the idea of objectivity is a useful addition to the logic of value.  
For example, it builds on and clarifies arguments advanced by others. Don R. Bowen 
argues that we cannot equate objectivity with being value free (Bowen 1977, 202). He describes 
three definitions of objectivity including the idea that science is objective if it is unprejudiced, if 
reality is capable of acting as a check on conclusions, or if it follows a methodology that allows 
for error correction (2009, 205). None of these rely on the notion of value freedom.  
Ray Lepley articulates six distinct definitions each of subjectivity and objectivity. These 
include what is existential versus internal (mental), what is clearly expressed versus what is vague, 
ad-hoc or random trial and error formulation and testing versus processes of intelligently controlled 
formulation and testing, what is verified versus not verified, and what is idiosyncratic versus what 
is “cosmically secured” (Lepley 1944, 183). He argues that values cannot be categorically 
categorized as subjective nor facts as objective. Both are formulated and tested through 
interactions of subjective and objective factors (1944, 185). He demonstrates that values can count 
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as objective, but Douglas’ analysis of the various kinds of objectivity can do the same. For 
example, Dewey’s arguments about warranted assertability, or Lewis’ terminating and non-
terminating judgments can certainly meet some of Douglas’ definitions of objectivity.  
4.4.4 Value Management 
 In rejecting the value-free ideal, Douglas claims, “We need another ideal and a more robust 
understanding of objectivity to go with it” (Douglas 2009, 63). The ideal is supposed to address 
questions like “What is the proper role for values in science, if science is not value free? Can value, 
any values, play any role whatsoever in science” (2009, 85-6). She thus aims both to articulate 
what scientific objectivity entails, and which values should be employed in what ways. Her 
concern is values running “roughshod over evidence and reasoning” (2009, 86). In other words, 
she sees values as presenting a problem for science. Therefore, her account is a form of value 
management.  
 Douglas’ particular conception of what a value is and what it is capable of doing motivates 
her approach. Recall that its central theme is the idea of limiting the direct role of values to prevent 
scientists from engaging in wishful thinking. Before arguing this, she claims, “simply because a 
scientist values (or would prefer) a particular outcome of a study does not mean that the scientist’s 
preference should be taken as a reason in itself to accept the outcome. […] There must be some 
important limits to the roles values play in science” (2009, 87). Notice her claim that there must 
be limitations comes after she identifies values with a preference. It’s clear here that values in that 
context are being discussed as mere preferences, for the issue is that it is simply a matter of scientist 
having a preference (and not appraisal of it), and the fact that it is simply a matter of having a 
preference is what she considers problematic for her claim to make sense. For if preferring also 
refers to appraisal, then it wouldn’t be simply a matter of a scientist valuing, nor would the 
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preference be such a reason in-itself that merely because an outcome is valued does not mean that 
it is valuable.  
Because Douglas emphasizes values as generalized ends or as preferences, it is clear why 
she does not believe they can serve an evidentiary role. Simplicity can be wishful thinking in a 
complex world, and merely liking a theory doesn’t make it true. As Inmaculada de Melo-Martin 
and Kristen Intemann point out, Douglas’ assumption that values are not relevant to whether there 
is evidence for a claim “lends force to the problem of wishful thinking” (de Melo-Martin and 
Intemann 2016, 514). In other words, once again the conception of value is what leads to the 
perception of the problem. But are these notions of value justified? 
4.4.5 Values, Evidence, and Judgment 
Let’s reconsider how Douglas characterizes values in general. Take this passage where she 
articulates the danger of allowing a direct role for value at certain stages of inquiry:  
A direct role for values in the characterization of data would allow scientists to reject data 
if they did not like it, for example if it went against a favorite theory […] A direct role for 
values in interpretation of evidence would allow values to have an equal or more weight 
than the evidence itself, and scientists could select an interpretation of the evidence because 
they preferred it cognitively or socially, even if the evidence did not support such an 
interpretation. And if values were allowed to play a direct role in the acceptance or rejection 
of scientific theories, an unpalatable theory could be rejected regardless of evidence 
supporting it. (2009, 102, emphasis added) 
Here we see her discussing various occasions of value use which are linked to likings, preferences, 
and tastes. Next consider this claim again: “If we allow values to play a direct role in these kinds 
of decisions in science [...] science would be merely reflecting our wishes, our blinders, and our 
desires.” What are we to make of this? Is a value a form of liking, of preference, a matter of taste, 
a form of wish, a desire, or a blinder? Does value apply to each of these as distinct phenomena, or 
do all six concepts essentially mean the same thing? If not, how precisely do each of these concepts 
relate to each other? For example, does a value necessarily act as a blinder? If so, what is meant 
by blinder? If not, why prescribe a blanket ban on direct use at certain stages? 
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Consider Douglas’ claim that values are problematic because we cannot wish the world a 
certain way. This not only requires a conception of value that incorporates wishing, but also one 
with a particular conception of wishing. Yet, for example, according to Dewey’s account, wishing 
is not properly a part of valuing at all.  
Alternatively, consider an account of values that does include wishing, just not as Douglas 
seems to conceive of it. As discussed, Lepley argues that wishes are part of any inquiry; they 
express themselves as criteria rather than being isolated anticipated satisfactions. He explains, 
“choices are in no case either unconditioned or unaffected by other elements in this and other 
adjustment situations. Purposes and ‘choice-wishes’ are in varying degrees formed, informed, and 
reformed by critical reflection, social criticism, and the effects experienced in overt action” 
(Lepley 1944, 58). Wishes in interaction with other scrutinized events give rise to “suggestions” 
and assist in directing and appraising the outcomes of further action; they afford subject matter 
and suggestions for inquiry. Thus, wishing can quite literally be a viable part of “making it so.”  
While it is always possible to engage in uncritical “wishful thinking” in a bad sense, Lepley 
notes, “In the degree that persons become maturely wise they wish to view wish effects as 
objectively and realistically as possible, to inform choice wishes in light of inquired-into-and-
tested-wishes” (1944, 53). Thus, the mere fact that wishing is involved in valuing by no means 
warrants the conclusion that a scientist will ignore evidence or undermine the basis of science and 
our pursuit of reliable knowledge. Presuming they take science seriously, a mature wisher would 
do this. Wishful thinking in the bad sense owes more to individual habits (1944, 58). Therefore, 
even if it is appropriate to associate valuing with wishing, we still need justification for the 
particular sense of wishing that Douglas employs.  
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Now consider the other concepts I have linked to value. Liking, as I described, is a form of 
behavior and not to be taken in a purely personal, emotional, or mental sense. Thus, it has 
observable effects and produces observable consequences; we don’t look at likings in isolation and 
we can be discerning about the worth of various likings. The same goes for desires, a term which 
is how valuation ought to be conceived according to Dewey. Desire takes place where there is a 
situation demanding effort to conserve or produce something. It is not isolated in-itself or merely 
personal. How precisely does Douglas’ conception of liking differ from this (if at all) and why is 
it justified? 
When it comes to blinders, I suspect Douglas employs the concept to describe someone 
who ignores evidence and insists on an outcome come what may. But according to Dewey, 
deliberation is irrational to the degree that it allows an aim to become fixed or so absorbing that 
our ability to foresee consequences becomes warped. For Dewey, ends should not be isolated and 
desired come what may, but rather are considered alongside means and the facts of the case. 
Maintaining a fixed end diverts us away from our examination of consequences and results in 
careless inspection of existing conditions. Thus, it would represent a failure in deliberation or 
valuation. In other words, we have no reason to think that values inherently act as blinders, but 
rather the opposite; valuation is poorly done to the degree we are blinded, and only in appraisal 
can we begin to criticize our immediate prizings and prevent them from being blinders. So 
conceived, mature valuation in a direct role is necessary to preventing mere wishful thinking. In 
other words, when we substitute some of these terms as my account describes them, some of the 
concerns that direct roles for values in certain states is always problematic dissolves. 
Consider a scientist who prefers a certain theory and even desires to declare it confirmed 
despite evidence to the contrary. The scientist is conflicted because they also prize science as a 
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source of reliable knowledge. In deliberation the scientist makes a practical judgment that they 
ought not ignore evidence that conflicts with their theory since it would undermine their efforts as 
a scientist to find truth. I don’t think we could deny that the scientist made a value judgment, yet 
it doesn’t count as an indirect use of values. Is it really correct to claim that the scientist should 
not have made the value judgment? Could the scientist even not have made the judgment?  
Remember that evaluation occurs where there is uncertainty over what to do, and it aims 
to resolve this conflict. Without judgment, no action can take place. Perhaps the scientists should 
not have had the desire or be conflicted in the first place, and this is the problem. But, the scientist 
didn’t act on the immediate desire, they merely were inclined to act, their prizing emerging from 
an impulse. Do we want to claim objectivity lies with scientists not having such impulses (since 
these would count as direct valuing) rather than having the maturity to carefully evaluate and reject 
harmful desires? Recall from Chapter 3 that such judgments of practice must take place throughout 
inquiry as we must judge whether facts are facts of the case at hand; these too are value judgments 
like the case just mentioned and so denial that a scientist should make any such judgments is 
problematic. 
Perhaps, the response might be that it is appropriate for the scientist to act according to the 
epistemic criterion of predictive competency. However, as a mere criterion, this wouldn’t be 
sufficient in a case where the scientist’s preferred theory and an alternative theory were at least 
competent but not as precise. In other words, if the scientist knew that both theories were 
competent, and wanted to declare their own preferred theory confirmed, but judged that it would 
be wrong to do so on that basis of mere preference, such a judgement would be a value judgment 
that Douglas’ account would prohibit. As minimal standards, the epistemic criteria she does allow 
for would not be sufficient to determine the choice. It would only work in a case where one theory 
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is competent and the other is not. Nor is it clear whether such criteria would constitute a value 
judgment or not. In her 2009 book she questions whether they constitute values, whereas in later 
writings she refers to them as values. If they do count as values, it remains open whether they 
would be appropriately distinct from social and political thinking (see 5.1.2). While a proponent 
of the value-free ideal could point to so-called epistemic values to justify the choice not to go with 
preferred theory because it is preferred, since Douglas rejects that there is a hard distinction 
between epistemic and non-epistemic values, this option is not available to her. 
Now consider Douglas’ quote from the previous section, that simply because a scientist 
values or would prefer an outcome doesn’t mean that it is reason to accept the outcome, and there 
must be limits on value usage. For this claim to make sense, we would have to agree that values 
and preferences are related, and that there is something in the nature of a preference that makes it 
a bad reason to accept an empirical conclusion, that it can’t count as evidence, or tell us anything 
about the world. But Douglas doesn’t explicitly say anything about the nature of preference to 
justify this. First, what is so problematic about a preference, particularly if it is a mere preference? 
Presumably it would be this: preferences, like desires or wishes, are subjective. They must be 
limited or else they threaten objectivity. After all, her central concern with values isn’t their 
indirect usage (she favors greater use of such values), but that their direct usage must be limited or 
else the integrity of science is threatened. But if preferences are subjective, if they are not evidence, 
they mustn’t tell us anything about the way the world is, only about “what we want.”  
 But what reason do we have to accept that preferences are so subjective? As noted in 
Lepley, it could be that they are conceived as a terminal response and “when so conceived, 
attention is focused so exclusively upon the immediate act of choice that we lose sight not only of 
the processes which may have provided data which makes the choice itself more than subjective 
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but also of the processes of testing which may follow as effects of the actions which flow from the 
choice” (Lepley 1944, 182). When prizings are not taken as terminal responses, as we have learned 
from Dewey’s and Kitcher’s account, they can be more or less adequate and informed and 
reflective; when maturely and wisely considered, they reveal something about the world to us, and 
we have no reason to see them as isolated.  
 As Intemann and de Melo-Martin point out, values can indeed become the basis of 
evidence. Rejecting Douglas’ view that values are extraevidentiary, they point out that studies 
measuring harms or impacts rely on values. In studying climate change, the question of whether 
loss of a cultural tradition counts as an impact depends on judgments about what goods are worth 
protecting (Intemann and de Melo-Martin 2010). Questions about how to represent race in racial 
disparity studies may involve whether the “one drop rule,” the race of the mother, self-
identification, or geological ancestry is more appropriate. Because of cases like this, “normative 
values about what ought to be are indeed sometimes relevant to what is the case” (de Melo-Martin 
and Intemann 2016, 514). If this is true, then values are not always subjective, but in addition they 
can tell us how the world is.   
 Is it possible that Douglas’ account permits a notion of valuation and of carefully 
considered preferences in this way? If it does, it isn’t reflected in her normative claim that values 
should never play a direct role at certain stages. If values are not always merely subjective, and 
can tell us about the world, it wouldn’t warrant her claims about the dangers of direct value usage 
and a universal ban on their usage at certain stages, and it wouldn’t warrant the claim that “our 
values […] have no bearing on the way the world actually is at any given time” (Douglas 2009, 
103). In other words, when we consider different accounts of value, elements of Douglas’ approach 
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to value management no longer seems warranted and thus to that degree it depends on whatever 
conception and justification of value she employs.   
Of course, it is possible that Douglas has some conception of value that is consistent with 
valuation in direct roles, or a different conception of valuation, such that despite making 
judgments, values remain nevertheless problematic. Perhaps even if values are a product of mature 
judgment they may still lead to the consequences that she is worried about. But, there is no 
evidence of such a conception of value judgment in her account, and even if there were, it still 
seems far from certain that such a conclusion is justified. One doesn’t have to accept all my account 
to see the problem either. If there is some meaningful difference between merely wanting 
something and judging that one should want something, then her characterization of direct values 
becomes problematic, and the blanket ban on all forms of direct valuation at certain stages seems 
unwarranted. If her claim is that values should never play a direct role during stages like theory 
acceptance because they are always subjective or problematically acting as evidence, then this 
conception of value needs further justification. If her claim is that values should never play a direct 
role during such stages despite the fact that values can sometimes be objectively judged and 
sometimes be subjective, or in other words, that valuation makes no discernable difference, then 
further precision of what is meant by judgment and further justification of the ban is needed. If her 
claim is that values in a direct role during such stages need not be always bad, such as in the case 
of objective judgment, then qualification of the claim that values should never play a direct role 
needs to be limited to cases of valuing but not necessarily valuation.  
If the concern is that values in their direct role are always problematic because they can 
never act as evidence, then she hasn’t said enough about the nature of valuation to warrant this. As 
noted, Sharyn Clough claims “not only are value-judgments informed by evidence, but where 
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relevant, value judgments can be used as evidence […] in helping to decide which evidentiary 
judgments should be given weight when choosing between hypotheses” (Clough 2008, 274). For 
example, a feminist value like inclusivity applied to studies of psychological theories of human 
development is likely to lead to giving full weight to experiences of males as males, females as 
females and so on. This is premised on the “well established inductive claim that, over time, 
theories that are […] exclusive tend not to be explanatory of, or consistent with, the evidence 
(2008, 276). In other examples discussed, feminist values utilized in the study of physiology and 
endocrinology lead to the identification of androcentric assumptions and empirical oversights that 
were eventually corrected, leading to better value claims and better science (Clough 2004, 111). 
In another paper, she argues that hypotheses consistent with equality have a better empirical track 
record than those consistent with racism (Clough and Loges, 2008). If this is true, and given what 
we have learned from Lepley that certain values may be more empirically sound than others, if a 
theory is consistent with a generalized value, it can be evidence that the theory may be true.  
Perhaps Douglas could allow that direct roles for values will not always be problematic or 
challenge the integrity of science if used in the stages she says they shouldn’t be used, but that 
given that her concern is with scientists potentially influencing policy, it would be prudent to still 
have a blanket ban given that values can have a track record of being harmful. However, even this 
would need further justification because we would need to know how likely it is that bad value 
judgments are made in science and whether this could ever be improved. Also, de Melo-Martin 
and Intemann have presented possible approaches to deal with values being directly used in science 
and their potential impact on policy (de Melo-Martin and Intemann, 2016). 
Thus, when we carefully examine Douglas’ conception of value, it reveals that much of 
her approach to value management depends on conceiving of values in a certain way. However, 
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problems arise because there is a lack of precision in terms of whether her account includes the 
possibility of mature value judgment, if it does in what respects the concerns she has about value 
usage pertain to mere valuing or valuation, or whether mature valuation would make any 
significant difference. Using her conception of value either requires qualification of her account 
to exclude cases of mature valuation or it requires revision of the account. Many of the problems 
she identifies with using values can be addressed by suggesting that scientists should not engage 
in valuing, but rather they should engage in mature valuation and that we should focus on 
improving valuation such that valuative inquiries do not proceed based on pursuing fixed-ends. 
Such an approach will not guarantee that the problems she is concerned about won’t occur. 
Certainly, it is possible that even a well-supported value judgment can be used badly. But as 
Clough and Anderson point out any descriptive or normative predicate used inappropriately can 
drive inquiry to a poor conclusion. One can over-rely on an empirically grounded general value 
just as one can over rely on an empirically grounded protocol or a particular observation. However, 
my analysis suggests a shift in emphasis to the improvement of value judgment and their usage to 
meliorate that concern instead of a sweeping claim about how values should be used simply 
because they are values, a point I discuss further in the following chapter. 
4.5. Value Management in Philip Kitcher 
Since I have already discussed Kitcher’s work in detail in previous chapters, I won’t discuss what 
his conception of value is to the same degree as I have in the case of the accounts of Longino, 
Kourany, and Douglas. However, I will describe Kitcher’s discussion of how values fit into science 
and will evaluate Kitcher’s work as an example of value management.  
 In rejecting the value-free ideal, Kitcher points to historical examples of scientific 
transitions as resting on the adoption of different schemes of values, with competing sides 
weighing the importance of successes and failures of a theory according to these schemes in 
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competition with a rival theory. He proposes a three-fold division of schemes of values. A broad 
scheme of values represents ideals and goals people have for themselves and their societies; at this 
level it seems all values are included, similar to Lepley’s inclusive conception of values. Within 
broad schemes concern values relating to obtaining knowledge, either instrumentally or 
immediately, or what Kitcher calls cognitive schemes of values. This is not to be confused with 
cognitive or epistemic values previously discussed; cognitive schemes regard the value we place 
on knowledge, or particular kinds of knowledge. Finally, there are probative schemes of values, 
where specific questions are considered more important than others. Probative schemes of values 
are most important to considering transitions in the history of science (Kitcher 2011, 37).  
 According to Kitcher, transitions in the history of science are primarily an exercise in 
demonstrating that one theory’s successes in responding to certain questions are the most important 
because those questions are the most important. He explains:  
When schemes of values clash, the subsequent course of scientific dispute consists in each 
side’s trying to extend its own range of successful solutions, while making trouble for the 
other. As this occurs, retention in one of the doctrines can easily require modifying the 
scheme of values—you cannot continue to insist that these are the really crucial problems, 
as your opponent starts to find defensible answers to some of them […] Resolution turns 
on showing how the losers are committed to an untenable scheme of values. (2011, 36) 
For example, initially Copernicans had success in explaining the limited separation of Mercury 
and Venus from the sun but faced difficulty accounting for why things not firmly attached to the 
earth’s surface did not fly off. Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomers thus adopted different 
probative schemes of values where each takes different problems to be more important (2011, 58).  
 Importantly, Kitcher stresses that these schemes of values interact, rather than one set being 
hierarchically derived from another. For example, given certain problems we may revise our 
cognitive schemes of values; initial epistemic goals determined by our epistemic scheme of values 
may be revised in the face of problems deemed important by our probative scheme. Further 
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problems may lead to revisions in our probative scheme to relax standards, or we may revise our 
goals informed by our broad scheme (2011, 38). In the case of scientific transitions, these kinds of 
revisions are expected. As a theory generates novel successes, an opposing side is forced to amend 
their idea of what the critical issues are, to amend their scheme of probative values. Eventually, a 
track record of problem solving by the victors leaves their opponents without a compelling 
probative scheme of values. Kitcher explains, “Debates reach a stage at which no serious scheme 
of cognitive values would yield a scheme of probative values capable of prolonging debate. If 
some people continue to resist, they do so because of allegiance to a broad scheme of values that 
shape judgments about cognitive and probative values” (2011, 58-9). 
 This allegiance to a broad scheme of values where one would insist on focusing on certain 
crucial problems while dismissing all other successes can lead to a situation where there is no 
clearly articulated scheme of cognitive values of their own. For example, an anti-Darwinist may 
insist on an account of the emergence of the first cell or maintaining a history of life consistent 
with a reading of scripture yet lack a viable alternative theory (2011, 59). He considers the idea 
that science falters when broad schemes of values play a role, while cognitive and probative 
schemes of values are permitted. Yet, he rejects this claiming, “the error lies not in invoking broad 
schemes of values, but in the character of the particular broad scheme of values introduced” 
(2011, 59).  
 According to Kitcher, broad schemes of values can play a legitimate role in scientific 
practice, but they are required to be sustainable in an ideal conversation. Recall from Chapter 2, 
that Kitcher believes that ideal deliberations satisfy the conditions of mutual engagement, which 
roughly speaking requires us to acquaint fellow deliberators with our needs, provide them equal 
status in the conversation, and aim at solutions that everyone can endorse (Kitcher 2011b, 340). A 
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conclusion counts as adequate only if under these conditions we can reach a consensus (2011b, 
343). However, for there to be mutual engagement, participants must not rely on false beliefs about 
the natural world, they must recognize the consequences for one another of actions under 
discussion, and they must be able to identify the wishes of other participants and how they might 
evolve (Kitcher 2011, 50). These epistemic criteria are necessary, Kitcher argues, because 
“consensus reached on the basis of error would be problematic” (Kitcher 2011b, 344). 
 Another important element is the idea of mirroring, involving the expansion of one’s 
sympathies where perceived desires of others are given equal weight to one’s own. However, 
desires of ideal participants must be filtered to only include desires compatible with precepts of 
the participant’s ethical code and are filtered through the epistemic conditions just mentioned 
(Kitcher 2011, 51). The idea is to achieve desires judged to be the best balance among varying 
assessments made by fellow participants. If discussion reveals that a potential solution to a conflict 
falls short of the conditions of an ideal conversation (such as relying on factual errors or 
shortcomings in accommodating the wishes of classes of other people), it can be discounted. This 
is why Kitcher believes that the anti-Darwinist’s broad conception of values can be rejected since 
they violate the epistemic conditions required for mutual engagement. 
4.5.2 Logical Status of Values as Characterized 
 It isn’t difficult to see that Kitcher’s account of the logical status of values includes valuing, 
and generalized ends. Recall that his pragmatic naturalism sees the ethical project as emerging as 
a response to the problem of altruism failure. Altruism failure emerges because we are unable to 
adjust our desires as we should and instead behave selfishly. Desires lie at the heart of his account 
and the actions and consequences they lead to are relevant. Thus, valuing is present in his account. 
In addition, the concept of normative guidance and the development of ethical codes suggests a 
conception of valuing as generalized ends, as maxims set up patterns of behavior, and disruption 
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of those habits occasionally lead to revisions of those codes (Kitcher 2011b, 331). Kitcher explains 
that such “vague generalizations” may include notions like “it is right to tell the truth,” but “like 
many valuable generalizations in the natural sciences, they are surely not exceptionless” (Kitcher 
2012, 318). Such codes guide behavior rather than constituting an end-in-themselves.  The various 
schemes of values can thus take on the status of a proposition in inquiry.  
Finally, Kitcher, unlike most other accounts discussed, devotes most of his efforts to 
articulating a conception of “value” as valuation. While desires are part of valuing, they are more 
or less adequate based on the consequences they are fitted to produce. Normative guidance requires 
us to perceive the regularities of actions and consequences and to avoid desires that lead to trouble; 
we must look into the future and consider alternate directions that ethical practice might take (2012, 
315). Mutual engagement aims to allow for the refinement of ethical codes as a social technology 
designed to function as means of resolving ongoing social tensions. Thus, values in this sense take 
on the logical status of a judgment.  
4.5.3 Value Management 
 Kitcher’s articulation of an ideal discussion under conditions of mutual engagement in 
science is a response to what he sees as the failure of the value-free ideal. Scientists, Kitcher argues, 
must make value judgments and should use broad schemes of values in their work. Not only would 
judgment emerging from an ideal conversation function similarly to the value-free ideal in 
condemning broad schemes of values that threaten scientific integrity, but in certain conditions we 
would expect a broad scheme of values to allow for adjustments to a probative scheme in cases 
where there are opportunities to greatly benefit society or avoid harms; continuing with an original 
plan when an unanticipated discovery opens up opportunities for relieving human suffering can be 
condemned (Kitcher 2011, 60). So, Kitcher’s account attempts to maintain the integrity of science 
while also attempting to determine what values should be adopted in science.  
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 Is this a case of value management? Recall from Chapter 1, that what typifies a case of 
value management is a normative account that tries to determine what values should be used in 
science and how values can be used while maintaining a sense of scientific objectivity. However, 
both needs arise because using values in science seems to present an ongoing problem that needs 
managing. Value management is required because values are problematized. If one claims, 
“Values need to be used in science, therefore we need to protect the integrity of science,” one must 
presume that values represent a threat. Yet, this doesn’t seem to motivate Kitcher. For instance, he 
believes that value judgments are necessary for scientific inquiry not, like Longino, merely because 
they can influence background assumptions, but because, like the account discussed in Chapter 3, 
value judgments are “constantly made” to determine the practice of inquiry as we judge whether 
what we have done so far warrants taking the next step (2011, 34). Values are thus normalized as 
part of inquiry itself. Instead, the focus of his account is on what makes a good value judgment.  
 Kitcher, as previously mentioned, wants to challenge the often-implicit notion that value 
judgments are subject to no standards or that valuing is a matter of taste. His account addresses 
developing valuation, rather than thinking of values themselves as representing a threat to 
scientific integrity. In doing this, I want to suggest that Kitcher is doing something other than value 
management; the problem he addresses is primarily about what makes for good value judgment 
while concerns about the integrity of science are secondary and follow from his solution to his 
problem. This is evident from his claim that “Everything depends on the character of the value-
judgments made, on the schemes of values and how they are applied, on the ways in which schemes 
of values are adjusted. If there are standards for endorsing, applying, and amending values, we can 
separate the religious opponents of evolution and the hired guns of industry from the genuine 
experts” (2011, 39-40). So, while Kitcher addresses how to maintain integrity, it doesn’t stem from 
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a problem arising from the mere presence of values. He explains, “Instead of ‘Science and 
Values’—as if the latter were grudgingly tacked on as an afterthought—we should think in terms 
of ‘Values and Science.’ (2011, 39). The meaning of this and the idea that Kitcher is doing 
something other than value management and what this specifically means will be addressed in the 
following chapter. But this doesn’t mean that Kitcher’s approach doesn’t have its own challenges. 
4.5.4 Ideal Conversations and Value Judgments  
  Kitcher’s idea of a good value judgment requires that values be what would emerge from 
an ideal conversation under conditions of mutual engagement. Importantly, this conversation does 
not include just a few parties, but everyone: we must “introduce the considerations and lines of 
reasoning that would be brought forward to achieve consensus were the entire human population 
to participate under conditions of mutual engagement” (Kitcher 2011b, 340). However, he 
recognizes that such a conversation is impossible, so instead deliberations are supposed to replicate 
the outcome of a conversation that would occur if the entire human population were brought 
together in mutual engagement (Kitcher 2011, 51). While such conditions are supposed to mimic 
the conditions under which our ancestors began the ethical project, and while Kitcher believes we 
cannot hope to live up to these conditions and that their use is to suggest useful directions to take 
in actual conversations about values, it seems that such a standard will be of little use if we can’t 
imagine what such conversations would be like under those conditions.  
 After all, we must imagine what desires would remain after being filtered, but the extended 
mirroring process requires us to attend to another’s filtered desires, other people’s assessment of 
that person’s desires, other’s assessments of our assessments of other’s desires, and so on (2011, 
52). Such an enterprise may be difficult to imagine on a small scale, let alone trying to imagine it 
on the scale of the entire human race. If we can’t imagine what such an ideal conversation will 
look like, what use is it as a standard by which to measure our actual deliberations?  
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 It is also ambiguous as to whether the concept of the ideal conversation is supposed to be 
the benchmark of an adequate value or whether it is merely supposed to be an aid in deliberation. 
After all, he claims that ideal discussion is “The only vehicle available to us […] for arriving at 
judgments about values” and that “our ethical discussions are adequate to the extent they reach the 
conclusions that would have resulted from an ideal deliberation” (2011, 49-50). However, he 
suggests that it is supposed to be an aid in actual conversation, and in the later Preludes to 
Pragmatism, his Chapter “Hall of Mirrors” discusses the notion as a mechanism as a means of 
avoiding the “problem of partiality,” or a way to correct for bias towards individuals or qualities 
(Kitcher 2012, 328). Here he builds in the work of Dewey into a “Deweyan conversation” that 
requires us to reflect other emotions into our own, filter judgments based on ignorance, and trace 
whether biases occur by examining consequences of certain traits or social connections (2012, 
340). However, he also points out that for Dewey, such an approach is “part of a body of techniques 
available for intelligent resolution,” and is a tool of inquiry rather than a standard to determine 
what counts as justified morality; for Dewey resolution is not just a matter of correcting for bias, 
but for resolving a problematic situation. Avoiding partiality is one concern for valuation, but it is 
not the only concern. Thus, Kitcher’s method may be an aid in deliberation as a mechanism for 
checking biases, but it seems less helpful as the sole basis for justified value judgment.  
 It is also worth considering the fact that while Kitcher clearly describes his concept of an 
ideal conversation as a proposal for ethical solutions, it as an ideal conversation. Recall that for 
Dewey (and others) value judgments need to be responsive to concrete conditions. While we may 
imagine how those who hold conflicting views may deliberate with us under ideal conditions and 
consider what value judgments would emerge, conditions different from the ideal might warrant 
different solutions. In other words, judgments I might consider warranted under ideal conditions I 
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might not consider warranted under actual conditions, particularly if others won’t partake in 
mutual engagement. For instance, we may hold certain theories to different standards given 
concrete conditions than we would under ideal circumstances. In Science, Truth, and Democracy 
(2001), Kitcher discusses instances where political and epistemic asymmetry may lead to our 
beliefs being taken to be more supported than they actually are and that while the Millian ideal of 
free inquiry is good under ideal conditions, they don’t exist. Under ideal conditions blocking 
certain forms of research would not be necessary, but under actual conditions it might be. Thus, in 
concrete conditions, wide sympathy may not be desirable as a means to resolution. 
 Finally, it is worth considering that Kitcher’s answer to good value judgment heavily 
focusses on values responding to social conflicts. This is telling since his discussion of how to 
make value judgments in science is identical to the account he gives in The Ethical Project. In 
other words, it conceives of values too narrowly in terms of ethical matters, but like Lacey, Kitcher 
applies his solution too broadly. Whereas according my account, values as judgments of practice 
are far broader than ethics, including scientific, artistic, logical, and general practical concerns. 
Thus, it is less clear how well suited Kitcher’s ideal conversation is regarding those matters if it is 
to be the basis for what counts as justified value-judgments or not.  
4.6. Conclusions to Draw in Comparing Accounts of Value 
When compared to the account of value affirmed in Chapters 2 and 3 the approaches of Longino, 
Kourany, Douglas, and Kitcher expose potential problems in approach. For one thing, it is clear 
that each account relies on a conception of value and that limitations in that conception of value 
can mean challenges for the account. Each approach has problems, yet the analysis reveals 
important things to take away when considering the roles for values in science.  
 Longino’s emphasis on social criticism and a diversity of perspectives, like Kitcher’s ideal 
conversation, provides a tool to check implicit biases in values and offers a plausible account for 
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the experimental testing of value judgments. Kourany’s distinction between values that are biases 
and values that are more objective tells us that values do not have to be a threat to science so long 
as we figure out how to distinguish them. Douglas’ account tells us explicitly that values do not 
always function in the same way and that we should be mindful of the logical role they can have, 
while her accounts of objectivity tells us that the presence of values does not mean a lack of 
objectivity. Finally, Kitcher’s account suggests that we should be careful that values should not be 
externally tacked on to science and that there may be an approach beyond value management.  
 Another important take-away is that these normative ideals, criteria, and standards all 
function as generalized value claims. They prescribe general norms of behavior that should aid us 
in formulating ends-in-view rather than being pursued as ends-in-themselves. As such, each may 
be subject to revision and amendment given concrete conditions.  
 For example, Longino notes that her ideas form the basis of an idealized community 
(Longino 2002, 134). But short of ideal conditions, these norms may need to be judged and revised 
to determine their relevance to inquiry as we take note of means and ends. For example, the 
criticism that she favors may be unwelcome during early stages of the development of research 
programs that need to be built up within a community before it can withstand the kind of criticism 
expected. If accepted research legitimizes racist or sexist views, it may affect the growth of 
research countering such conclusions in certain ways including the potential lack of funding, or 
other means of support that would allow it to even get to the table to engage in criticism of accepted 
work. This undermines potential diversity and criticism in the future. This point is essentially made 
by Kourany who argues that for alternative accounts to develop and alter community standards in 
Longino’s ideal community, it will be highly dependent on political societal conditions which are 
by no means guaranteed (Kourany 2010, 62).  
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While there is reason to accept Longino’s point that alternative views should not be 
arbitrarily excluded, and that there needs to be as much criticism as possible, is this a good reason 
to also put all potential theories on an even level? Perhaps just like new theories need time to 
develop before they are criticized, certain theories that can legitimize racism or sexism need to be 
excluded until non-racist and non-sexist attitudes can properly develop both within the scientific 
community and the community at large such that they cannot be easily overwhelmed by lingering 
and stealthy racist/sexist attitudes. Can we put off one form of objectivity today in order to embrace 
it in more stable ways in the future?  
This may be true for Kitcher as well. Under ideal conditions, we would probably not expect 
sexist values to be part of a valid broad scheme or to influence our probative schemes. But short 
of ideal conditions, such values will influence science, and so it might be better to adopt different 
value schemes and different standards of evidence and criticism for certain theories to counter 
research than we might otherwise under ideal conditions. Douglas’ rule that values should be 
banned from playing a direct role at crucial stages of inquiry may not always be necessary. 
Kourany and Clough believe that in many cases such value use can lead to better science, not 
worse. If this is true, then we need to consider how such a rule should function in concrete 
conditions rather than accepting it as an end-in-itself and thus when it may not be wise to apply it.  
One of this chapter’s central aims was to show that justification of approaches to value 
management will depend on the justification for the accounts of values they presume. Another aim 
is to make the case that by not paying sufficient attention to these different accounts of value, we 
don’t notice that competing accounts can be incommensurate. An example of this is found in 
Kourany’s criticisms of Longino’s account. Kourany’s criticism of Longino’s account involves 
the kind of neutrality that it adopts with respect to what kinds of values are welcomed into critical 
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conversations. Recall that Kourany is critical of this idea since it puts feminist values and sexist 
values on the same level; since any value or perspective is to be welcomed, epistemic communities 
even conforming to Longino’s prescribed criteria are not guaranteed to eventually reflect the 
values that Kourany believes are necessary and thus science is not guaranteed to be an aid in the 
fight for women’s equality. Because of this, she rejects Longino’s account (Kourany 2010, 62). 
 Notice, that Kourany’s criticism presumes an account of value where values are not on an 
equal level. Certain values objectively should be adopted, and other values are just biases. 
However, Longino’s conception of values doesn’t permit anything other than neutrality initially. 
All values are potential sources of idiosyncratic bias, and thus we cannot make distinctions 
between acceptable and unacceptable values to use in science without that social criticism. For 
Kourany such an approach is unnecessary since she believes she has identified the values that are 
the source of objectivity and the ones that are bias and thus welcoming all values only leaves the 
door open to biased values having an influence. In other words, Kourany’s criticism of Longino is 
less about her approach to social criticism and more about the conception of values she adopts.  
 Alternatively, consider an objection from Douglas towards Kourany that her approach 
leaves her open to wishful thinking since we may reject a theory that has strong evidence despite 
not being socially successful. However, Kourany distinguishes between values that are justified 
and those that are biased. So, she would reject that the values she favors act as biases or blinders 
just like the value-free ideal. If anything, Kourany points out that the values that she favors lead to 
more objective science (Kourany 2010, 56). If we accept this, then she might have plausible reason 
to deny that science that fails to be socially acceptable can count as objective or could at least 
argue that social failure indicates possible bias. For Douglas, however, any value used directly will 
compete with evidence and can lead us to act according to our biases and blinders, yet Kourany 
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cannot accept this; for her values can act as a gate keeper to prevent the adoption of biased science. 
Thus, disagreement hinges on competing conceptions of value.  
While the values that Kourany favors may be sustainable in an ideal conversation and may 
validly inform a broad scheme of values, the more dogmatic elements of Kourany’s program may 
not conform to Kitcher’s pragmatic naturalism. Alternatively, he and Douglas may disagree over 
using broad schemes of values in a direct role at certain stages. For Kitcher the emphasis on what 
could count as good value judgment serves to block distorting influences in science such as hired 
industrial guns, climate change deniers, and anti-Darwinists. For Douglas, however, even if she 
accepts that some desires are more adequate or justified, it makes no practical difference when it 
comes to their direct usage in certain stages of inquiry; for Kitcher, it makes a huge difference. 
Hence, again competing conceptions of values can leave critics talking past one another.  
Figure 7 
 Longino Kourany Douglas Kitcher 
Broad 
description 
of values 
Preference, 
idiosyncratic  
Prejudices, biases, 
subjective 
OR 
Adequate, objective, 
justified 
Interests, biases, 
blinders, desires, 
wishes, likes, 
preferences, wants 
Desires, value-judgments, 
progressive truths 
“Value” 
meanings  
Valuings, 
generalized ends: 
determine 
choices either 
subjectively or 
inter-
subjectively in 
the adoption of 
background 
assumptions. 
Valuings: determine 
choices, promote 
sexist/racist research 
OR 
Generalized ends: 
inquiry resources, 
determine choices; 
provide standards for 
successful science 
and objectivity. 
Valuings, generalized 
ends:  
act as evidence or 
motivation.  
Indirect uses; inform 
ends-in-view indirectly; 
ensure science is 
morally responsible. 
Valuings, generalized ends, 
valuation: 
Inform ideal conversations, 
provide schemes of values 
to determine choices, 
broadly capture functional 
fitness for conflict 
resolution. 
Primary 
logical 
status(s) in 
inquiry 
Non-
propositional 
impulse/habit, 
propositions 
Non-propositional 
impulse/habit 
OR  
propositions 
Non-propositional 
impulse/habit, 
propositions 
Non-propositional 
impulse/habit, propositions, 
judgments 
This analysis reveals how important the conception of value being used is when it comes 
to defending or criticizing competing approaches to value management, including the value-free 
ideal. As noted in Figure 7, none of the four figures agree on what “value” means. If we can’t agree 
on what we mean by “value,” at a given point, what the functions of different kinds of values are 
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at different stages of inquiry, and what the consequences of using values will be, then there is a 
risk that we will be talking past one another. What are taken to be problems given an account of 
value used by one philosopher are not necessarily problems given the account used by another. 
Thus, each philosopher is entitled to ask for further justification of the other philosophers’ 
conception of value. If a conception of value used to articulate a normative account can’t be, or 
otherwise isn’t, defended and justified, then that normative account suffers.  
What is especially important to keep in mind when we discuss the various logical statuses 
of values among competing conceptions of value is that for some philosophers, values will not 
feature in scientific judgment at all, neither as a proposition in a judgment, nor as a judgment. They 
are physical, not logical. For some philosophers, values will factor within judgment itself such as 
when generalized ends are utilized to determine what theory to adopt or to propose a course of 
action, thus appearing as propositions. If values are only valuings, inquiry is only about finding 
the means to carry out what is valued, such as in the case of a scientist who ignores evidence to 
bring inquiry to a pre-determined end. Valuing behaviorally affects inquiry without figuring within 
in it as a logical component. This is why it may be difficult to determine if valuings are having in 
inappropriate influence. However, if values do function within inquiry they may be true or false, 
or they may be affirmed as useful or not; they can provide reasons and justifications. These are 
radically different ways in which values can influence science, and lack of general agreement on 
what values are suggests different conceptions of what scientific judgment is and how it works.  
4.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analyzed various accounts of how values fit into and should be used in 
science. In doing so, there were over eight distinct concepts associated with values, with over six 
distinct functions they might perform in science. There may be even more distinct concepts 
depending whether we consider concepts like liking, bias, and taste to be distinct. For example, it 
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may be tempting to say that liking something and having a taste for it are the same thing, but as 
Dewey explains taste is something to be cultivated, developed, and formed rather than describing 
arbitrary liking (Dewey 1929, 262). This wide diversity in conceptions of value should give 
philosophers pause when we talk about values in science because it is all but clear whether we are 
talking about the same thing.  
 It should also give us pause if accounts of how values should be used in science rely on 
these conceptions of value for their validity. When the conception of value presumed in many of 
these accounts is traded for my own account, many of the problems and prescriptions for these 
problems no longer follow just as in the case of asking what is the relationship between university-
trained doctors and wishing. Because of this, we must ask why we would use one conception of 
value over another? What justification does each conception provide? Thus, further justification 
will be needed to continue to assert a conception of value, or the prescription will need to be 
qualified or revised.  
When compared to the account developed in the last two chapters, a common theme 
emerges. Many tend to underemphasize the notion of value as valuation; values are often discussed 
as mere valuings or they are discussed as general conceptions; both act as their own form of value 
judgment in determining what we should do. Because of this, accounts tend to focus on the worry 
about the use of values either because general values will be applied inappropriately or 
dogmatically, thus undermining scientific integrity, or because employing values means that 
science will be a biased, prejudiced, or idiosyncratic pursuit of conclusions simply because they 
are liked, thus undermining scientific integrity. However, these apparent problems arise because 
valuation is underemphasized and underdeveloped in these accounts, but it is valuation which 
specifically requires paying attention to the concrete conditions of value usage and the adequacy 
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of a course of action in a particular inquiry (and thus the potential for undermining the reliability 
of scientific results) that can help maintain scientific integrity. As a result, values are treated as 
having their own meaning and justification, as independent or antecedent to inquiry rather than 
being developed within it. This intrusion of values into an inquiry creates competition when 
considering evidence and thus creates a problem. Hence, their incursion requires management. It 
should not be a surprise that Kitcher’s emphasis on value judgment does not lead him to the same 
conclusion, and I will address this in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 5: Experimental Value Formation 
In the previous chapter, I considered numerous approaches to value management and determined 
that none of these accounts share the same conception of value despite the fact that the conception 
of value adopted has a significant influence on arguments about how values should be used in 
science. In examining Kitcher’s account I suggested that value management involves the idea that 
values have a meaning and justification independent of the inquiry that they are being used for, 
and that a different approach may yield an alternative to value management. This chapter will fulfil 
the purpose of this dissertation and develop such an alternative that I will call experimental value 
formation. Before I do this, however, more needs to be said about how values are treated in 
philosophy of science to demonstrate the difference. First, I will consider the issue of epistemic 
and non-epistemic values and the relationship between values and evidence to demonstrate that 
values are typically conceived of independently of inquiry. I will then present my account of 
experimental value formation as a different approach to thinking about values in science. Next, I 
will evaluate the approach in light of the plausibility of the account of values I have affirmed. I 
will close the chapter and the dissertation by arguing that this approach should be a first step in a 
new direction for research into values in science rather than being a complete program into itself.   
5.1. Values in Philosophy of Science 
Considering the concrete conditions in which values play a role in science reveals some 
troublesome ways in which values are discussed. The first example of this will be the debate 
between epistemic and non-epistemic values, while the second will be the matter of values 
compared to evidence. In the first example the distinction is more complicated than it sometimes, 
but not always, appears, and in the second example when we consider how values and evidence 
interact, it is no longer obvious that they are in strict competition with each other.  
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5.1.2 Epistemic Vs. Non-Epistemic Values 
In Chapter 4, I already considered epistemic and non-epistemic values briefly, however I want to 
return to the issue in more detail. As mentioned, Hugh Lacey’s (and others’) defense of the value-
free ideal depended on a strict demarcation between epistemic and non-epistemic values, while 
critics of the value-free ideal like Helen Longino and Heather Douglas have argued that we cannot 
rely on such a distinction to deny a place for non-epistemic social and moral values in science. I 
will argue that once we pay attention to the various meanings of value I have elaborated, we cannot 
claim that there are inherent differences between epistemic and non-epistemic values, but that 
distinctions could be made for legitimate reasons according to different possible functions such a 
distinction may play in a given inquiry. 
According to Lacey, only what is observed and certified by experiment, independent of our 
desires, value perspectives, cultural and institutional norms, can serve as evidence for scientific 
theories and serve as a basis of theory acceptance (Lacey 1999, 4). He advocates the thesis of 
impartiality which holds that personal, moral, and aesthetic values should play no role in choosing 
a theory (Lacey 1999; 2005). However, cognitive values, which are values about what qualities 
we want our beliefs to have, are necessary for theory acceptance since accepting or rejecting a 
theory is itself a judgment of cognitive value (Lacey 1999, 15).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Lacey’s distinction rests on what the subject matter 
that values pertain to. Cognitive values pertain to desires about beliefs, while other values pertain 
to oneself, people in general, institutions, or art (1999, 27). However, there are other bases upon 
which he makes the distinction. Another way he distinguishes cognitive values is by claiming that 
they are a criterion of cognitive value, that they indicate sound scientific reasoning (1999, 91).  
One of the ways a criterion can manifest cognitive value that Lacy dwells on is if it serves the 
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objectives or aims of science.93 However, for a philosopher like Kourany, who is explicitly urging 
for changing the aims of science, this argument will not be convincing. 
According to Lacey seeking a higher manifestation of a cognitive value cannot be 
incompatible with other cognitive values gaining higher manifestation in that theory. A value that 
seeks consistency with biblical interpretation cannot be a cognitive value because it clashes with 
manifesting other values like empirical adequacy (Lacey 2005, 66). He also adds that if the 
historical record demonstrated that a method of trying to manifest social values in theories 
furthered the aims of science, the need for a distinction between cognitive and social values would 
not be necessary (2005, 68). However, he clearly does not believe this to be the case. I, however, 
reject the notion that valuation is about the manifestation of a general end, so the principle of the 
distinction is not one I would subscribe to. 
There are additional arguments Lacey presents, but I won’t address them all. Instead, I 
want to focus on one specific argument. Because cognitive values do not require a conception of 
a good life or what is a good society like we find in other kinds of values, they can function 
impartially. Different social and personal values are only differences rather than disagreements, 
owing to different relative conceptions of good lives and good societies, presumably making them 
more idiosyncratic (2005, 52). However, differences in epistemic values like whether to favor 
accuracy, simplicity, or fruitfulness “are disagreements, not simply matters of taste” (2005, 53). 
However, as we have learned from previous chapters, one could value and operationalize general 
                                                          
93 I don’t wish to address this at length because it would become a distraction from my original point, but one such 
criterion that he considers a cognitive value is pursuing science according to materialist strategies which is defined 
in terms of seeking out explanations of natural phenomena in terms of underlying laws, structures, or processes in 
a way disassociated from any link with values, human lives, or social arrangements (Lacey 2005, 69). As he notes, a 
materialist strategy borrows from a materialist metaphysics. However, such a view presumes a fact-value 
distinction, and as I discuss from Putnam’s work, fact-value distinctions presume some kind of metaphysical world 
view.  
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epistemic ends in a “subjective” or idiosyncratic way, while the notion that personal values are 
merely personal and thus not capable of empirical disagreement is faulty.  
Unlike Lacey who seeks a hard distinction, other philosophers undermine distinctions 
between cognitive and non-cognitive values, and their accounts reveals other ways in which 
distinctions could be made. While philosophers like Longino and Douglas are correct in pointing 
out we cannot make sharp distinctions between epistemic and non-epistemic values, their 
arguments require further analysis. Recall that Longino argues that epistemic values are values 
that are supposed to be conductive to truth, while non-epistemic values are political and social in 
nature. In presenting her argument, she states “My aim is […] to cast doubt on the very idea of a 
cognitive value or virtue, where we mean by that a quality of theories, models, or hypotheses that 
can serve independently of context as a universally applicable criterion of epistemic worth” 
(Longino 1996, 42). This is already contentious because it isn’t clear why a quality must be 
independent of context to be conducive to truth. If we detangle “value” as a generalized end from 
“value” as a judgment, then general values are to be intelligently adopted based on the contextual 
end-in-view, so the conclusion that a value is contextual instead of universal isn’t a ground for 
concluding that we cannot distinguish between cognitive and non-cognitive values. In fact, other 
philosophers don’t rely on the universality versus contextuality demarcation at all for their 
distinction; Steel has argued that different cognitive values can depend on context, so long as they 
promote the attainment of truth in the context of their use (Steel 2010, 20). Lacey also does not 
make the distinction on the basis of contextuality (Lacey 1999, 213). 
Longino’s argument demonstrates that it is not the case that there are certain sets of values 
that only promote truth and do not have social and political valence, while others have such valence 
and do not promote truth. However, it isn’t clear why she (although others too are guilty of this) 
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treats “non-cognitive” and “politically and socially” as synonymous. Longino’s argument suggests 
that we can’t always contrast the cognitive with the social and political, not that we can’t contrast 
general ends that (generally) promote truth with those that do not. 
Similarly, Douglas argues that “The main argument for the porousness (and thus failure) 
of the epistemic/nonepistemic distinction is that epistemic values end up reflecting the 
nonepistemic values of the day” (Douglas 2009, 90). Social and cultural values can inform 
epistemic decisions, thus acting as epistemic values allowing for “smuggling the non-epistemic 
values through the boundary.” She explains, “how one interprets a cognitive value such as 
simplicity may well be influenced by socially structured aesthetic values, values that help one 
interpret and recognize simplicity” (2009, 91). Further, she questions whether epistemic values are 
reasons on their own to accept a theory since simplicity in a complex world won’t provide truth.  
Both sets of objections have limitations. Just because a value is socially informed does not 
mean that it can’t be conducive to truth, and once we detangle general values from valuations, then 
a value like simplicity, while not being a reason-in-itself to believe a theory is true, can be 
conducive to truth at least some of the time. If epistemic value is defined as being conducive to 
truth, then in various circumstances, certain values will definitely be conducive to truth while 
others will definitely not. It may be that when accepted theories rely on sexist biases and thus have 
gaps in data, novelty may be clearly a cognitive value since it suggests we look to new theories 
that may not have gaps in that case while consistency will not. And, as we noted from Lepley’s 
discussion in Chapter 2, epistemic values may have a better track record of being empirically 
verifiable than values used in ethics.94  
                                                          
94 I’m not suggesting a loyalty to traditional epistemic values here. Certain traditionally discussed values may be 
very unreliable. Although, recall Lepley’s point that this is not evidence of fixed difference, but a matter of testing 
possibilities and sophistication of said testing. 
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This last point highlights the potential functions that different values can have when it 
comes to categorizing them as being epistemic or non-epistemic. If a scientist invokes a value 
(whether it is traditionally categorized as epistemic or not) with the explicit purpose of preserving 
or promoting social ends while taking no interest in the actual truth, then the value is functioning 
clearly as a non-epistemic value. Alternatively, even if social, ethical, or aesthetic habits inform 
our understanding of a value, it may still function as epistemic if it is being affirmed because it is 
believed it will be conducive to truth. Or, when we consider Longino’s objection, any value can 
have politically and socially relevant consequences, so we may wish to ask if those consequences 
are relevant to our categorization. For example, invocation of a value may yield social or political 
consequences, but that doesn’t mean that it was functioning that way as part of the end-in-view of 
the judgement being made at the time.  
The epistemic function of consistency is that it can help conserve data and hypotheses that 
may save time and render problems more determinate. By contrast, it can serve a social function 
when it endorses the status quo and can legitimate gender oppression while novelty will seek to 
end gender oppression (Longino 1996, 51-2). However, by claiming that a consequence of 
adopting consistency is that it may legitimize gender oppression, it does not follow that that the 
value was functioning as a social value in the inquiry in which it was adopted, but rather it could 
be an unfortunate side effect. Whether we want to consider such consequences or not in how we 
categorize values may vary depending on what our purposes are at the time.  
Notice that Longino undermines the distinction to argue that socially and politically 
informed values can play a legitimate role in theory and background assumption choice, while 
Douglas undermines the distinction to sully the idea that any value should play a direct role in 
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theory choice. However, Douglas also distinguishes between cognitive values and “epistemic 
criteria” and thus introduces another potential distinction.  
Steel defines an epistemic value as one which promotes the attainment of truth, however 
he distinguishes between intrinsically epistemic values whose quality if attained constitutes the 
attainment of truth, and extrinsically epistemic values which promote the attainment of truth 
without being an indicator or a requirement of truth (Steel 2010, 18). He includes internal (logical) 
consistency and empirical accuracy as intrinsic. This is similar to Douglas who argues that there 
are certain criteria that science must meet to be acceptable, or minimal criteria that would indicate 
a problem if they were lacking (Douglas 2013, 799). She identifies internal consistency and 
predictive competence (but not precision) as such criteria. Since these values operate as minimal 
requirements which exclude theories that do not possess them, she claims these “are less like values 
and more like criteria that all theories must succeed in meeting” (Douglas 2009, 94). However, 
Steel doesn’t believe that her characterization of criteria warrants denying the label “epistemic 
value” (Steel 2010, 25).  
I am inclined to agree since what these criteria mean in practice is prescribing certain 
operations for promoting certain consequences in inquiry, namely a reliable theory. An 
inconsistent theory which only serves to frustrate inquiry is deemed bad on that basis. Thus, 
consistency would inform the end-in-view for inquiry just as any other valued quality. 
Nevertheless, we may follow Douglas and Steel and affirm that one way to distinguish epistemic 
values is that they are required for truth.  
However, I don’t believe that this means that they are free from social tinge either. Even a 
minimal standard of epistemic competence could admit social and moral influences given theory-
ladeness of observation. If one accepts Longino’s account, then even just determining capacity for 
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predictive competency would require background assumptions. In addition, Kevin Elliot (2013) 
and Miriam Solomon (2001) have pointed out that what is meant by calling a theory accurate or 
competent can vary. While Douglas characterizes predictive competency as a minimal benchmark 
to determine “close enough” plausibility, what might count as plausible may depend on the 
purposes of the scientist whose models represent aspects of the world. A theory may be known to 
be literally wrong, yet still competent for its intended purpose as previously discussed. As Lacey 
points out, “close enough” or “good enough” judgments are value judgments (Lacey 2005, 61). 
Thus, while we may distinguish the value as being epistemic in the sense it may be required for 
truth, it still may not be clearly distinguishable in that it is independent of social or ethical 
considerations.  
Steel’s idea of extrinsic epistemic values echoes my point that whether a value will count 
as epistemic can vary by context as they can be “contextual in the sense that their capacity to 
promote the attainment of truth depends on occurring within a specific set of circumstances […] 
what is truth promoting and what is not can depend on the actual state of the world” (Steel 2010, 
20). Because a value only needs to be truth promoting, it doesn’t have to be non-social either. As 
he notes, “Both epistemic and non-epistemic values can be and typically are social” (2010, 23).  
So, to summarize, values are not distinguished from each other by being logically distinct. 
As I argued in Chapter 3, they are all judgments of practice. We cannot sharply distinguish values 
from each other, but that doesn’t mean that we should abandon distinctions altogether. As Putnam 
pointed out in the work discussed in Chapter 3, we can abandon dualisms but that does not mean 
denying that there is any sense in distinctions (Putnam 2004, 10). Whether we want to call a value 
epistemic or non-epistemic is ultimately a logical question about what ways of distinguishing 
 
 
243 
 
values aids us in a given inquiry. It is not a matter of the inherent nature of values themselves to 
be epistemic or not.  
For example, we may distinguish epistemic values, as Lepley might suggest, on the basis 
that certain values are more verified in science than others. We may distinguish epistemic and non-
epistemic values based on consequences they may produce when acted upon. We may distinguish 
an epistemic value if it can ever be useful in promoting truth, or if we invoke it solely for its 
epistemic functions without regard to social consequences. We may distinguish a value as 
epistemic, as Douglas or Steel might, if it is necessary for truth. A value may count as epistemic 
or as non-epistemic depending on the criteria used and the function it performs, and this is fine so 
long as we note the reasons for its distinction, and we don’t fall into essential or absolute 
taxonomies. The epistemic versus non-epistemic value debate can in some cases hinge on thinking 
these values have an essential meaning independent of inquiry and this analysis reveals the 
importance of thinking about how values are formed and used within inquiry to make distinctions. 
5.1.3 Values Vs. Evidence 
 One of the ways in which values present a danger to science is when they are portrayed as 
conflicting with evidence. It is common enough to hear that “values should not trump evidence,” 
or, when values are implicitly linked to prejudice, that “prejudice should not trump evidence.” But 
what is actually meant in these cases? One meaning suggested is that values act as, or instead of, 
evidence. Haack mentions the concern that when values are used they, not the weight of evidence, 
determine what theories to accept, and that values “constitute evidence” (Haack 1993, 34-5). 
Likewise, Douglas characterizes direct usages of values as cases where values act like evidence or 
“compete” with evidence, becoming a reason in themselves to adopt a claim. In cases like this a 
theory or conclusion is adopted solely because the scientist wants the claim to be true or values 
the claim being true. The issue is not about a choice being wrong but is whether it is what we want 
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(Douglas, 2009, 96). This might take the form of “I like X, therefore X is true.” If values cannot 
act as evidence then relying on them risks supplanting evidence with the desire for theories that 
better support one’s social values (de Melo-Martin and Intemann 2016, 514). 
 That is one characterization. In another, values work against evidence, not because they act 
as evidence, but because they constrain it by biasing it or ruling it out. Hudson refers to values 
justifying one’s choice of evidence and the illegitimacy of this (Hudson 2016, 171). Wilholt 
discusses values operating as preference biases to increase the likelihood of a preferred outcome 
rather than outright fabrication. Outcomes can be declared irrelevant, attributed to alternate cases, 
or declared insufficient (Wilholt 2008, 93). One example includes industry funded studies into 
Bisphenol A whose toxicity is associated with its similarities to estrogen. Some studies used rats 
who were insensitive to estrogen yet omitted that this could have affected their conclusions (2008, 
93). It’s likely that in these cases values operate implicitly, unlike in the first set where if the value 
alone is used to make the choice, it is likely to be a conscious decision. This might take the form, 
“When we consider the evidence that really matters, X is true.” 
 Finally, values interact with, although not necessarily constrain, evidence by coming into 
use when there is no decisive evidence to choose between competing theories. In comparing 
empirical support for two competing explanations of physical and cognitive human behavior, a 
linear-hormonal model and the selectionist model, the decision could be made on the basis of 
political and social interests served by reinforcing gender dimorphism. Or, in the time of 
Copernicus, choice between a geocentric or heliocentric model could be made based on whether 
one favored simplicity or consistency with other established theories (Hudson 2016, 169). This 
position is that of Neurath with his auxiliary motives being used to determine choice, and more 
recently by Steel whose values-in-science approach allows non-epistemic values to influence 
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choices only when epistemic values fail to indicate a best option (Steel and Whyte 2012, 170). 
Even this approach sets up a conflicting tendency between values and evidence since it suggests 
that the more evidence we have the less values should be used (Biddle 2013, 130). 
Underdetermination arguments thus presume a sharp separation of evidence and values.  
These are three significant ways in which values are considered to be in conflict with 
evidence. However, there are two problems with thinking that values conflict with evidence. The 
first is that it tends to view evidence and values as completely distinct logical or ontological entities 
whose nature is fixed independent of context, after all we must return to the lesson from the 
previous chapter and ask what is meant by “value” in each context. As Lynn Hankinson Nelson 
points out a naturalistic account of evidence should assume no pre-theoretic standard of what 
evidence is prior to investigations to explain and predict what we experience (Nelson 1993, 173). 
Assuming such a position, we could not presume that values and evidence are essentially distinct. 
As previously mentioned, according to the holistic account she develops, sociological or political 
claims or theories can constitute evidence for a theory and feminist scientists have demonstrated 
this (Nelson 1995, 405).95  
Kristen Intemann and Inmaculada de Melo-Martin deny the assumption that values are 
always extraevidentiary.  As discussed in the previous chapter, determining what constitutes an 
impact or a side effect requires a value judgment, and these determine what counts as evidence. 
Concepts like “ecological restoration,” “sustainability,” or “healthy forests” require values 
regarding what we consider important to protect and what is central to environmental flourishing. 
Evidence that gray wolves are in decline rests on the concern about the continued existence of gray 
wolves, the existence of “pure” gray wolves that are not interbred with coyotes, or the presence of 
                                                          
95 Nelson discusses this at length in case studies such as studies in neuroendocrinology (See Nelson 1995, 410-415). 
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gray wolves in a particular ecosystem (de Melo-Martin and Intemann 2016, 514-5). Given this 
they note, “In such cases, it is incorrect to see contextual values ‘trumping’ or ‘supplanting’ 
epistemic considerations” (2016, 216). 
A second problem with the idea of a conflict is that this may not best reflect how values 
and evidence logically interact and thus it can be misleading. We do not “judge” that a theory is 
good because it embodies simplicity. We may impulsively favor simplicity, but we judge simple 
theories as ends-in-view in concrete situations, and thus values and evidence work into an 
integrated judgment of practice.  
Given the account of judgments of practice affirmed in Chapter 3, we can acknowledge 
that what counts as evidence is partially based on what value judgments we make. This should not 
be particularly controversial as such value judgments (judgments about what we should do) 
determine what methodologies to use (Douglas 2009), what ontologies to adopt (Longino 2013), 
what ideational conceptions to use (Dewey 1938), what questions to pursue (Kitcher 2001), and 
what background assumptions to make (Longino 1990). These judgments can determine how we 
group together what we experience and filter those experiences into a form that is useful for 
inquiry. Nelson argues that on a naturalistic account, scientific theories make use of large systems 
of theories, practices, and standards and that these serve as evidence for a theory (Nelson 1993, 
180). In practice this means that values, common sense ideas, and political beliefs can all serve as 
evidence, so we should “not erect artificial boundaries between politics and science” (1993, 183). 
Alternatively, my account of values suggests that our value judgments should be determined by 
what evidence we can bring to bear in making a choice. Evidence should influence what we value, 
but what more can be said about how values and evidence interact? 
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One useful model for thinking about the relationship between evidence and values can be 
found by considering Dewey’s account of the relationship between facts and ideas and their 
resulting logical entanglements (Dewey 1938, 112). He argues that the relationship between facts 
and ideas should be understood as operational in nature, with each playing a functional role in 
inquiry. Perceptual and conceptual materials (facts and ideas) are “instituted in functional 
correlativity with each other,” where facts locate and describe a problem, while ideas represent 
possible solutions (1938, 111). Our account of the facts of the case will inspire ideas, and as those 
ideas are tested, they direct us towards new perceptions and the revision of our understanding and 
the collection of new facts. The facts and our ideas begin as tentative and are tested and checked 
against each other until, as inquiry progresses towards an answer, they begin to become firmer (or 
if inquiry doesn’t progress, we may realize that we may have to start over with a new understanding 
of the facts and consider new ideas to test them) (1938, 113-4). 
I believe that we can use this account to model the relationship between evidence and 
values in science by considering their operational functions. The function of value judgments is to 
determine what operations and which ideas we should adopt and thus the criteria by which 
experience is organized in to facts and facts are organized into evidence. In other words, facts 
become, through value judgments (as discussed in Chapter 3), facts of the case. These facts of the 
case become the evidence of final judgment; the fact would not be evidence without the valuation. 
Much of this depends on how the problem is defined. As Dewey notes, “The way in which the 
problem is conceived decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; 
what data are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of 
hypotheses and conceptual structures” (1938, 108). Thus, affirming that a problem is adequately 
defined will determine what counts as evidence. The function of evidence is to test and allow for 
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revisions to our ideas and previous judgments; these direct us towards new operations requiring 
new value judgments. These judgments must be based on and tested by evidence. Like ideas and 
facts, values and evidence are “checked by their capacity to work together to introduce a resolved 
unified situation” (i.e. attain warranted assertability) (1938, 111). Values and evidence thus work 
as an evidentiary-evaluative circuit. This model is useful because it also reminds us that neither 
evidence nor values are determinate independent of inquiry but become determinate within it.  
Just like facts and ideas, what we count as evidence and what we value or deem valuable 
will likely begin as tentative, until mutual correlative logical operations make the determination of 
what facts are facts of the case, and what we ought to value become more determinate. As Nelson 
points out, standards of evidence emerge within processes through which we generate knowledge 
(Nelson 1993, 181). In philosophical discussion of values and evidence, this functional division 
complicates the narrative. Values as valuations (not mere valuings96) can no longer be placed at 
the margins where evidence is insufficient, but we should also not consider either to take priority 
or even that they need to be at odds with each other. As we attain new evidence, this should reflect 
new value judgments, and as we make new value judgments, we alter what counts as evidence in 
inquiry (what propositions to affirm) so that it directs us in our operations taken towards attaining 
warranted assertability. Neither evidence nor values should be thought as determinate independent 
of inquiry, and we should resist the temptation to think of evidence has having self-sufficient 
character which we merely record, but rather think of it as the outcome of a refining process. Recall 
from Chapter 2, experience is not given; it is taken. Dewey characterizes it with an analogy: “The 
man who is making a boat will give wood a form which it did not have, in order that it may serve 
the purposes to which it is to be put. Thinking may then be supposed to give its material the form 
                                                          
96 Mere valuing as impulsive or habitual decisions can of course lead to behavior like ignoring or dismissing 
evidence. 
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which will make it amenable to its purpose—attaining knowledge, or, as it is ordinarily put, going 
from the unknown to the known” (MW 8: 66). This model also helps us remember that values are 
not terminal responses but develop within contextual situations. 
One objection to this approach is that it seems like there are obvious cases were values do 
trump evidence, even if we don’t consider it problematic. For example, ethical codes of conduct 
and rules governing ethical experimentation seem to rule out all kinds of potential evidence that 
could be collected. However, it is important that we remember that in problem solving adjustments 
that the problem itself is not determinate from the beginning. If ethical considerations do alter what 
we consider acceptable practice, it is judged that in the long run practicing science in an ethically 
unacceptable way will only frustrate the ends of inquiry given the backlash and this leads to a 
reformulation of the problem as we understand it, namely to seek answers in an ethical manner. 
Because the problem itself is reformulated in this way, certain kinds of facts are not relevant to the 
problem being addressed (as facts of the case). In other words, unethically collected facts are not 
relevant to the problem as formulated and so again this is an example of evidence and values being 
formulated in correlation with each other rather than two pre-determinate and opposing factors.  
 This model echoes the point made in Chapter 3 which is that science requires values, not 
merely because sometimes evidence doesn’t add up, but because propositions are never purely 
descriptive. They are affirmed in functional correlation with other propositions suggesting a course 
of action as a means of forming an end-in-view and a final judgment. Valuation is, thus, far more 
common than we may realize. For example, in writing this chapter I had to constantly evaluate 
how simplistic or complex to make my explanations, a judgment that will be verified or not based 
on whether how well it is understood.97 In philosophy of science it is easy to focus on big decisions 
                                                          
97 I hope my judgments are correct.  
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that come along once we get stuck regarding what to do with competing or insufficient evidence, 
but I propose that we consider a more “micro model” for thinking about values. I am not claiming 
that there is an essential difference between “big” decisions and little ones, but that value 
judgments are commonly made but not “seen” throughout the process of inquiry. This micro model 
is in keeping with the account of practical judgment discussed in Chapter 3 where I argued that all 
inquiry just is a series of practical judgments, and thus valuations, from the affirmation of various 
propositions to delimit the problem and determine what is relevant to a potential solution, to 
determinations of the best operations to undertake, and finally the judgment itself as it is asserted. 
 Consider the example of the development of electron microscopy and early attempts to 
photograph mitochondria. Beginning in the 1940’s rival interpretations of the internal structure 
found in such micrographs were established, with American scientists holding that the inner 
membrane form ridges called cristae that do not divide the body, while the Swiss held that lamellae 
do close off the body and are not attached to the bounding membrane (Rasmussen 1995, 401). The 
American interpretation held that their findings were compatible with biochemistry yet removed 
all potential conflict between the evidence from electron microscopy and biochemistry by limiting 
their conclusions to topography and not by attempting to determine membrane composition using 
microscopy. In contrast, the Swedish approach favored the use of higher resolutions and 
interpreting the micrographs purely visually with more emphasis placed on accurate measurement. 
By measuring the best micrographs, they believed they could deduce molecular architecture. When 
disagreement began to focus on sample preparation techniques, the Swiss team argued the 
American interpretation produced flawed images since it relied on sample preparation techniques 
that could damage structure, despite the same protocol also being used by biochemists. The 
Swedish interpretation was able to challenge established biochemistry. However, despite no 
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biochemical argument to refute the second interpretation, biochemists favored the American 
interpretation and it is now the dominant view (1995, 420).  
 It is tempting to see a case like this as an example of two competing positions with neither 
having definitive evidence and being decided in the end by some value like external consistency. 
Nicholas Rasmussen points to the social factors of the “political dimensions” of the relationship 
between biochemists and the proponents of the American interpretation which “stabilized the 
decision” on structure and their means for arriving at it as orthodox (1995, 419). However, it is 
important to remember that these competing results followed only as a result of a multitude of 
value judgments giving rise to the protocols for imaging. For example, the development of a 
fixative process for samples using osmium was “judged best partly because it gave appearances 
[…] where mitochondria are narrow […] [the] recipe was established as reliable on the assumption 
that nucleus and cytoplasm should appear homogeneous, which can be assessed in living cells 
using visible light only to a limited degree, and that anything larger than the narrowest 
mitochondria represents swelling” (1995, 388). This value judgment about the relevance of the 
narrowness of the mitochondria determined what would be called evidence.  
 Additional examples of how judgments of relevance determined what counted as evidence 
can be found in competing approaches to fixation. The Swedish team’s process focused on 
producing samples as quickly as possible from recently living tissue and carefully adjusting the 
physiological levels of salt and pH. This judgment was based on the idea that the best fixative is 
the one that would leave the specimen with a maximum organization according to the epistemic 
principle that there is more order in a living than a fixed specimen (1995, 409). The American 
team did not consider this relevant as they believed that fixed and unfixed specimens differ, and 
this cast doubt on the value of precise measurements from electron micrographs for reaching 
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biochemical conclusions (1995, 408). Thus, differing judgments about the relevance of facts 
altered what would be counted as evidence of what. In the dispute, “there was a basic question 
about what the rules should be—that is, a fundamental disagreement on how well micrographs 
needed to be made, and how to use them properly as evidence” (1995, 407).  
What we should draw from this limited account of the various decisions and judgments 
that were made to even produce the first two sets of micrographs and their interpretations is that 
final judgments came about as a result of minor judgments made to establish protocols for the 
emerging practice of electron microscopy. What came to be called evidence was a product of 
several value judgments, and any final or overall judgment cannot be completely distinguished 
from them even if they may not be in the foreground. What it does show is that various facts (such 
as the thinness of mitochondria in an image) informed various value judgments which then 
reinforced the importance of other facts and eventually what would be called evidence. This 
suggests that value judgments and evidence are not conceptually distinct, and that valuation occurs 
throughout inquiry. Thus, again we should hesitate to think of values as being determinate external 
to inquiry, but rather formed and made determinate within it.  
5.2. Experimental Value Formation 
As I have discussed in the previous section, when it comes to the matters of categorizing values or 
considering the potential for conflict between values and evidence, we must pay careful attention 
to the ways in which values are formed and used within inquiry rather than making sweeping 
abstract generalizations and a priori claims. Whether a value (as what is valued, generally 
prescribed, or as evaluated) will count as epistemic or will pull against evidence will depend on 
context, not upon the inherent nature of values themselves.  Thus, we should resist the temptation 
to think of values as having a determinate meaning antecedent to inquiry. This already addresses, 
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or rather points to ways to reconsider, problems that values can pose for science. What about other 
problems that tend to arise when considering values in science?  
 In the previous chapter, I considered an entire array of ways that values can play a role in 
science. As discussed in this and previous chapters, there are some obvious ways that values can 
be problematic when used in science. There is the direct approach where valuings drive what 
conclusions are reached. This might take the form of “I like result X, therefore X.” There also 
cases where a general value may be employed that would override other considerations and would 
be employed where there is no guarantee that theories that embody them are more likely to be true, 
and in fact it may be more likely to lead to falsehood. This would take the form of “Simplicity, 
therefore X” or “Egalitarianism, therefore X.” There are also more subtle ways in which values 
can have an impact, where the value itself never appears as a proposition in inquiry but does affect 
the behavior of the inquirer in a way that leads to ignoring or cherry-picking evidence to reach a 
desired conclusion. These are cases of implicit biases and could be informed by likings or habitual 
responses to affect background assumptions, function to weigh the sufficiency of evidence, 
provide standards of social success, distort truth, compete with evidence, be dogmas, be well 
regarded decision vectors, be epistemic aids, and so on. 
 What is an effective way to limit the possibilities of values having this kind of influence? 
I believe that the common element in most of these problems lies with treating values as having 
predeterminate meaning and quality antecedent to inquiry. For example, the idea that a scientist 
would decide to warp, distort, or ignore evidence because they want to obtain a conclusion that 
they like, suggests the use of value as valuing, where what is valued is determined regardless of 
what comes up in inquiry. This means that the value has a predeterminate meaning and quality and 
the process of inquiry itself wouldn’t affect what is valued such that it wouldn’t be altered by the 
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evidence collected. If a scientist decides to adopt a theory based on some generalized epistemic or 
social end, there is a similar logical quality to the decision; inquiry is brought to a predeterminate 
end according to a value that has a predeterminate meaning and quality antecedent to inquiry itself. 
In either case, because of impulse, habit, or because the end is set up as an end-in-itself, inquiry 
becomes a matter of pursuing a fixed end which renders inquiry less intelligent and less reasonable.  
 Dewey makes the point that fixed habits, rules, principles, and ends are opposed to 
experimentation since their purpose is to provide a sense of security in the form of certainty 
whereas an experimental approach requires indeterminacy (Dewey 1922, 237). Recall that 
valuation takes place where the value of something is indeterminate; that is, we cannot say from 
the beginning that there is a fixed value of something and thus we need to experiment by testing 
the consequences that various kinds of actions are likely to produce to determine what the value 
of various options are relative to each other. When an impulse or habit becomes fixed it “overrides 
all competitors and secures itself as the sole right of way […] Then choice is arbitrary, 
unreasonable” (1922, 193). Alternatively, “principles treated as fixed rules instead of as helpful 
methods take men away from experience” (1922, 238). 
 Fixed habits and impulses won’t allow for adaptation, and fixed principles leads us away 
from facts and reality. Thus, the solution to prevent (or limit the likelihood) of this, is to ensure 
that ends do not have a predetermined value and quality fixed prior to inquiry; values must be 
indeterminate and thus be formed and revised within inquiry by consideration of evidence and 
concrete conditions. We must therefore encourage mature valuation. When ends are not pursued 
as ends-in-themselves but are evaluated as ends-in-view we must evaluate various ends by 
considering concrete conditions. So, if a general value frustrates our aims within inquiry, we don’t 
adopt a theory merely because it happens to embody it. When the value of some prizing is 
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indeterminate, we must consider the evidence at hand that speaks against it. When we deliberate 
reasonably, the end-in-view adopted is one that “stimulates by unifying, harmonizing, different 
competing tendencies […] not in their original form, but in a ‘sublimated’ fashion […] making 
eliminations and recombinations in projecting a course of possible activity” (1922, 195). This kind 
of valuation and re-evaluation requires intelligent consideration, and it is what makes it less likely 
that a valued end will run roughshod over evidence and will lead to the adoption of a theory merely 
because something is valued.  
 Because values in such a process are indeterminate at the beginning of inquiry, the value 
ultimately settled on is one that forms within inquiry through experimental means and 
considerations, rather than being formed antecedent to inquiry. I believe that this model will limit 
or avoid the problematic influences of values in science and should change how we think about 
the influence of values in science. This brings us back to our discussion of Kitcher in the previous 
chapter. Recall that for Kitcher, schemes of values form, reform, and are shaped by inquiry as a 
process. Values are part of the process of inquiry and so “everything depends on the character of 
the value-judgments made” and so the problem shifts to what makes for good value judgment. 
Values should not be “tacked on as an afterthought” to science. 
 I think what Kitcher is suggesting is that we should shift our focus away from thinking of 
science and values as distinct concepts and instead focus on how values are formed within and 
play a logical role in scientific inquiry. If I am right about this interpretation, then this is something 
other than value management since the focus is not on “managing” something distinct from science 
which represents a problem, and instead is a fundamental shift in focus in how we think about the 
logic of science and how valuation plays a role. Philosophers of science are too focussed on values 
as ends, that is as desired ends or general ends, and should shift their focus to an approach that 
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addresses on how value judgments are formed in concrete conditions. I call this approach 
experimental value formation. The idea behind this approach is that (1) that most of the obvious 
ways in which values can be problematic in scientific cases are when a scientist out of impulse or 
habit either uses a value as a valuing or follows a general end as an end-in-itself instead of engaging 
in valuation within inquiry, (2) that the key to objectivity is more valuation not less, (3) that 
valuation is already inherent to scientific practice, and (4) considering how values can be 
successfully formed within successful science allows us to model the best kinds of values and 
value judgments to use in science and in the most appropriate ways. It is also a project focussing 
on melioration of value judgments rather than prescribing fixed rules, ideals, or criteria.   
 My hypothesis is that so long as scientists are engaging in mature valuation within inquiry 
rather than merely following impulse, habit, or general end, if they are intelligently considering a 
course of action as an end-in-view, then most of the problems associated with values in science 
are not as likely to arise. A scientist who values a certain conclusion, for example, will not blindly 
insist on that conclusion despite any evidence that arises just because they happen to value it. Nor 
will they begin to dismiss or distort evidence in ways that couldn’t be defended and deemed an 
adequate response. This is because it is to be expected that what a scientist values should be 
modified as inquiry progresses, and the scientist must weigh the value of pursuing certain ends 
against the potential means involved like fundamentally distorting the facts of the case.  
 In addition to Kitcher, there are some philosophers of science who have moved in this 
direction. As discussed, Elizabeth Anderson urges this kind of shift. She points out, for instance, 
that “the time has come to rethink […] models of the relations between values and hypotheses,” 
certain models like underdetermination arguments do not “help us evaluate the different ways that 
values might be deployed in inquiry” (Anderson 2004, 2). As cited in the previous chapter she 
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notes that the undertheorization of value judgments has impeded the development of criteria to 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of values in science. The problem, as she describes it, 
is that traditional arguments for the inclusion of values in science sees values as an exogenous 
influence on theory choice and take value judgments for granted and has “impeded the 
development of criteria to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of values in science” (2004, 
3). As recounted, she argues that value judgments are taken to have a dogmatic character because 
they are not empirical. If, however, value judgments are formed in respect to available evidence, 
they “can be integrated into scientific theorizing without making it dogmatic” (2004, 2).  
 Lynn Hankinson Nelson has argued for the importance of scrutinizing value claims as a 
means to objectivity. She establishes the fact that value claims are already a part of scientific 
inquiry as scientists bring their values to the laboratory (Nelson 1990, 306). She also argues that 
when values are subjected to empirical control, it is clear that not all values are equally defensible 
(1990, 308). The notion that inclusion of values leads to relativism, she claims, rests on the 
assumption that there are no grounds for evaluating values and no alternative understanding of 
objectivity than value-freedom. Failure to be upfront about our values and to thus to scrutinize 
them is dangerous. She notes, “If values remain separated from what we can ascertain about how 
things are, if we advocate or praise them or adopt them without reference to what we come to 
know about how thing are, there’s nothing ‘objective’ about them. If left unevaluated, they become 
incorporated into the content of science, and then ideology has a field day” (1990, 134). She urges 
that we accept science as value laden to make sense of scientific practice: “Scrutinizing and 
evaluating the values, political and otherwise, incorporated in our approaches to human and 
nonhuman nature, and taking responsibility for their consequences, must, without the assumption 
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of false boundaries, become part and parcel of good scientific practice” (1990, 316). Thus, greater 
valuation is the key to objectivity.  
 Matthew Brown has argued that the idea that evidence leads to objectivity and values 
detract from it is a source of tension in the arguments of opponents of the value-free ideal since 
they favor a lexical priority of evidence over values. Part of the problem with the lexical priority 
of evidence over values, is that it requires a “relatively uncritical stance towards the status of 
evidence within the context of certification, relative to values” (Brown 2013, 836). It is 
problematic to assume that values should only play a role at the margins since we have no a priori 
way to claim that evidence is going to be any more objective than value judgments. Evidence can 
prove to be bad in many ways in that it can be unreliable, noisy, or unrepresentative. Alternatively, 
values can be adopted for good reasons and not be merely a preference. He advocates for “rational 
revisability of evidence and values” where “on this principle, both the production of evidence and 
value formation are recognized as rational but fallible, revisable processes” (2013, 837).  
 There are at least two significant reasons why a scientist, engaging in mature valuation, 
would not engage in the problematic behavior identified by so many philosophers of science. The 
first, as I will discuss further in the following section, is that scientists don’t only consider their 
own idiosyncratic preferences. Kitcher points out that when we deliberate as individuals we are 
already socialized, our patterns of actions are modified, and our dispositions are attuned to the 
broader community (Kitcher 2012, 338). Evidence for this is found in scientific practice as 
scientists make decisions with a view towards the expected response from other scientists in a 
community of “validators,” and they seek their work to be incorporated into ongoing research in 
the community. If a scientist seeks to engage in particularly idiosyncratic valuing and to have this 
be reflected in their final work, it is likely to frustrate them. The second reason is that insisting on 
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certain values come what may is likely going to frustrate research in the long run and make a final 
judgment difficult. For example, if a scientist makes decisions about what theories to accept based 
on its ability to embody a general end rather than using a general end as a suggestive aid in forming 
an end-in-view, then this will also likely prove to be problematic in the long run. If one insists on 
simple theories despite mounting evidence of complexity, this will be harder to defend in the long 
run. If the scientist continues to insist on simple theories then philosophers like Douglas are correct 
in pointing out that wishing, or rather desiring, does not make it so. In other words, valuations as 
judgments of practice of this nature are not going to be warrantedly assertable.  
 It may seem simple, but by incorporating the account of value I have affirmed, we can say 
this when using values in science goes astray: the inquirer made the wrong judgment. This means 
both that the end itself could be bad, but also how it is attained (the means used in inquiry) have 
caused problems. If a given finding is found problematic when subject to criticism, for example, 
if the inquirer finds that their solution did not work out as planned, or when pursuing inquiry in a 
certain way makes finding a true answer more difficult we can say that warranted assertability is 
undermined and we must return to inquiry (Burke 1994, 202). This can suggest that bad value 
judgments were made. Such determinations of what we ought to value can only be determined 
experimentally. Sometimes this will consist of considering or testing various ends-in-view as a 
resolution to a problem in individual situations, and sometimes it will consist of experimenting 
with general approaches across various cases to develop new tools in the form of general ends. But 
in all cases, how we ought to proceed is determined within inquiry on an experimental basis. It 
creates a value that wasn’t there before, and therefore it is experimental value formation.  
 If a scientist maturely considers various courses of proposed action (each of which may be 
valued in some way) to determine what should be valued, it is less likely that they will blindly 
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follow certain ends since it will make it difficult for them to find the truth in the long run. But what 
about the scientist who doesn’t seek to find the truth, but rather only seeks to get others to believe 
as they do? Likely examples include creationist scientists or hired guns of industry who are merely 
seeking to give a conclusion the appearance of legitimacy. It should be noted that in an obvious 
case where no evidence or counter-evidence would affect the conclusion reached and where the 
inquirer isn’t concerned with demonstrating the truth of their claim, then the problem that the 
inquirer is addressing involves science as a means but is not scientific in nature. Thus, while they 
may make some kind of judgment, it isn’t scientific judgment. 
 In value judgments in science, there is just the one final judgment. It will not be distinctly 
social or ethical, nor epistemic. The judgment is a judgment of practice, and it could involve social, 
moral, or epistemic matters that are deemed relevant to the judgment. There will be obvious 
problematic cases like dogma, implicit biases, or habitual responses favoring general ends that are 
less likely to seriously affect inquiry the more we engage in valuation. In these cases, social and 
ethical factors will be problematic if they distort inquiry in the ways just discussed; that is, in cases 
where they replace judgment or where we judge poorly. However, there are still complex cases 
that are less obvious when social and ethical factors could be relevant. There is no obvious a priori 
reason to claim that their inclusion must threaten scientific objectivity. For example, Kristen 
Intemann argues that definitions of clinical depression depend on value judgments because there 
is no consistent correlation between symptoms and biochemical events. To avoid the arbitrary 
lumping of various symptoms into a definition, she points out that the symptoms all impair the 
functions most essential to human flourishing and this is what distinguishes them from the 
common blues. She notes, “determining which functions are central to human flourishing involves 
making value judgments” (Intemann 2001, S509).  
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 Now compare this to Kourany’s example of PMS. In that example, there were no consistent 
definitions of PMS and it included a very large array of symptoms from headaches, depression, 
dizziness, low blood sugar, and so on. Nor was there a consistent account of how severe the 
symptoms had to be. Despite this, it was linked to impaired concentration, physical condition, 
judgment, and efficiency, as well as deviant behavior and diminished moral and legal 
responsibility (Kourany 2010, 50). Kourany argues that in this case, biases in the form of sexism 
and androcentrism led to these definitions. What is relevant is that in a case like this, unlike the 
depression case, is that either there was no careful mature value judgment and instead the definition 
arose from implicit bias, or there was a poor judgment in which case we could point to the problems 
it gave rise to. In the depression case, it is less obvious and seemingly less problematic to weigh 
social and ethical factors in judgment. Of course, the value judgments informing the definition of 
depression could prove problematic as well, but like any judgment, as new evidence comes to 
light, it can be revised.  
 If the more problematic ways in which values affect inquiry will take the form of 
unquestioned and thus absolute likings, implicit biases, or habitual use of general ends despite the 
fact that they may not be likely to lead to successful inquiry, then the best way to avoid these will 
be to make sure that mature valuation takes place. To reiterate a point by Dewey, when a general 
conception is taken for granted it can remain implicit, unstated, or propositionally formulated in 
such a way that it becomes static instead of functional and this is a “death warrant” for inquiry in 
that they can be obstructive to new lines of investigation (Dewey 1938, 507). If valued ends lead 
to the consequences philosophers of science worry about, deliberation is the key to avoiding them. 
This is because deliberation, as a process of valuation, involves blocking “efficient overt action” 
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that would flow from habits or impulses and then experimenting by considering what various lines 
of action would be like if acted upon (Dewey 1922, 190).  
 Through the formation of various ends-in-view we are then in a position to give meaning 
to potential courses of action, including those that would likely aid or frustrate our scientific aims. 
Like Intemann’s example, sometimes social and ethical factors will aid, and like Kourany’s 
example, sometimes it will frustrate these aims. Above all, however, “All deliberation is a search 
for a way to act, not for a final terminus” (1922, 193). Thus, its aim is to avoid fixed ends and this 
makes it crucial to scientific objectivity. Since, as I have already argued, valuation is already 
inherent to inquiry anyways, and since valuation is a resource for critically examining previously 
unquestioned valuings, it stands to reason that there should be a heavy focus on the processes by 
which valuation is made, and on methods of improving valuation.  
 Since the approach is experimental, it resists the idea of simple or absolute criteria or 
prescriptions for what constitutes good science. My argument isn’t to claim that we already have 
a good understanding of valuation, but that the focus of philosophy of science should be on the 
development of such models. Nor does my account hold that any use of value judgment is good. 
The mere use of judgment instead of direct valuing does not mean values can’t become 
problematic. As Kitcher notes, everything depends on the character of the judgment. However, 
with explicit focus on how successful valuation is made, including those cases where valuations, 
including both epistemic and social and ethical factors lead to successful science (including what 
“successful science” means in various contexts), we will be in a better position to recommend 
various kinds of values, to know their limitations, and to determine how they should function in 
scientific inquiries. That is, experimental value formation recognizes that scientists already 
 
 
263 
 
frequently make value judgments anyways, and so the role of the philosopher will be to better 
understand those valuations and to eventually be in a position to improve on them.  
 That is not to claim that such a focus will be free of problems. The fact that a general end 
has a demonstrated empirical track record does not mean that it’s usage will avoid the problem of 
improperly leading inquiry to an inadequate conclusion. Part of having a verifiable value judgment 
means that the determination of what values to use is also a matter of how they should be used in 
inquiry and in an inference. In other words, if an otherwise carefully considered and perhaps 
generally empirically grounded value is used such that it biases or skews inquiry in the wrong 
direction, then that judgment as an end-in-view is to that extent incorrect. Recall from Chapter 2 
Dewey’s claim that if the adoption of an end serves to cause further frustration, it is to that extent 
a bad end. A generally well established and maturely considered end like gender equality can also 
frustrate inquiry depending on how it is used. Thus, a key element of experimental value formation 
is that it is at heart an empirical project to finding out how to use different values in different 
contexts and inquiries rather than just what values are generally well supported. To that extent, 
there is a degree of finding out how to manage our usage of values. However, an important 
difference between this project and value management is that it does not rely on sweeping claims 
about how values should be used because they are values.  
 The experimental value formation approach makes no promise to eliminate problematic 
uses of values in science. For example, it is worth considering whether a scientist could make a 
careful and mature value judgment and yet still have values negatively affect science. For example, 
in the time of Galileo or Lysenko the social environment may have been such that valuation 
consistent with restrictive social values might be warranted if breaking with those values could be 
worse despite the threat to scientific integrity. The context of valuation may make any sort of 
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judgment problematic compared to other contexts. However, there are a few important things to 
keep in mind. First, like Lewis argues, something can have value in certain particular contexts 
despite not ultimately being objectively valuable. Second, with value being relative to context, my 
approach can recognize that if we can only make the best of a bad situation, our focus should be 
on ensuring the conditions needed to avoid similar situations in the future. In other words, it doesn’t 
guarantee that only ultimately good values will be made, but rather focusses on melioration of the 
conditions and situations in which valuation takes place to secure and stabilize goods recognized 
as necessary to secure scientific integrity. It thus insists on a broader focus than any one case.  
 My approach is also sober enough to recognize that there will not always be obvious 
answers. For example, in their work on environmental justice, Steel and Whyte discuss studies of 
commercial hazardous treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDFs), their placement, and 
their relationship to areas with large minority populations. The United Church of Christ’s Toxic 
Wastes and Race in the United States (UCC) study determined there was a significant disparity 
between communities that had TSDFs and contained higher minority residents and communities 
that did not have TSDFs and lower numbers of minority residents, thus concluding that race is a 
better predictor of location of a TSDF than other factors (Steel and Whyte 2012, 164).  
 On the other hand, a study funded by Waste Management Inc. by Douglas Anderton of the 
University of Massachusetts claimed that the average percentage of minority residents did not vary 
based on whether TSDFs were located in the community or not. The significant difference between 
the two studies was choice of control group. The UCC study included all zip code areas in the 
United States that did not host a facility, while the UMass study included only census tracks that 
did not host a facility and that were in a metropolitan statistical area that already contained a 
facility. When we consider the rationales for these decisions, there are obvious value concerns. 
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The UMass study “argued that census tracts are a better unit of analysis than zip codes because 
they are too large and thus could be subject to ‘aggregation errors’ and ‘ecological fallacies’” 
(2012, 165). It also argued that its control group was a better choice because the areas excluded 
were not likely candidates for TSDFs because they did not contain industries that would require 
them and thus it would be misleading to use such areas.  
 In this case, while the rhetoric focussed on what was more “justified,” the choice is clearly 
the result of a judgment of practice used to determine what facts were relevant as the facts of the 
case. The judgment regarding choice of control group was formed based on connecting certain 
means, in this case using census tracts and excluding rural areas, with anticipated ends, which were 
expected results that wouldn’t be misleading. The difference in findings was attributed to choice 
of control population and so “a key question is why one control group should be chosen rather 
than another” (2012, 166). Were either set of valuations warranted? Critics of the UMass study 
argued the choice of control group was wrongheaded since it bypasses the question of why certain 
metropolitan areas do not have TSDFs, the fact that some rural areas do have them, and that studies 
on environmental impacts demonstrated that larger areas can be affected by land use decisions and 
thus the zip code as a unit of analysis is a better option (2012, 166).  
 Critics argued that the studies were each addressing separate questions, again highlighting 
how evidence is determined by choices about formulation of the problem, and that such 
formulations are themselves products of valuation. However, it is not readily apparent that either 
study is fundamentally wrong headed or subject to unacceptable value usage.98 Despite being 
funded by industry, the UMass study’s use of values is not obviously driven by the desire to 
vindicate TSDF choices. It is possible that values operated in a more implicit/indirect way in 
                                                          
98 Steel and Whyte believe it is, although their reasoning for this doesn’t rely on much beyond conjecture that the 
UMass choices were determined by their funding.  
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choosing control groups, but the choice itself could be rationally defended. When it comes to 
choosing between the two options for control group, the warrant for either assertion may not be 
apparent without further studies and further considerations. They may both be adequate for the 
problem they address, and questions about whether to use their studies in further inquiries, such as 
in policy considerations, are themselves value judgments as we judge what facts are facts of that 
case. Determining if either approach is wrongheaded will only come with further experimentation 
with these approaches and improvements to valuation in cases of this nature.  
 When it comes to determining if values were playing an inappropriate role, Steel and 
Whyte are critical of Douglas as she suggest that how scientists respond to new evidence will 
determine inappropriateness. If, despite evidence pointing to one particular hypothesis, a scientist 
refuses to change their mind it may suggest direct value usage, or as I would describe it, dogmatic, 
habitual, or impulsive thinking rather than careful valuation. They argue that this is problematic 
since it can be ambiguous if a scientist has changed their mind. Anderton later insisted that he did 
not deny the existence of environmental injustice, but rather insisted that the mechanism to explain 
it emphasized economic and sociological factors other than overt racism. They believe it remains 
ambiguous whether this is a change in mind.  
 Instead they insist that to determine inappropriate value usage, we should focus on the 
quality of the research and make the motives of scientists a secondary consideration (2012, 177). 
However, I think Douglas is right in her suggestion that understanding value usage is going to be 
a matter of how scientists behave. Recall from Chapter 2 that valuing is affective-motor, and so if 
a valuing is driving behavior regardless of evidence, no evidence will change their mind. While it 
may not be obvious how values are influencing research, this may be because “no researchers […] 
would admit that nonepistemic values played a direct role in determining the outcomes of their 
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study” (2012, 173). We should remove the stigma about using values and be more upfront in our 
reasoning about judgments of practice and why we consider value judgments to be warranted. As 
noted, scrutinization of our values allows us to take responsibility for our consequences of our 
judgments, and one of the benefits of feminist science has been its self-conscious inclusion of 
values to subject them to empirical controls (Nelson 1990, 315). Valuations are inherent to 
research, and so we cannot separate the quality of the research with the motives of the scientists as 
they affect their judgments of practice. Being upfront means more opportunity for critical 
examination and experimentation with such judgments to determine how to improve them in the 
future. It also allows us to pay more attention to what distinguishes good mature valuation from 
bad valuation. Thus, while my approach doesn’t provide a definitive answer in this case study, it 
does suggest a method of improvement.  
5.3. Evaluation of account of Values in Laboratory Studies 
 As I argued in the previous chapter, if our thinking about how values should play a role in 
science is going to be justified, then our conception of values will have to be justified as well. This 
will be true for my experimental value formation approach. So how plausible is the account I have 
affirmed? To examine this question, I will consider laboratory study research. While it doesn’t 
definitively determine my approach is correct, it does point to a more complex approach to values 
used in concrete conditions in the laboratory than other accounts considered.  Karin Knorr Cetina 
undertook a yearlong laboratory study in 1976 at a federal research facility in California devoted 
to basic and applied research in chemical, physical, microbiological areas in which she observed 
scientists’ interactions with instruments and each other, using a “sensitive methodology” that 
interacted with and engaged scientists, conducted interviews, and collected lab protocols and paper 
drafts (Knorr Cetina 1981, 17). As I will argue, many of her findings suggest that scientists do 
engage in valuation in the ways I have described.  
 
 
268 
 
 First and foremost, Knorr Cetina confirms that scientific inquiry proceeds by, and largely 
consists of, a series of practical judgments. She reports that inquiry involves “chains of decisions 
and negotiations” through which outcomes are derived which she calls “selection.” Selections are 
required and are based on translations of further selections (1981, 5). For example, a scientist 
running a regression program may select a function using a criterion. Such criteria are translated 
second order selections. Similarly, a problem like reducing urban smog may be translated to a 
problem of reducing led in gas (1981, 5). Scientific products can be structured in terms of 
selectivity with each selection being challengeable because they involve the possibility of 
alternative selections. Important is Knorr Cetina’s conclusion that scientific facts are the result of 
decisions and thus “to study scientific investigation, then, is to study the process by which the 
respective selections are made” (1981, 7).  
According to Dewey valuing is a matter of selection and rejection, it indicates a preference 
for “this-rather-than-that” (Dewey 1922, 334). Valuation occurs in any experience where 
alternative possibilities enter. As Knorr Cetina characterizes selections, they are decisions 
amounting to a choice among other possible choices, or, this rather than that. As noted, all 
judgments have a reference to a course of action to be tried, and since as Knorr Cetina suggests 
that they are part of the practice by which science is fabricated, we have reason to believe that 
selections are valuative in nature. Once we acknowledge that selections are valuative, then her 
point is evidence for my account that scientists must constantly make judgments of practice.  
As she notes, “The formal features of reasoning show the scientist to be a practical 
reasoner” (1981, 22). However, her point is that such selections cannot be only found in partitioned 
sections; she argues, “since choices exist throughout the process of experimentation, there is no 
research core which, even in principle, is left unaffected by the circumstances of production” 
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(1981, 40). Decision criteria negotiated and affirmed at the proposal stage are often revised, 
ignored, or overthrown in the process of research (1981, 89). For example, a choice faced by a 
scientist between a filter and a centrifuge to eliminate chemical precipitation agents from a protein 
sample was translated into a problem of energy consumption and thus they chose based on energy 
consumption. However, when the filter did not work, the problem was again translated into a 
matter of practical availability, and they reverted to the centrifuge. However, such translations are 
contextual and often utilize an end-in-view.  
Even though selections as value choices or practical judgments are constantly made 
throughout inquiry and (as I will discuss) affect results, they are not apparent in the final work. 
The contextual selective nature of research is brushed over in a decontextualized finished paper 
(1981, 110). She notes that rarely are choices made explicit. Many “(perhaps even most) laboratory 
selections are made without their ever becoming a topic of discussion or reflection. Scientists speak 
of such selections as the ‘normal’, ‘natural’ or ‘logical’ thing to do” (1981, 89). This explains why 
we often don’t “see” the valuations that take place according to my micro model.  
While practical decisions are thus required, sometimes these claims will be a product of 
careful judgment and sometimes they won’t be. As she reports, selections are often not noticed 
until something interferes with the “natural” sequence of events or there is an anomaly. In such 
cases judgments will be made, but often selections can be made without conscious attention using 
habit. Thus, not all selections are a product of careful judgment. However, for this section I will 
focus on cases where judgment is conscious to consider how her account of what she calls control 
of decisions compares to my account of judgment. 
As mentioned, translations are often done to recharacterize a problem. Not only does this 
demonstrate that affirmations characterizing the problem are ultimately practical since they 
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determine further selections, but according to Knorr Cetina, selections are often made as a matter 
of a problem-solving adjustment (1981, 9). Determination of how research ought to be conducted 
is in view of a defined problem, where the problem itself is a matter of judgment. She notes, “the 
process of defining a problem penetrates into the very core of research through its implications 
and operationalizations […] we can say that a specific definition of a problem activates a set of 
presuppositions which determine a set of subsequent questions asked in the laboratory” (1981, 
88).99 Thus, how a problem is defined will determine what is relevant to a given inquiry in a given 
context, and thus can determine what operations are performed and what will count as relevant 
evidence for that inquiry, just as I described earlier.  
Knorr Cetina’s work does more than demonstrate that scientists do constantly make value 
judgments, it demonstrates that how they make such judgments is in line with what I have argued. 
One point that she repeatedly stresses is the fact that the selective (or valuative) nature of inquiry 
means that it is highly contextual. She explains, “the concrete research situation [is] the key to 
understanding how decisions in the laboratory are made […] laboratory selections are local, 
depending on the context of research” (1981, 33). She adds that decisions are made in a particular 
time and place and carried on by particular interests of agents rather than universally valid 
interpretations. Her account of a contextually specific reasoning process points to what she calls 
an “indexical logic” and thus like my own account of valuation is situation oriented. She explains, 
“The decision-translations through which the selections of the laboratory are produced refer us to 
the context in which they are embedded. The selective interpretations of the laboratory are 
situationally and contextually contingent” (1981, 16).  
                                                          
99 Notice the similarity to the Dewey quote in section 5.1.3.  
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The contextual nature of this valuation suggests, as might already be clear, that decisions 
are made as ends-in-view rather than based in universally applicable general ends. Ideas are 
contextualized and practically suggestive as they “take on the character of solutions” (1981, 57). 
These ideas display themselves as unrealized solutions holding the promise of success rather than 
being merely “conjectures about a phenomenon subjected to test” (1981, 57). Ideas are thus 
ultimately practical judgments since:  
The occurrence of an unrealized solution is important to scientists in that they take it as an 
organizing principle for subsequent actions and selections. It provides a principle for 
reevaluating previous priorities, and introduces new equivalences. It makes some decision 
translations more salient and downgrades others. (1981, 58)  
In other words, since the scientist is a practical reasoner, their work involves examining various 
ends-in-view as Knorr Cetina explains, “the major task of the laboratory is to rule out possibilities, 
manipulate the balance of choices so that one becomes more attractive than the others, and to up- 
or downgrade variables with respect to alternatives” (1981, 21). Decision criteria are invoked in 
circumstances with reference to a specific aspect of research with costs considered with respect to 
considerations like time, effort, money, etc. (1981, 40). Evaluation involves calculation of 
outcomes, weighing alternatives, and making selections according to expected consequences 
(1981, 75). This largely mirrors Dewey’s account of weighing competing ends-in-view. 
 The fact that scientists make selections and translate selections by considering ends-in-
view also suggests that scientists in many cases do not make a selection solely on the basis of it 
being valued. Choices are modified according to what is available. Often what is available in the 
lab will determine what tests are performed. One scientist explained that all things being equal he 
would have selected an entirely different series of tests from those available at the service lab 
(1981, 35). This suggests that scientists modify and evaluate their prizings according to the end-
in-view rather than pursuing something purely because it is wanted.  
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So far, Knorr Cetina’s work suggests that scientists evaluate ideas and selections relative 
to each other, with careful consideration of context and means. This confirms part of my account, 
but her work also echoes the idea of an ends-means continuum. As she explains: 
selections of previous work constitute a resource which enables scientific inquiry to 
proceed […] selections of previous investigations also affect subsequent selections by 
modalising the conditions of further decision-making. Thus, the products of science are not 
only decision-impregnated, they are also decision-impregnating, in the sense that they point 
to new problems and predispose their solutions. (1981, 6) 
As explained in Chapter 2, the idea is that ends and means cannot be sharply distinguished as ends 
become means to further ends. This suggests not only that valuation is contextual involving 
consideration of antecedent conditions and consequences and thus is not a terminal response, but 
also that long term effects constitute a basis by which to continually test a judgment.  
As mentioned, previous work can provide a resource for future work in the form of tools, 
methods, and interpretations, and part of this can be the establishment of generalized ends. 
However, this goes beyond just general values like simplicity or fruitfulness, but also experimental 
protocols as well. Selection of generalized ends can be fixed by education, social cooperation, 
training, and instruments (1981, 6). They can serve to overrule some local contingencies by 
“suggesting which decisions should be made in regard to the indeterminate choices that scientists 
confront” (1981, 40). Thus, in this respect they function as general values. 
Despite this, Knorr Cetina’s point about using these criteria for judgments in the form of 
generalized ends echoes my own. She explains, “decision criteria are invoked in specific 
circumstances, with reference to a specific aspect of the research” (1981, 40). In addition, 
generalized prescriptions are often rejected for anything other than routine analyses since they can 
be outdated and thus scientists often engage in methodological adaptations for new situations. 
Research laboratories will develop general ends according to a local interpretation of methodical 
rules; they develop a local know-how to determine how to make things work best in practice (1981, 
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37). She explains, “contrary to what we may think, criteria for ‘what matters’ and ‘what does not 
matter’ are neither fully defined nor standardized throughout the scientific community. Nor are the 
rules of official science exempted from local interpretation” (1981, 39).  
In other words, generalized ends are invoked in deliberation, practical judgment, and in 
selection, but as generalized ends they are suggestive, not determinate. Scientists do not make 
decisions based on broad value notions since there are local indeterminacies that require contextual 
valuation. Knorr Cetina notes, “while we must not diminish the importance of rules as instruments 
of social action, we cannot assume that they rule out the underlying indeterminacy and contingency 
of such action, nor the processes of negotiation which should have been determined by those rules” 
(1981, 46). Values as general ends are not a substitute for values as valuation, but rather inform 
ends-in-view which are then evaluated accordingly.  
Determination of successful valuation in the form of selections and their translations is not 
based on bringing about a pre-determined end, but rather is based on its ability to resolve the 
problem the scientist is facing. Knorr Cetina explains, “If there is a principle which seems to 
govern laboratory action, it is the scientists’ concern with making things ‘work’, which points to a 
principle of success rather than one of truth” (1981, 4). Here success is determined as a concrete 
and feasible goal rather than an abstract ideal. She further elaborates that “the selection of a 
substance, technique or composition formula ‘because it works’ refers us to the greater relevance 
of success than truth in actual laboratory works […] success, as one scientist said [is], ‘a different 
trip for every one of us’, [and] what works—and consequently what counts towards success—
depends […] upon routine translations arising from practical concerns at a research site” (1981, 
41). This is relevant to valuation because it echoes the points made in Chapter 3, namely that 
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verification of valuations (selection) is consistent with warranted assertability, a success term 
which is situational and contextual, referencing the resolution of a concrete problem.  
Further, according to Knorr Cetina, successful selections factor in certain criteria into the 
end-in-view. She explains, “Scientists constantly relate their decisions and selections to the 
expected response of specific members of the community of ‘validators’, or to the dictates of the 
journal in which they wish to publish” (1981, 7). They very much have in mind a view towards 
potential criticism of their work from enemies and allies within the field and this informs their 
concept of success. Scientist’s value the imposition of one’s own work as a resource to be used in 
the subsequent work of others, and thus it must be perceived as a resource in the ongoing research 
of others. Thus, a scientist in careful evaluation will not impose wants and values into their work 
without regard to the consequences for inquiry, since idiosyncratic selections mean that research 
is less likely to be used by others or is likely to encounter criticism. Therefore, prizings are more 
likely to be appraised to obtain success.  
Scientists constantly must make practical judgments in order to conduct inquiry effectively, 
but do these judgments affect the conclusions reached? After all, no one would deny that scientists 
must make practical judgements at certain stages, but it doesn’t follow that they can or should 
determine outcome. According to Knorr Cetina, they do. Not only do we know that scientists make 
selections as ends-in-view, in that they anticipate what the results should be, but inquiry cannot be 
cleanly divided into stages. She explains, “research in the natural and technological sciences 
cannot be partitioned into one section which is open to the situationally contingent selections and 
contextual influences […] and another which consists of the internal, objective and standardised 
execution of the necessary enquiry” (1981, 40).  
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To recap what Knorr Cetina’s work tells us, scientists are practical reasoners who 
constantly make evaluative practical judgments in the form of selections and translations of 
selections. This echoes my account that science is a process of making complicated value 
judgments. Scientists’ selections are determined since a problem-solving adjustment and often 
definition of the problem itself will be practical and determine what counts as relevant evidence 
for a resolution. Selection or valuation takes place by considering competing ends-in-view and the 
means that will affect the ends valued. They think along an ends-means continuum. Scientists do 
not take general ends as being deterministic or as a value judgment in themselves but are 
considered to be relevant or useful to the situation and are often modified in a given context. We 
have also learned that validation of such judgments is not determined according to abstract 
concepts, but in concrete terms of success, echoing the notion of warranted assertability. Finally, 
these selections are buried or not noticed despite being extremely common.  
All of this echoes my account of values and suggests that it may apply to actual scientific 
practice. Obviously, Knorr Cetina’s observations may not be generalizable across all of scientific 
practice nor do all selections involve careful valuation, but they do suggest that my account is at 
least plausible in that when we consider the concrete conditions of deciding what to do, scientists 
will consider things in complex and concrete ways rather than focusing solely on what they happen 
to want or value, or making decisions according to a pre-determined end contained in a generalized 
value concept, whether it be a “cognitive value” or in prescribed protocols and procedures. If 
values are not pre-determined as desires or as ends-in-themselves but are rather developed and 
shaped within inquiry itself as a matter of practice, then this suggests that the best approach to 
considering how values should be used in science would be to focus on how values are formed 
within inquiry, and how to improve that process to mitigate potential problems. Thus, the account 
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of valuation I have affirmed can be considered a reasonable approximation of how values are 
employed in science and thus values are more complex and nuanced than other accounts 
considered tend to characterize them.  
5.4. Conclusion 
This dissertation’s central goal was to focus on how conceptions of value can affect the values in 
science debate and to develop a plausible account of value by which to evaluate the state of the 
debate regarding values in science. The experimental value formation approach is the culmination 
of this effort. It is not supposed to be an alternative normative account in addition to the value 
management accounts from the previous chapter, but rather recommends a fundamental shift in 
approach to thinking about this debate. This is because once we consider the ways in which values 
can be manifested and formed, many of the presuppositions about the nature of values, evidence, 
scientific inquiry, and the social and ethical factors involved in each are reconstructed. Thus, the 
problems these accounts respond to dissolve in favor of new problems. There is a shift away from 
thinking that values can be problematic for science and thus how can we mitigate them and towards 
the idea that scientific judgments can be complex and problematic and how can we improve them? 
 The shift in focus that I recommend does not aim at an all in one set of prescriptions to 
determine what counts as good or rational science, nor does it pretend to have perfect knowledge 
of what counts as good reasoning when it comes to valuation and its place in science. But this is 
just my point; valuation is an underappreciated aspect of scientific inquiry, and if we want to 
improve the way values integrate into science, we need to make the process of valuation more 
explicit and to develop logical accounts in the service if its melioration. Nelson suggests that part 
of our reluctance to incorporate values is because of a lack of trust in ourselves (Nelson 1990, 
308). If this is so, building trust will be partially a matter of building trust in a method of critical 
evaluation. Thus, the dissertation represents the beginning of a new philosophical program for 
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thinking about values in science rather than being the final word on the subject. Further 
development of such an approach isn’t discussed, not only because it is outside of the scope of this 
dissertation, but also because the real experimental work on valuation, how to improve it, and how 
it can and should function in science still needs to be done. Thus, my work is not so much a final 
judgment, but rather a proposition suggesting the formulation of a problem for further inquiry.  
 For example, consider a case of a scientist who, facing dwindling resources, is tempted to 
fabricate data because they may be practically certain of what the data may look like anyways, and 
with the laboratory running out of funds and the need for the data to support graduate students, 
and the fact that it is very unlikely they would get caught, it might seem like a viable value 
judgment to proceed with fabrication. It may be possible that within this context that such a 
judgment has warrant. However, if we recall Lewis’ discussion of values-in-fact, value predication 
can vary based on context and circumstances. A certain outcome can be genuinely valuable but 
objectively bad. My proposal does not offer a solution, but it does offer new avenues for thinking 
about the relative value of potential judgments, and it offers a new way to examine problems like 
this since we may now try to determine what standard of value-in-fact predication should be 
acceptable in science and under what contexts we may seek different relative standards of value. 
 Or another avenue for further study might be proposed given that value judgments are an 
inherent part of inquiry and given that social and moral elements may be part of such judgments, 
everything will depend on the quality of the judgment and the person making it. One possible key 
to maintaining objectivity may be by fostering a scientific attitude (as briefly discussed in Chapter 
1) in our patterns of judgment (Dea and Silk, forthcoming). Thus, perhaps another avenue of 
inquiry for philosophers of science will be how to instill and improve such attitudes.   
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 As I have discussed, the nature of what values are does affect the debate in philosophy of 
science about what place they have in science; this is true of historical debates over the value-free 
ideal and it is true of the modern-day debate. What characterizes the modern-day debate is a series 
of normative accounts that aim at value management. That is, by relying on a conception of what 
values mean by their inherent nature it is suggested that they represent a problem for science which 
requires managing. I have argued this is a problematic approach by focusing on the nature of 
valuation. When we consider these approaches and how values are characterized we find no 
general agreement on what values even are, let alone the potential logical functions they are 
capable of performing. What some philosophers will identify as values will not be recognized as 
values by other philosophers. By no means is it clear that discussions are on the same page when 
discussing how values should be used. Thus, greater precision is needed in value discussion. 
As I have argued, values are incredibly complex and multi-faceted, taking the form of 
valuing, valuation, and generalized ends. Whereas much of discussion of values tends to view 
them as terminal responses, which are often manifested as mere desiring or liking on the one hand, 
or as the application of fixed ends having their own inherent value on the other, I have considered 
several accounts that urge that we look to the concrete conditions in which values are formed and 
utilized. When we do this, we find that values are formed based on their suitability to the case at 
hand and in response to needs felt. Because of this they are capable of being judged according to 
their adequacy for resolving the problems they are considered for. Inquiry itself is a sequence of 
valuations taking the form of judgments of practice, and these value judgments are verified every 
time we deem some method, some approach, or some conception well suited to its intended 
purpose for resolving a problem. Because values are capable of being verified, we have a clear 
basis to address how values are used in science.  
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Values that are not verified or are judged to be wrong are values that should not be used in 
science. It isn’t difficult, given that scientific inquiry inherently involves intelligent adaptation of 
concepts to evidence, to see that relying on dogma, impulse, or habit without intelligent criticism 
are bad judgments and this goes a long way to resolving many of the problems found to present 
themselves when values are used in science. This does not resolve all potential problems regarding 
how values are used. However, by shifting our focus to valuation, we may be in a better position 
to investigate why value judgments go wrong rather than looking at the problem as why values 
can lead to bad science. The former I believe is an ultimately more fruitful question.  
For philosophers, the shift towards an experimental value formation approach will involve 
the further development of the logic of valuation itself. The model of judgments of practice 
discussed in Chapter 3 may be the beginning of such an effort. For example, understanding that 
there is a difference between a value judgment and a generalized value puts us in a better position 
to be able to recognize the difference between utilizing and affirming a general value to aid as a 
part of a much larger judgment and it inappropriately being a judgment by-itself. It also allows us 
to pay more attention to the role that an invoked value is playing in a logical judgment about what 
to do, and thus it not only allow us to make more careful and refined distinctions between values 
based on the roles that they are playing, but also to experiment with what values are most effective 
in certain roles at resolving problematic issues that are part of inquiry. So, philosophically the 
approach suggested in this dissertation offers avenues for new discussion and research. 
In the long run, however, the discussion of values and their interrelation with facts in 
inquiry may mean the abandonment of language concerning factual and value judgments 
altogether. As discussed in Chapter 3, Lepley suggests that factual and valuative judgments are 
different modes of expressing the same thing, even suggesting that any factual or valuative 
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formulation can be translated into each other. Perhaps this might mean abandoning any meaningful 
distinction between the two in favor of examining scientific inquiry as a series of warranted 
assertions. More research would need to be done, but if it is true, then this would require a major 
rethink of the values in science debate.  
Such a shift would also mean that philosophers and scientists have a role to play in terms 
of our public discussions of values and science. On the one hand there is a danger that being more 
open and upfront about value usage may lead to dismissal and a breakdown of trust that the public 
may have in scientific publications and policy advice. This issue can be more compounded if 
scientists are perceived to be advocating for particular issues or changes to public policy. As 
previously mentioned, if trust in science breaks down because it is more apparent that value 
judgments are being made, this can largely be attributed to a lack of trust in values and value 
judgments. Philosophers bare some of the burden for creating this lack of trust in values, and 
perhaps they now have a responsibility in helping to build that trust. In the short term this can be 
done by articulating more specific and clear ways that values can be appropriately used, by offering 
clear accounts of logical fallacies associated with value usage, by providing a taxonomy that can 
allow for the public at large to identify different kinds of values and their different functions, and 
by explaining how verifiable practical decision making are a common part of our daily lives and 
are thus less of a menace than previously thought.  
Philosophers of science can also play a role by discussing and communicating clearly with 
scientists themselves so that the scientific community feels more comfortable about being upfront 
about valuative reasoning and providing a framework by which they can understand when it may 
be appropriate to advocate for causes such as in cases of climate change, and how they can 
articulate why their advocacy does not tarnish the integrity of their studies. Sometimes this may 
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mean that in order to secure public trust, the openness of value discussion may have to be less 
prominent, and sometimes it may involve being more upfront, noting and experimenting with what 
contexts public reaction may be positive or negative, and when it may undermine ultimate aims. It 
may also involve figuring out how democratic and public values can be integrated into science and 
how this can be translated into ends-in-view for particular scientists to consider.  
Philosophers will also especially need to articulate clearly why certain value judgments are 
warranted and others are not. Doing so may aid in reducing the cynicism that might arise if it is 
revealed that factual claims in science are also value judgments and so one may feel they are 
therefore entitled to instead assert whatever claims are consistent with their ideologies and to 
dismiss alternatives as “fake news.” Being able to trace the valuative reasoning, to defend and 
justify it according to evidence tells us that while values are a part of what makes up facts, facts 
are also what make up values and so we can trust in the process and not fall back into epistemic 
anarchy. And, in fact certain values may simply be inappropriate in discussion of scientific 
knowledge and this can be justified. In the long run, the hope we may have is that progress in 
articulating the basis of mature value judgments and their melioration may spill over into the 
habitual thinking and mindset of the public such that they can trust in value judgments and are less 
inclined to jump to the conclusion that if values are being used, science must not be as reliable.  
For now, however, so long as we devote more attention to how value judgments are formed, 
and so long as we are more explicit about our considerations and valuations and weighing of 
potential ends-in-view, we open the door to more opportunities for criticism and analysis of value 
judgments that are already inherent to science anyway. Our aim should be the development of 
models of value judgment built on what has proved successful. With this in place, we will find that 
the key to maintaining the integrity of science will involve more valuations taking place, with 
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greater care, consideration, and testing. Further development and refinement of how values are 
formed within science is the first step towards articulating how to maintain the integrity of science, 
but it first requires that greater priority be given to theorizing about valuation.  
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